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INTRODUCTION 
 
Western strategies of rapprochement with the Communist bloc during the Cold War, 
often referred to as détente, permeated diplomatic discourse from the 1960s through the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thereafter, the United States became the sole remaining 
superpower amidst multiple, if considerably weaker regional power centers throughout 
the world. Former Cold War strategies such as détente now bear little significance to the 
emerging new world order. 
Yet one often-overlooked side effect of the détente era was the permanent 
alteration of relationships among allies of the Western Bloc. Probably no European 
country was more deeply affected by the shift in U.S. policy than the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG, West Germany). Ever since the formation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1949, West German foreign policy had relied on the military strength of the 
United States to contain the Soviet Union. West Germanys first chancellor, Konrad 
Adenauer, argued that ties with the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) were designed to bring about a position of strengthpolitical, military, and 
economic superioritywhich would eventually allow for a reunified, democratic 
Germany. However, with the prospect of a superpower détente in the 1960s and an 
increasingly apparent U.S. acceptance of the status quo in Europe, Adenauers strategy of 
forcing the Soviet Union to concede to German reunification seemed flawed. 
Furthermore, declining U.S. interest in Europe meant, for West Germans, less security 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. When, in the 1960s, the American military and political 
strength seemed to increasingly weaken and German reunification less and less likely, a 
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fundamental shift in German foreign policy occurred. Rather than being subservient to 
American diplomatic initiatives, West Germany, under the auspices of Foreign Minister 
and later Chancellor Willy Brandt, choose to implement its own détente with the 
Communist bloc in pursuit of German national interests. 
German assertiveness, however, remained covered under the rhetoric of German-
American solidarity. Diplomatic necessity demanded that any crisis between such close 
allies remain below the surface. This concealed crisis leads to one of the central 
conclusions of this work: that Brandts Ostpolitik was the first truly independent, if not 
clashing, foreign policy for the new German republic vis-à-vis the United States. 
 The historiography of such a recent topic must nevertheless be viewed in its 
historical context. I have identified three trends in the historiography on Ostpolitik; the 
1970s, the 1980s, and the postCold War literature. The 1970s are marked by great 
enthusiasm for Brandt and Ostpolitik. Clearly enthralled by the aura of charismatic and 
visionary Brandt, works such as William Griffiths The Ostpolitik of the Federal 
Republic of Germany see Brandts policies as a huge success story. To these writers, 
Brandt was seen as the German Abraham Lincoln, who implemented this visionary, long-
term policy from an inferior position. Forced to act by the lack of leadership and 
reliability on the part of the U.S., he single-handedly reconciled not only the leftist and 
Atlanticist wings in the working-class Social Democratic Party (SPD) but also pushed for 
a proper amount of West European integration, negotiated treaties in which everybody 
won, and led the West in implementing détente with the Soviet Union.1 Clearly, the 
popularity of Nixon in the wake of Watergate was at an all-time low while German 
                                                
1 William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), 
176-185. 
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détente had succeeded not only in increasing normalization between the two German 
states but also seemed to have curtailed Soviet aggression. Germans in the 1970s believed 
this optimal policy could neither be discredited by the Communist coup detat in 
Angola (which they blamed on the inherent instability of the underdeveloped world), 
nor the interGerman border conflicts (which were caused by Hans-Dietrich Genschers 
attempts to gain a higher profile for his party, the Free Democraic Party (FDP).2 The 
ingenuity of Ostpolitik is also portrayed in Richard Löwenthals Vom kalten Krieg zur 
Ostpolitik.3 Here, Brandts policies are depicted as a necessary and overdue de-escalation 
of global conflict. More reasonable analyses, such as Peter Merkls essay, The German 
Janus, do not glorify Brandt, but nevertheless see his policies as spearheading a new era 
of Western integration.4 
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Ronald Reagans dubbing of the 
Soviet Union as the evil empire, and the re-escalation of conflict in the 1980s caused a 
considerable shift in the debate surrounding Ostpolitik. Authors reconsidered the 
portrayal of Brandt as the lonely forerunner of a new era. Instead, scholars began to 
emphasize the parallels between Ostpolitik and American détente, noting that Nixon 
supported Brandt, and that Ostpolitik was just another stage of détente led by a visionary 
Brandt, albeit under American pressure. Here, the impact of Kissingers memoirs, 
published in 1979 and 1982, cannot be underestimated.5 His detailed accounts, whether 
totally accurate or not, portray Kissinger (and Nixon) in charge of détente, controlling
                                                
2 Griffith, 228-234. 
3 Richard Löwenthal, Vom kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974). 
4 Peter H. Merkl, The German Janus: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik, Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 
4 (Winter 19741975): 803-824. 
5 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979); idem, Years of 
Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982). 
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more or lessall their allies political moves. In Détente and Confrontation, Raymond 
Garthoff contradicts this Kissingercentric portrayal by arguing that Nixon and Kissinger 
implemented détente in an attempt to maintain western unity in the context of German 
Ostpolik.6 Either way, the Kissinger memoirs placed agency back into the White House. 
Stephen Ambroses biography of Nixon, for example, portrays the president as a 
pragmatic leader who embraced détente because it could not be stopped.7 Helga 
Haftendorn, in Sicherheit und Stabilität, maintains that the Nixon/Kissinger and Brandt 
policies complemented each other and in Neue Ostpolitik Peter Bender links Ostpolitik 
and détente to such an extent that he suggests Kissinger envied Brandts successes in 
formalizing détente with the East.8 These scholars focused on analyzing Germanys 
relationship with Eastern Europe with no access to inside information from the Nixon 
White House and simply worked under the accepted paradigm that Germanys position 
within the Western alliance remained constant. In doing so they have overlooked how 
Ostpolitik fundamentally altered Germanys status within, and relationship with, the 
Western alliance. 
Scholars of the postCold War period, then, fall into two basic categories. They 
either promote a picture of Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik that is very much shaped by his 
political comeback as a man of peace and vision or one that is critical, portraying him as 
someone who effectively compromised his democratic mainstream position for a leftist 
                                                
6 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 109. 
7 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon, vol 2, The Triumph of a Politician, 19621972 (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1989), 387. 
8 Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Stabilität: Außenbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik zwischen Ölkrise und 
Nato-Doppelbeschluß (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986), 134; Peter Bender, Neue 
Ostpolitik: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986), 
183-184. 
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panEuropean vision. Accordingly, Peter Merseburger, a representative of the former 
group, in his recent biography of Brandt sees the German leader in unwavering and full 
support of U.S. policies.9 The comprehensive work by Wolfgang Schmidt, Kalter Krieg, 
Koexistenz und kleine Schritte, must also be mentioned in this category, as Schmidt sees 
Brandts successful Ostpolitik already rooted in his vision of a united Europe, 
expressed in exile in Norway.10 Timothy Garton Ashs In Europes Name: Germany and 
the Divided Continent, on the other hand, even doubts that the Berlin crisis of 1961 led to 
a disillusionment with the United States. Rather, he believes Brandt, a leftist radical in 
search of a united Europe, was thwarted in his objective more by the Communists than by 
the Western powers with the Berlin crisis of 1961.11 
These differences in interpretation may in part arise from the fact that the 
historiography on the decision-making process within the Nixon administration has been 
rather contradictory. One opinion holds that Nixon had surrendered his foreign policy to 
Kissinger, who in turn conducted American foreign policy focusing on pragmatic power 
politics rather than cold war ideology. This view, advanced by William Burr and Mary E. 
Sarotte, interprets US-Soviet détente much like Ostpolitiki.e. as a pragmatic policy 
with few ideological conflicts. 12  
A more frequently cited view is the complementary nature of Nixon and 
Kissinger, in which the introverted, withdrawn, and aloof Nixon set foreign policy on a 
                                                
9 Peter Merseburger, Willy Brandt 19131992: Visionär und Realist (Stuttgart, München: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 2002), 371-372. 
10 Wolfgang Schmidt, Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte: Willy Brandt und die 
Deutschlandpolitik 19481963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001). 
11 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europes Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random 
House, 1993). 
12 William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New 
York: New Press, 1999), 7-9; Mary E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and 
Ostpolitik, 19691973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
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general level and let the extroverted, personable, and detail-minded Kissinger fine-tune 
the workings of American foreign policy within his masters framework.13 
According to a revisionist interpretation by Joan Hoff, Nixon and Kissinger were 
both very engaged in concrete foreign policy decisions, with their policymaking process 
so intertwined that she refers to it as Nixinger diplomacy. She attributes a certain 
wisdom and consistency to Nixons foreign policy approach but sees this watered-down 
by his interaction with an opportunistic and pessimistic Kissinger who was still mired in 
the foreign policy concepts of the 1950s and 1960s. Feeding each others obsession with 
secrecy and personalized executive control brought out the worst in both statesmen and 
ultimately led to a failed foreign policy.14 It is important to note that the latter two 
approaches to U.S. foreign policy beg the question of how much of Nixons ideology 
filtered into American policies of détente and how much those policies therefore differed 
from Brandts more pragmatic approach. 
Results of this study do not only have implications for German-American 
relations, they enrich the traditionalist/revisionist debate on American foreign policy. 
Revisionist critics of American foreign policy, such as Joyce and Gabriel Kolkos, have 
seen American foreign policy as a means to expand American capitalism. To protect U.S. 
economic interests, the United States allied itself with conservative parties, exerted 
influence on the advancement of U.S. national interests, and undermined the development 
of Socialism.15 
                                                
13 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 141; Richard C. 
Thornton, Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon 
House Publishers, 2001), 146. 
14 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 149-157. 
15 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 19451954 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 709-713. 
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Even critics of American foreign policy with less of a Marxist approach to 
history, such as George F. Kennan, have voiced concern about the unwillingness of the 
United States to accept the interests of other states that were at odds with her own.  As 
Kennan argues, 
behind all this, of course, lies the American assumption that the things to which other peoples in 
this world are apt to contend are for the most part neither credible nor important and might justly 
be expected to take second place behind the desirability of an orderly world.16 
 
The ascension of Willy Brandt into the foreign ministry in 1966 and as chancellor in 
1969, therefore, marks a crucial time in American foreign relations. With Brandts 
campaign promise to focus on German reunification, the United States and Germany not 
only faced conflicts over ideology and the empowerment of the working class, but also a 
conflict involving the German foreign policy agenda, which ran contrary to American 
interest in the orderly world of the status quo. 
Recent scholarship, which makes heavy use of declassified documents, also 
suggests a more critical view of Brandts policies. One example is William Grays 
analysis of the Hallstein Doctrine, which revises some of the general assumptions on the 
priorities of the Communist governments. He postulates that the Hallstein Doctrine was 
an effective tool for West Germany. Brandt, however, abandoned this policy when he 
came into office for the sake of a friendship with the East, thus making the price he had 
to pay to implement his policies of goodwill much higher than previously thought.17 
Sarotte also illuminates the Soviet Unions need to achieve a status quo in Europe in 
order to focus on confronting the Chinese. In addition, she argues that both superpowers, 
but especially the Soviet Union, mistrusted their respective German allies for fear of re-
                                                
16 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 83. 
17 William Glenn Gray. Germanys Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 
(Raleigh, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
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igniting German nationalism and destabilizing the status quo of. The Czechoslovakian 
uprising and the interGerman summit meeting in Erfurt demonstrated the volatility of 
Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and highlighted the Soviet search for any policies that 
stabilized the status quo. She implicitly questions whether Brandt did not implement 
political and economic goodwill gestures the Soviets had every interest of pursuing 
anyway.18 Jeremi Suri, in Power and Protest, discredits Brandt as a visionary by 
suggesting that Brandt and other leaders were driven to détente by a fear of domestic 
social upheaval. In order to placate popular discontent several national leaders, including 
Brandt and Nixon, engaged in a show of foreign policy détente and thereby managed to 
maintain a conservative order domestically. 
Sarottes assertion that the U.S. was somewhat concerned about the reemergence 
of German nationalism brings up another central point of debate, namely the question of 
how strong the German-American alliance really was. Here, the conventional wisdom, as 
expressed by Thomas A. Schwartz, is that the German-American alliance is an American 
foreign-policy success story par excellence.19 This conflicts with Wolfram Hanrieder, 
who sees German-American interests diverging in the 1970s as a result of structural 
changes in which their dissimilar socioeconomic conventions inevitably inclined them 
toward divergent political values, in domestic policy as well as in foreign policy. More 
importantly, when American economic and military influence appeared to wane, a 
deeply rooted cultural European arrogance toward the United States [] reemerged and 
                                                
18 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
19 Thomas A. Schwartz, The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, 
and the Legacy of the Cold War, Diplomatic History 19, no. 4, (1995): 549-568. 
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led to a somewhat disdainful European attitude toward what it perceived as Americas 
economic, political, and cultural inferiority.20 
On the economic side, one of the few works that deals extensively with the 
German trade with the East is Angela Stents From Embargo to Ostpolitik, in which she 
attests to the impetus that Willy Brandts policies provided for West Germanys trade 
with the East. Unfortunately, Stent completely ignores the effects eastern trade had on 
German-American relations and hints only once that the U.S. might have pushed the 
Soviet Union to seek a rapprochement with West Germany.21 Alan Dobson advances this 
point in US Economic Statecraft for Survival, 19331991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes, and 
Economic Warfare, by arguing that the Nixon administration was uncertain whether 
sanctions worked in the absence of hard economic data. In his analysis, sanctions 
therefore became a political issue in which the U.S. could not simply surrender.22 
Methodologically, writing a historical analysis of the 1970s is difficult in many 
ways. Because the history so recent, it is difficult to get the big picture when 
governmental records are still classified (be it intelligence estimates or nuclear power 
negotiations). Moreover, enthusiasm or opposition to the policies from contemporaneous 
political figures still influence the historiography, and statesmen still alive from that 
period, intentionally or unintentionally, forget their former impressions and actions. All 
this leads to the fundamental problem of a teleological interpretation of the period, which 
most people can still remember and of which the majority is convinced that they have an 
                                                
20 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 371. 
21 Angela E. Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: the Political Economy of West-German-Soviet Relations, 
1955-1980 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
22 Alan P. Dobson, US Economic Statecraft For Survival, 1933-1991: of Sanctions, Embargoes, and 
Economic Warfare (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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accurate, unbiased view, when it is in fact fundamentally shaped by the events that 
happened since then. 
This is certainly the case with Ostpolitik. Egon Bahr, Brandts assistant, portrayed 
Ostpolitik as the political process that culminated in the fall of the Berlin wall; opinions 
such as his are teleological arguments that fundamentally shaped the assessment of 
Ostpolitik as a highly successful policy. Public excitement over the possibility that 
Brandts Ostpolitik offered a thaw in the cold war has translated into unquestioned 
acceptance of this assessment. 
To gain a more realistic understanding of Ostpolitik, it is critically important to 
remember the West German conviction that the Soviet Union would eventually be the 
stronger power, the ideological motivations of the statesmen, the relative economic 
weakness of the U.S. economy, a perceived weakness of the untrained U.S. military 
forces stationed in Germany, and, in particular, the ongoing fighting in Vietnam. Perhaps 
more important than the actual military strength, in the context of the Mansfield 
amendment pending in the U.S. Congress, was the perception that the U.S. lacked the 
commitment necessary to fulfill its military commitments overseas. 
Rather than again simply looking at the diplomatic aspects of Ostpolitik, this 
analysis also takes economic factors and the political culture of the time into account. By 
recognizing the significant role trade played in bringing about Ostpolitik, as well as 
shaping the political culture of Germany, I offer a revisionist interpretation of Ostpolitik 
that sees compatibilities with American détente only on a superficial level. My argument 
is that the economic ties Willy Brandt initiated between the FRG and the Soviet Union in 
order to facilitate Ostpolitik improved the perceptions of the Soviet Union not just with 
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West German industry but with the West German public as a whole. The Nixon 
administration, on the other hand, failed to recognize the paramount importance of trade 
and thus failed to limit the effects of Brandts Osthandel or ensure sufficient domestic 
support for a similar degree of engagement with the Soviets. Consequently, Nixon was 
not able to assert strong leadership in the pursuit of détente, leaving NATO members on 
the two sides of the Atlantic with profoundly differing visions and interests. These 
differences continue to underlie the conflicts of today. 
To analyze the differing approaches to rapprochement with the Soviet Union, this 
project will focus on the attitudes and actions of German chancellor Willy Brandt, his 
American counterpart, President Richard Nixon, as well as their closest advisors, Egon 
Bahr and Henry Kissinger. Since both national leaders tended to rely heavily on their 
respective advisor in key diplomatic negotiations with little input from their own foreign 
offices, focusing on these four statesmen will provide an accurate account of motivations 
and developments as they pertain to the topic. The crucial timeframe for this study will be 
the years 1969 through 1974, when both Nixon and Brandt were in leadership positions 
and exerted enough influence to implement the policies they chose. While the idea of 
détente had already borne some fruit in the early 1960s with a direct Washington-
Moscow line of communication and limitations on nuclear weapons research, the most 
significant advancements of détente with regard to Germanysuch as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Moscow Treaties, SALT I and II, and the Berlin Accords
went into effect during the years 19691974. Yet to outline both ideological changes and 
continuity in Brandts stance toward the United States and illustrate trends in Germanys 
foreign trade policies, it also seems imperative to include a brief examination of the years 
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1957 through 1968. In addition, my examination of President Nixon personal attitudes 
toward West Germany from his vice presidency in 1953 until his resignation in 1974 will 
play a role. 
The sources covered in this work range from diplomatic correspondence and 
internal memos to newspaper coverage, voice recordings, Kissinger TELCONS, and the 
published reflections of the individual actors, where available. Trade statistics and 
opinion polls allowed me to gage the mood of the time. While this research is primarily 
an analysis of German-American relations, Soviet motivation and intentions played a key 
role in influencing transatlantic relations. Herein lays possibly the greatest strength and 
weakness of this project. Few works have analyzed German-American relations as part of 
a triangular relationship with the Soviet Union. Even fewer have included economic 
diplomacy as a central aspect of their research. Yet my research illustrates how vital these 
interrelated aspects are. 
Involving the Soviet Union in a diplomatic analysis of the 1970s, however, poses 
difficulties. Few well-researched studies on the Brezhnev years have been written since 
the 1980s. While the conclusions on Soviet foreign policy work well with my findings, 
more research on primary sources would go a long way to substantiate some of the 
historiographys claims. This oversight is in large part methodological. In the rush to 
shed light on the most contentious mysteries of Soviet policy thanks to the flood of new 
material, scholars have understandably focused upon a highly circumscribed range of 
themes and sources. The result has been a fixation on crisis during the Stalin, 
Khrushchev, and Gorbachev years, as well as a heavy reliance upon the comments of a 
few key figures, negotiations among the great powers, and the archival documentation of 
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these encounters. Moreover, while only a few works have sought to explain Soviet 
foreign policy in the 1970s, still fewer have placed policymaking in a larger institutional 
context. With the Soviet archives inaccessible for the time being, I tried to be cautious 
about sweeping generalizations on Soviet policy and limited myself to the most obvious 
of conclusions. 
Regarding German-American relations, I tried to follow the chronological order 
whenever possible. At times, though, parallel developments of economic and political 
aspects did not allow me to develop my argument coherently without somewhat breaking 
the chronological order. 
Lastly, despite William A. Williams Schools dedication to the primacy of 
economic interests in U.S. foreign relations, I found the secondary literature scarce, at 
best, and the archivists enthused about me being one of a handful of scholars to use 
their material within the last ten years. The absence of a detailed historiography with 
which to argue proved more difficult, not less, and I trust that, despite the absence of 
standard works, I was still able to place it in the broader framework of historical 
discussion. 
 Throughout this work I had to resist the temptation to extrapolate from current 
findings about the effectiveness of Ostpolitik or détente during the latter half of the 
1970s. In my opinion neither the liberal viewthat Ostpolitik through the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) undermined the Communist system and thus 
aided in its demise, nor the conservative viewthat Ostpolitik provided the Soviet Union 
with the economic capability to sustain its system longer than otherwise possible, can be 
substantiated from the sources currently available. Consequently, I thought it sensible to 
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end my analysis with the fall of Brandt and Nixon from power and not continue to trace 
the effect of their policies to the CSCE or the Marxist revolution in Angola.   
In structuring my project, I have divided the events into four chapters. I explore 
the underpinnings of Ostpolitik and U.S. détente in chapter one. The conclusion here is 
that Ostpolitik was different from U.S. détente efforts in ideology, ambition, and strategy. 
While a superpower détente would accept and even strengthen the status quo as well as 
keep the ideological confrontation alive, Ostpolitik ultimately sought to lessen ideological 
conflict, as well as eliminate superpower confrontation and thus a considerable amount of 
superpower influence. Only through a united Europe, contained in a bubble that isolated 
it from superpower confrontation, could a peaceful coexistence be created that would 
eventually allow for German reunification. 
With Ostpolitik entailing a deliberate attempt to free West Germany from 
American hegemony by establishing closer ties with East European regimes, I portray 
Willy Brandt less as a visionary who managed to succeed through appeals to peace and a 
united Europe, but more as a pragmatic leader who, disillusioned with American tutelage, 
saw an independent West German foreign policy as a necessary means of achieve 
German reunification. His complementary Westbindung, which he has been widely 
applauded for, followed a strengthening of ties with Western Europe, for the ultimate 
purpose of uniting Europe against superpower conflict. Ultimately, this argument rests on 
the premise that in a bipolar world, the FRG was unable to draw closer to the Soviet 
Union without moving further away from the United States. 
U.S. détente, on the other hand, much more resembled Soviet ambitions. While 
both President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pursued a policy of nuclear de-
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escalation for safety as well as fiscal sanity, they remained entrenched in their Cold War 
ideology. Defeating the opposing system remained the ultimate goal, though it now 
would be done through peaceful means. The greatest challenge for both superpowers was 
to engage in a normalization of relations without losing the strategic edge or, for the 
Soviets, their raisons dêtre for being in Central Europe. 
Chapter two covers the implementation of respective détente policies by both 
statesmen during 1969 and the spring of 1970. It discusses Nixons attempts to have his 
West European allies assume more geopolitical responsibilities by giving them more 
power, despite Europes unwillingness to be involved in quagmires such as Vietnam. It 
also covers Brandts initial hundred days in office, during which hecontrary to 
American beliefssuccessfully established a dialogue with the East. Key aspects of this 
chapter are the first gas pipeline deal and the interGerman summit meeting at Erfurt. 
Chapter three analyzes superpower reactions to Brandts overtures, the continued 
successes of Ostpolitik through the summer of 1972, and American reservations and 
concerns. The particular focus of this time-period rests not so much with the already 
thoroughly debated Eastern Accords but more with the intensification of trade and the 
accompanying paradigm shift in how the Soviet Union was perceived by the West 
German public. This chapter also emphasizes the contrasting manner in which foreign 
trade concessions were to be used, i.e. American efforts to obtain concrete political 
concessions for trade agreements with the Soviets vis-à-vis Brandts engagement with the 
Soviet Union on the basis that increased interaction would eventually lead to Soviet 
goodwill. 
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 Chapter four addresses the shift in Soviet attitudes toward Ostpolitik and détente. 
Internal factors, a lingering fear of Germany, and the attractive alternative of a 
superpower détente brought the differences between Ostpolitik and Soviet or American 
détente to the forefront. I also cover Kissingers failure to recognize economic diplomacy 
as a vital part of U.S. foreign policy and the consequences that Watergate, and with it a 
stronger U.S. Congress, had on the international posture of the United States. The Yom 
Kippur War is portrayed as a turning point that finally undermined American leadership 
of Western détente efforts, leaving a permanent rift in the Western alliance. 
The conclusions of this analysis engage the major historiographical contributions 
in several ways. First, it illustrates that German Ostpolitik and American détente were 
substantially different. While their short-term goals may have overlapped during the 
1950s, with détente the United States sought to solidify the status quo while the FRG 
wanted to overcome it. Yet the historiography is strikingly devoid of this underlying 
tension between Brandts Ostpolitik and the American version of détente. Most accounts 
portray Ostpolitik as a German version of American détente that differed in speed but not 
nature. 
Secondly, this project strengthens the argument of Cold War revisionists who 
interpreted U.S. policies in opposition to European Socialist and leftist politicians, such 
as Brandt. Nixons distaste for Brandt was far more ideological than is generally 
recognized. Nevertheless, I also support some traditional interpretations, such as the 
argument that Nixon genuinely believed in the Cold War as an ideological conflict with 
Communism and his willingness to sacrifice American economic advantages in that 
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struggle. He distrusted Brandt not only because he was a Socialist but because he 
weakened the ideological unity of the West. 
Third, this study questions the effectiveness of the Western alliance. If West 
Germany was willing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc by pursuing bilateral 
negotiations, transferring critical technology, and undermining the American policy of 
linking Soviet political concessions with Western technology outflow, then this would 
seriously undermine the value of the alliance. With allies like these, who needs enemies? 
Within the Western alliance, the perceived loss of American power in the 1970s 
created a power vacuum in Europe. The degree to which West European countries 
perceived this power vacuum is crucial to understanding the German-American alliance. 
The emergence of alternative theoretical models such as the Third Way, the strong 
impetus of Western European cooperation, and the creation of a European power bloc 
certainly indicated that the Europeans felt that their interests were not sufficiently 
respected by the United States. The increased cohesion within the European Community 
(EC) not only fostered European cooperation but also afforded protection from American 
criticism, as one could conveniently blame the other European partners. 
Fourth, the era of détente, 19691975, is periodized with three previously 
unidentified turning points in the German-American relationship. The first occurred 
during the interGerman summit meeting of March 1970, when Nixon and Kissinger 
realized that Brandts utopian idealism might just succeed with the Soviets; the second in 
the autumn of 1972, when Brezhnev began to shift from a selective détente with Western 
Europe to a superpower détente and subsequently chose to re-invigorate the hard-line 
antiGerman rhetoric within the Soviet Union. A third, rather obvious turning point is the 
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Yom Kippur War. Since the war prompted Congress to decisively shelve the Soviet bid 
for Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, it signaled to the Soviet leadership that their 
economic objectives in superpower détente had not succeeded. 
Lastly, this study also provides insight into contemporary issues in United States- 
European foreign relations. The German-Soviet economic ties that developed during the 
Brandt years led to a more extensive reevaluation of the Soviet Union within German 
society and politics than in the U.S. This disparity triggered a profound conflict in 
interpretation over how the West should behave vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Cold 
War context of the late 1970s and 1980s. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF DÉTENTE 
 
In 1959, United States secretary of state John Foster Dulles unofficially suggested to 
West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer that a more open dialogue with the 
Communist states of Eastern Europe might be in the best interest of the Federal Republic 
of Germany.23 Even though the ambiguous catchphrase détente would not be coined 
until a few years later by a Russian, the previously inconceivable concept of a 
rapprochement with the East was born. In a looming conflict Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev threatened to turn control of East Berlin over to the East Germans, should 
American, British, and French protective forces not withdraw from West Berlin within 
six months for the sake of demilitarizing and transforming the Western sectors of the city 
into a "free city." Faced with this Soviet threat, the position of the FRG and the U.S. was 
linked, yet different. 
 With the American strength already challenged with the launch of Sputnik in 
1957 and the thenapparent Soviet ability not only to produce nuclear warheads but also 
to deliver them to the American mainland, a shift of power in East Berlin would further 
undermine the projection of American strength and influence. The FRG would be 
confronted with direct consequences, such as the harassment of its citizens at checkpoints 
or a possible repeat of the Berlin blockade. German and American interests were thus 
                                                
23 Interestingly enough, Brandts recollection on this American prodding is not a positive one. See Willy 
Brandt, Erinnerungen (Zürich: Propyläen, 1989), 167. Dulles suggestions were quoted in Konrad 
Adenauer, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Bücherei, 1967), 466-467. 
All translations of German primary sources (published or unpublished) were done by the author. 
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interlinked, but not always identical. Dulles suggestion for a shift in West German 
relations with the Soviet Union was a sensible one, which Adenauer unsuccessfully tried 
to implement in a discussion with Soviet ambassador Andrei Smirnov.24 For the FRG, 
this would have been a substantial change in its foreign policy, as Adenauer had relied 
not only on the United States in matters of military security but had also conducted 
foreign policy using American strength in dealings with the East. Despite what Dulles 
preached to Adenauer in 1959, it would take another three years for an American 
president, John F. Kennedy, to come to the same conclusion, albeit under different 
circumstances. The difference between the two situations was that President Kennedy 
was able to threaten the escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis to a global nuclear war 
while Adenauer could only throw around limited political and economic weight. Herein 
lay the fundamental difference between the strategic position of the U.S. and the FRG: 
the U.S. could be content with the status quo as it preserved its hegemony over the 
Western world. For the FRG, the status quo preserved its impotence. 
 At the time Adenauer entertained Dulles suggestion of a détente with the East, 
Brandt became more outspoken in his support and reliance on American support. As 
mayor of Berlin, Brandt was adamant about the necessity of discarding the ultimatum 
before any discussions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union could begin.25 
The SPD leadership, on the other hand, was willing to begin negotiations right away and 
criticized Brandt severely for not embracing the party line.26 Yet the party line would 
                                                
24 On June 6, 1962, Adenauer suggested that the Soviet Union and the FRG should de-escalate aggression 
for ten years in order to build up normalized relations. See Wjatscheslaw Keworkow, Der geheime Kanal: 
Moskau, der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), 103-106. 
25 Erich Böhme and Klaus Wirtgen, ed., Willy Brandt: Die Spiegel-Gespräche 19591992 (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1993), 13. 
26 Peter Merseburger, 371-372. 
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soon change, allowing the SPD to become moderate enough to share political power in 
1966. 
 
Bad Godesberg and the proAmerican Brandt 
On November 15, 1959, the Social Democratic Party approved a new platform that 
altered the fundamentals of SPD policy. It rejected Marxist philosophy, condemned the 
oppression of the communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe, supported democratic 
principles with free elections, and embraced a market economy with social 
responsibilities. This transition from a workers party to a peoples party also altered SPD 
foreign policy goals. Previously, the SPD had opposed a strong alliance with the West in 
the vague hope that Germany could better achieve unification by playing the superpowers 
against each other, which had caused numerous conflicts between the SPD leadership and 
the thenmayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt. 
After the Bad Godesberg congress, the SPD leadership seemed to embrace 
Brandts (and the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) governments) position of 
an uncompromising Western integration with the Atlantic alliance as the basic framework 
for German foreign policy.27 While Brandt had little input in the creation of the new party 
platform, he did endorse it during the party congress in Bad Godesberg. This shift in 
internal party politics overnight transformed him from an outsider to the most favored 
candidate for chancellor in the upcoming elections.28  
More than the party position had shifted, however. Most likely, Brandts tenure as 
major of Berlin had shifted his views on NATO. Having voted against German 
                                                
27 Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle 1958 bis 1969 
(München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 86-87. 
28 Merseburger, 375-378. 
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participation in NATO in 1955, at Bad Godesberg Brandts support for NATO and the 
United States hegemonic role within it was complete. He rejected political 
considerations that would limit the role of NATO or involve German troops in more 
Europe-focused defense initiatives.29 He even went so far as to indicate during his 
election campaign in 1960 that, as chancellor, he might override party policy and allow 
tactical, albeit no strategic, nuclear weapons for the German army.30 
Brandts criticism of the Western allies was limited to France, which, in his view, 
had rejected the integration of West Berlin into the Western zone in the years 1949
1952.31 Otherwise, in a 1959 speech he gave the Western allies unconditional support for 
their actions and even advocated German inactivity as a way to not undermine Western 
policy. 
In this round of arguments over Berlin, one must realize that you cannot tie the Western powers to 
supporting Berlin and on this other issue [technical contacts between the FRG and the GDR] just 
plow forward. [] We must be careful not to believe that Bonn and East Berlin could solve 
something that cannot be solved on this level. [] Furthermore, despite much concern in regards 
to politics in Bonn, I find it imperative not to veer away from the Western community. Instead, we 
must wrestle for changes within the policies of the West. We can only strive for those solutions in 
clear conscience, which do not weaken the overall position of the West.32 
 
Such concern for the cohesion of Western unity, absolutely unthinkable only a decade 
later, also informed his stance on a rapprochement with the East. In adhering to 
Adenauers foreign policy, which was based on Western strength, Brandt opposed 
Khrushchevs backchannel overtures for a meeting in March 1959. In a teleological 
explanation, Merseburger attributes Brandts refusal to Adenauers political power plays, 
yet Brandts refusal at the time was more in line with his deference to American foreign 
                                                
29 Böhme, 38. 
30 Böhme, 37, 39. 
31 Böhme, 20-21. 
32 Böhme, 27.  
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policy initiatives.33 In a clear sign of his proAmerican stance, in 1961 he rejected 
numerous suggestions that would later become part of his Neue Ostpolitik. While he tried 
to bring about an Allied Four Power Conference on Berlin, he did this not through 
unilateral initiatives or by contacting the Soviets but by prodding the Western allies in the 
summer of 1961 to begin such negotiations. He criticized suggestions by his own party 
members to establish non-political contacts, in order to alleviate the division between the 
two Germanies and possibly establish political contacts in the long run. He even 
eschewed his later visionary model of a confederation between the two German states, as 
negotiations leading up to such a solution could hinder allied dialogue or hurt the position 
of the West.34 
By 1961, Brandt embraced a decidedly proWestern policy.35 In the realm of 
foreign policy, he clearly subordinated Germany to the tutelage of the United States, be it 
in regards to interGerman dialogue, reunification, or nuclear armament. He also 
expressed no interest in dealing with the Soviets directly, for fear of weakening the 
Western alliance and out of ideological disregard for Soviet sincerity in negotiations. 
Nixon could not have been happier with the Socialist mayor of Berlin. As vice 
president under President Dwight Eisenhower, he must have appreciated the staunch 
support from Brandt. Despite the obvious correlations between U.S. Democrats and 
German Social Democrats, Brandt expressed sympathies for both presidential candidates, 
Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy, for supporting allied responsibility in the 
                                                
33 Merseburger, 372-375. 
34 Böhme, 27. 
35 This is in sharp contrast to the argument by Timothy Garton Ash, who sees Brandt as a leftist radical in 
search of a united Europe, only to be disillusioned by the Berlin crisis of 1961. Ash, 59.  Merseburger also 
sees Brandt in full support of the Americans. See Merseburger, 387. 
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Berlin and German questions.36 In a sense Brandt, like Adenauer, would most likely 
have preferred to see Nixon succeed President Eisenhower as Nixon conveyed a firmer 
stance on confronting Communism head-on. Probably most well known in the history 
books for his kitchen-debate with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, his compassion 
for strengthening the democratic cause worldwide was widely apparent. New York Times 
publisher C. L. Sulzberger recalled the firmness of Nixons anticommunist convictions 
in his conversation from July 25, 1958.  
Until the time when the imperialist Communist movement began to be effective  since the latter 
part of World War II, I think  [U.S. foreign] policy was relatively adequate to protect our 
security. But now we find that the Communists have developed to a degree never before reached 
using the tactics of indirect aggression. Therefore we must expand our concepts. [] 
And there is an important ingredient of our foreign policy which we have not adequately conveyed 
abroad: We are not wedded to the status quo. We recognize that the world, above all the world 
outside the West, is in a process of change and that the popular masses want a better way of life. 
[] We must get across to other nations that ours is the true revolution. We should talk more 
about the promise of the American Revolution and less of the menace of the Communist 
revolution.37 
 
With West Berlin under the constant threat of Soviet invasion or even a disruption of life 
for the inhabitants of Berlin, it seems reasonable that Brandts interest in consistency and 
American strength would have him gravitate toward the presidential candidate who 
already had been vice president in the current administration and, if anything, stood for a 
greater show of military strength and political involvement over Berlin.38 Practical 
considerations, such as these, must have prevailed over any ideological similarities that 
might have existed between Brandt and Senator Kennedy. 
                                                
36 Brandt is Grateful: Thanks Both U.S. Candidates for Berlin Statements, The New York Times, October 
26, 1960, 31. 
37 Quoted in C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987), 192. 
38 Stephen Ambrose, Nixon, vol 1, The Education of a Politician 19131962 (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1987), 536. 
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On November 11, 1960, Brandt publicly criticized President-elect Kennedy over 
his friendly overture with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.39 He sought Western strength, not 
dialogue with the East at the time. Nixon would most likely have delivered this strength, 
as he criticized Kennedy for not having a firmer and tougher United States policy 
toward the Soviet Union. 40 In an ironic twist of fate, Brandt, at that time, would have 
preferred a President Nixon living in the White House. 
 
The Berlin Crisis of 1961 as the Turning Point 
The Berlin crisis of 1961 represents the first major American disillusionment with the 
previously trusted leadership for Mayor Brandt.41 When the first strands of barbed wire 
were rolled to divide the western and eastern halves of Berlin, West Berliners were 
shocked by this unbelievable act. Brandts facial expression of sheer unbelief and 
helplessness when first observing the events was preserved through video footage that 
quickly spread throughout the world. Yet Western allied presence was conspicuously 
absent. It took twenty hours for the first American military patrols to arrive at the scene 
of construction, two days lapsed before the Soviet commander of East Berlin received a 
protest note, and only after three days did the three Western allies register their protests 
with Moscow.42 The frustration Brandt experienced from the lack of allied support burst 
forth upon receiving word that U.S. military patrols finally had arrived. Brandt angrily 
                                                
39 Brandt is Critical: West Berlin Major Is Cool to Kennedy-Soviet Note, The New York Times, 
November 12, 1960, 3. 
40 News Summary and Index: International, The New York Times, May 10, 1961, 47. 
41 Ash, 59. 
42 President Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan all spent the crisis vacationing at 
their respective retreats.  
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commented, These shitheads are at least finally sending some patrols to the sector 
borders so that the Berliners wont think they are totally alone.43  
Allied response to this new Berlin crisis was certainly not as swift or sweeping as 
it had been in past crises. Ultimately, the actions of the Western allies signaled to Brandt 
that the fate of the East Germans had little priority.44 Rumors that the allies had been 
warned in advance by the Soviets of this step, or that John J. McCloy might have actually 
suggested this solution to the Berlin Crisis to Khrushchev, probably further 
underscored the fact that the Western powers were content with the status quo and were 
not seeking to promote the primary goal of German foreign policy: German 
reunification.45 In this context, much has been made about recent scholarship by 
Wolfgang Schmidt, who sees the conceptual foundation of Brandts new Ostpolitik not 
rooted in the Berlin crisis but rather in ideas that originated in the early 1950s.46 This 
argument is one over semantics and primarily rooted in a political motivation to ascribe 
visionary attributes to the man who was once ranked as the fourth on a survey of the 
greatest Germans of all time.47 Ultimately, Schmidt concedes that only the 13th of 
August 1961 made the failure of the old formulas [on Western strength] apparent to 
everyone and underscored the necessity of a new approach to the politics over 
                                                
43 Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (München: Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996), 131. Original: Diese Scheißer 
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Germany.48 Whether Brandt already had general visions of peace and a united Europe in 
the 1950s matters little, as even Schmidt allows for Brandts disillusionment with the 
United States over Kennedys soft stance on Berlin.49 The crisis of 1961 demonstrated 
that U.S. foreign policy goals and those of West Germany no longer overlapped 
completely. The Berlin crisis of 1961 had opened Brandts eyes to the fact that there was 
little chance of German reunification under American leadership.50 Kennedy had declined 
to appeal to the United Nations on behalf of West Berlin and the United States was even 
willing to make the foundation of the FRGs foreign policy, the non-recognition of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) subject to talks with Moscow.51 
Despite his anger and frustration, Brandt realized the continued importance of 
American military presence in Berlin and the FRG. He continued to push for a solution of 
West Berlin issues and the division of Germany through the Western alliance. In contrast 
to the subservient approach from before, however, he rather bluntly suggested 
appropriate Allied countermeasures in a letter to President Kennedy. If Brandt had any 
doubt as to the position of the Americans, these would have been laid to rest after 
receiving Kennedys response. Rather than promising to support the actions Brandt had 
asked for, Kennedy implied that this was not a threatening crisis and twice suggested that 
further communications should remain within the proper channels, as well as telling 
                                                
48 Schmidt, 541. 
49 Schmidt, 539-542. 
50 Diethelm Prowe, Der Brief Kennedys an Brandt vom 18. August 1961: Eine zentrale Quelle zur 
Berliner Mauer und der Entstehung der Brandtschen Ostpolitik, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 33, 
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Brandt that there was nothing the United States was willing to do as long as its power 
base in West Berlin was not threatened.52  
Kennedys distant attitude was complemented the fact that Brandt was not even 
allowed to study the letter before he had assisted the bearer, Vice President Johnson, in 
purchasing the same slippers that he was wearing when Johnson handed over Kennedys 
letter.53 
There has also been an effort by Diethelm Prowe to read Kennedys letter as a 
suggestion to implement a new Ostpolitik. Yet this is a teleological argument as such a 
claim cannot be substantiated from the text. Quite to the contrary, Kennedy urged Brandt 
to tie West Berlin closer to the FRG and to continue with a policy of strength.54 Brandt 
himself certainly recalls these events as a turning point in cold war history and his 
personal perception of the Western powers.55 Yet there is no mention of American 
suggestions for a détente with the East. 
I said later that in August 1961 a curtain was drawn aside to reveal an empty stage. To put it more 
bluntly, we lost certain illusions that had outlived the hopes underlying them [] Ulbricht had 
been allowed to take a swipe at the Western superpower, and the United States merely winced 
with annoyance. My political deliberations in the years that followed were substantially influenced 
by this days experience, and it was against this background that my socalled Ostpolitik  the 
beginning of détente  took shape.56  
 
For Brandt, the Berlin crisis of 1961 demonstrated the unwillingness of the Western allies 
to risk military escalation for the sake of all Germans. American interest was limited to 
the Western part and thus not identical with that of Brandt. While it may, indeed, be a tall 
order for any country to demand that another country risk a nuclear confrontation to 
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defend interests that are not its own, it seems futile to explore whether it was the 
Germans or the Americans who were unreasonable in their expectations, especially given 
that the latter were unclear about their intentions. What is significant, however, is that 
this crisis destroyed the paradigm that had bolstered German-American postwar relations, 
namely Americas role as the advocate of West German military and political interests in 
international diplomacy, in return for the FRG being a loyal ally of the United States.57 
Once Brandt returned to Berlin after being defeated in the federal elections of 
1961, his continued service as mayor of West Berlin must have caused him to view West 
Berlins occupational forces even more negatively. It is therefore not surprising that 
rather than appreciating American military strength during the showdown at Checkpoint 
Charlie during October 1961, his close confidante Bahr remembered the American 
military during this incident as reactive, not proactive. When American soldiers turned 
their backs on an East German refugee who was bleeding to death on East German 
territory, with the comment that this is not our problem, the disparity between a 
protective power and a friend became even more distinct.58 All of a sudden West 
Berliners realized that the Four Power Agreements were nothing but empty words.59 
Brandts outrage was not limited to the Western side, however. His anger at the 
Soviet Union was also evident in his speech on August 13, 1961. He criticized the GDR 
as well as the supporting Communist bloc nations by protesting against the illegal and 
inhumane acts of the peoples dividing Germany, oppressing East Berlin and threatening 
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West Berlin.60 That he mostly targeted the Soviet Union can be seen in his speech before 
the German parliament the following week. In it he implicitly placed the need for a 
response to the security of the status quo since the Soviet Union may not believe that she 
can slap us in the face and we smile in response. [...] The government of the Soviet Union 
must be reminded how dangerous it is to insist on breaking the Four-Power-
Agreements.61 Yet herein lay the problem: West Germany and West Berlin were secure, 
but not able to respond in any way. What Brandt had supported before now became 
untenable: West Germany relied solely on the Western allies for advocating its foreign 
policy interests. Apart from them, Germany was helpless. 
 
Kennedys Initiatives: Exploring Alternatives 
To overcome this Ohnmacht that Germany faced within the Cold War setting, Brandt 
pursued changes where changes were possible. In a foreshadowing of his future strategy 
of compartmentalizing different areas of international relations, he accepted the military 
status quo but fostered change diplomatically. To counter the Soviet military threat, the 
United States had to remain the protector of the FRG and West Berlin.62 West Germans, 
therefore, had to embrace NATO. As he indicated in one of his speeches, we may not 
succumb to the temptation of antiAmericanism; we need the Atlantic partnership and 
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must help to realize it.63 In a more revealing endorsement in a speech in May 1962 
before the SPD party he promised to further nurture and develop the relationship of trust 
with the United States since there was no alternative.64 Underlying this continued 
solidarity with the transatlantic alliance was the continued view of the Soviet Union as an 
inherently aggressive state. Soviet coexistence is thus not coexistence in its proper 
meaningnot really peaceful but, on the contrary militant [] To this day, Khrushchev 
and his followers still believe in total victory.65 
Yet within the framework of superpower confrontation, a change had occurred 
that Brandt was able to harness for his own ambitions. After the Cuban Missile Crisis had 
brought the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war, détente became an important means 
of easing the tensions between the two blocs. For President Kennedy, détente meant 
transparency of the Iron Curtain to the Communist bloc for the sake of propagating 
Western values. In a sense, he sought to continue the Cold War with ideological and 
political rather than military means. As Kennedy points out in a speech given at the 
University of Berlin, it is the personal contacts between the people, and not the military, 
that should now facilitate regime change. 
Nor can the West ever negotiate a peaceful reunification of Germany from a divided and uncertain 
and competitive base. In short, only if they see over a period of time that we are strong and united, 
that we are vigilant and determined, are others likely to abandon their course of armed aggression 
or subversion. 
It is important that the people on the quiet streets in the East be kept in touch with 
Western society. Through all the contacts and communication that can be established, through all 
the trade that Western security permits, above all whether they see much or little of the West, what 
they see must be so bright as to contradict the daily drum beat of distortion from the East.66  
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Brandt welcomed this new approach, since it coincided with his own changed priorities. 
Having broken with his previous convictions of subservience to American diplomacy, he 
advocated a military reliance on the West while developing more diplomatic initiatives 
with the East.67 
One hears occasionally that we may not conduct German-Soviet talks about Berlin and Germany 
because of the responsibility of the Four Powers. On one hand, it is correct, that we may not 
negotiate with the Soviet Union behind our allies backs or apart from them. [] On the other 
hand we must constantly try to improve our situation in Germany and cannot expect our allies to 
be more German than the Germans themselves. [] The Federal government [of Germany] [] 
cannot refuse talks with the Soviet Union. In certain respects, it must even seek it out.68 
 
Brandt now also seemed willing to criticize Western diplomatic efforts to which he 
previously had yielded. Frustrated by the lack of movement he criticized that it seems to 
me that during the past years the political practice of the West has frequently suffered 
from an insufficient ability to conduct realistic negotiations.69 
His new diplomatic efforts had two components. For one, he now actively sought 
a dialogue with the East. In Brandts Harvard lectures of October 1962, he characterized 
Khrushchevs vision of peaceful coexistence as an ideological weapon to further his 
influence without risking a nuclear war. To Brandt, coexistence meant peaceful 
competition between the two blocs.70 He saw the need to tear the term coexistence away 
from Khrushchev and his propaganda and make it our [humanitys] innermost aspect. 
Yet he did not portray his vision as a relaxation between the East and the West, but more 
as a global vision of a utopia that incorporated peaceful coexistence between all nations, 
especially between the industrialized nations of the North and the less developed nations 
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of the South.71 In essence, beyond an appeal for humanitarian cooperation, Brandt had 
not articulated his vision in terms of a practical policy. 
This humanitarian vision, however, which he outlined in a later interview, implied 
that he was not only willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union but also with the 
previously off-limits government of the GDR.72 Secondly, he wanted to make the wall 
more transparent to Berliners from both sides, in a policy of small steps.73  
This opening towards the East overlapped to a large extent with Kennedys 
visions. In trying to overcome CDU opposition to an opening to the East, it helped 
greatly to have the American presidents approval for this new policy.74 Brandt was able 
to initiate the first Passagierscheinabkommen, a visitation program for East and West 
Berliner friends and family for Christmas 1963, a perfect example for Kennedys strategy 
of bringing down the Iron Curtain. Brandt even implied that Kennedys assassination 
spurred him on to complete Kennedys effort of bringing peace and understanding among 
nations.75 
While German and American short-term strategy on dealing with the East 
concurred in this case, Brandts emerging Ostpolitik was more than a tool to fight the 
cold war in a peaceful matter. Ostpolitik emerged under the realization that the Western 
allies were not willing to pursue Germanys interests if they did not happen to coincide 
with their own. Western leaders paid lip service to German reunification, but in reality 
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they were quite content with the status quo.76 German reunification had been moved to 
the back burner, the last chain link in a vaguely defined process of possible change that 
involved a democratic Europe and world. As President Kennedy indicated in his speech 
before the University of Berlin,  
the peaceful reunification of Berlin and Germany will, therefore, not be either quick or easy. We 
must first bring others to see their own true interests better than they do today. What will count in 
the long run are the realities of Western strength, the realities of Western commitment, the realities 
of Germany as a nation and a people.77 
 
For Ostpolitik, reunification was the ultimate goal of foreign policy and a regime change 
preferable but not necessary. Driven by the awareness that the Western allies were not 
interested in such a unification, West Germany was to do everything in its power to 
achieve more unity between the two Germanies, whether this implied small or drastic 
steps. Even the concept of one nation in two states was acceptable as long as this did not 
result in a permanent division of the German nation. Lacking allied enthusiasm, 
Ostpolitik became a German initiative to change the German situation.78 Brandt first 
advanced his diplomatic initiatives in his landmark 1963 speech in Tutzing: Maintain 
the status-quo militarily and transcend it politically,79 so the message went. 
His assistant, Bahr, fleshed out this transcendence by advocating ideological 
flexibility. He suggested discarding the policy of  
all or nothing. Either free elections or nothing, either allGerman self-determination or a 
categorical No, either elections as first step or rejections, all that is not only hopelessly antiquated 
and unrealistic but also pointless for a strategy of peace.80 
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He further emphasized German interest in avoiding a revolutionary upheaval since this 
would necessitate Soviet intervention, thereby implicitly legitimizing the Communist 
regime.81 Offering an international solution to the German question, rather than an inter
German one, the task would be to create a European environment conducive to 
reunification through cooperating withrather than excludingthe Soviet Union.82 The 
second principle, change through rapprochement, would be achieved by alleviating the 
legitimate fear of the East German regime of being swallowed by West Germany to such 
an extent that the opening of borders and the breakdown of the Berlin wall would not 
create animosity.83 In his memoirs, Bahr made clear that this was also Brandts 
conviction, but for political reasons they had thought it best for Bahr to float this novel 
idea as a break with the traditional German policy of non-recognition and isolation of 
East Germany.84 
Brandts movements toward the East were initiated independently from the 
United States and constitute the first distancing from American diplomatic positions. 
While in 1960 Brandt had still advocated a unified Western front at all costs, he was now 
willing to pursue a dialogue with the East independently of the Western allies. This 
dialogue was limited to humanitarian issues and was in no way meant to offend the 
United States, as American military protection was still crucial to West Berlin. In this 
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undertaking, Brandt benefited greatly from President Kennedys vision of détente. It is 
not clear whether Brandt believed in a permanent cooperation with a communist East 
Germany, or if this was simply Bahr's vision at that moment. Either way, Brandt did not 
suggest this in other speeches nor did he push the concept of a united, peaceful Europe, in 
which the two Germanies could be united under the European umbrella. Unlike 
Wolfgang Schmidts argument that Brandt was well on his way to implement his 
visionary policy, much is to be said for a naïve if we would just understand each other, 
we could all get along motivation that led him to seek out the Soviet leadership. In an 
interview of January 30, 1963, for example, Brandt makes repeated references to the fact 
that his reasons for meeting with a Soviet delegation were to inform Khrushchev about 
Western aspects of the Berlin question, of which Khrushchev was not aware. In 
particular, Brandt takes issue with Khrushchevs statement that the wall caused certain 
inconveniences, which for Brandt were profound human tragedies.85 
 
Johnsons Ugly American policy: Friendship Turns to Frustration 
During Lyndon B. Johnsons tenure, Brandts Ostpolitik would take its final form. 
Roughly during Johnsons first term in office, Brandt expanded the self-assigned limits of 
German Ostpolitik from humanitarian issues to include economic and cultural contacts. 
Frustrated with Johnsons neglect of his European allies in the shadow of Vietnam, 
Brandt embraced a panEuropean peace concept and anchored his Westpolitik less and 
less with the United States and more with the EEC. This also entailed throwing the 
shackles off German diplomacy once he came into office. 
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During the mid1960s it became increasingly clear that the nuclear protection 
upon which West German security was based was not as strong as in the 1950s. The 
nuclear parity between the two superpowers that was reached in the mid1960s created 
increased tensions in the Western camp. The United States seemed more reluctant to 
engage in a nuclear war that was unwinnable. This reduced the credibility of nuclear 
deterrence for the European allies, as it was questionable whether the United States 
would be willing to initiate a nuclear war for Europe.86 Changes in NATO strategy, 
which set the benchmark for nuclear escalation increasingly higher, and a strong 
emphasis on conventional warfare reinforced this German fear. Maintaining a nuclear 
deterrent, though, was the name of the game in the mid1960s and Germanys reliance on 
a now apparently reluctant United States placed it in an awkward position. Since 
Germany had renounced building its own nuclear weapons, the creation of the Multi 
Lateral Force (MLF), a nuclear force manned with troops from various nations under the 
auspices of NATO, was the preferred method for the FRG to gain nuclear credibility. 
Thus, more than ever, Brandt had to continue to rely on NATO and the U.S. backing of 
the MLF proposition.87 
 Brandt also pushed for nuclear sharing during his visit to the Johnson White 
House in April 1965. After reiterating to Vice President Humphrey that Germany had no 
interest in becoming a nuclear power, he drove home the point that it was legitimate for 
Germans to participate in a strategy involving nuclear arms.88 Prevention of future 
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conflicts over the interGerman border was one of Brandts primary concerns and a 
German nuclear deterrent would lend credence to West Germanys interest in this 
regard.89 It may not have been Johnsons fault that the FRG ultimately had to resign itself 
to trading in nuclear weapons sharing for a paper tiger, the Nuclear Planning Group. 
Germanys European allies had little interest in seeing German military in charge of 
nuclear weapons. Most likely, MLF had already been dead by the time Brandt brought it 
up with Johnson.90 Sweet talking the Germans into supporting this dubious trade and the 
Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Schwartz viewed as a successful 
maneuver by Johnson in that Germany could make a virtue out of their non-nuclear 
status, might have saved face for the FRG (if not necessarily for Chancellor Ludwig 
Erhard, himself). For Brandt, however, Johnsons détente policies, of which the NPT 
certainly was a crucial one, backfired. 
For Brandt, the disillusionment over nuclear weapons sharing increased his 
emphasis on Europe, not the Atlantic, as the central stage for Ostpolitik. Again, this was 
more a structural necessity of détente in general than Johnsons doing. In a sense the 
military might of the U.S. became less significant to the same degree that détente implied 
military de-escalation in Europe. Johnson telling the Germans that MLF did not matter 
was tantamount to belittling ones own strength. Johnsons strategy was probably quite 
successful with the German conservatives in government, as they were thoroughly 
immobile in their outdated position of Western strength and Johnson wanted to jolt them 
in order to move ahead with détente. This would explain the cooperative and 
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harmonious German-American relationship in 1968.91 To Brandt, however, already 
disillusioned with the lack of American support over the Berlin crisis of 1961, the failure 
of the U.S. to meet German interests let him to flesh out his Ostpolitik with a Western 
anchor in Europe and an ambitious German foreign policy. 
Consequently, in mid1964 Brandt incorporated an emphasis on a European role 
for his Ostpolitik. This entailed a panEuropean element to include Eastern Europe and a 
strong emphasis on Western Europe as the anchor. 
We may assume that the emerging fusion of free Europe[an states] exudes a strong attraction, 
despite all its shortfalls and problems, and that a European conscience remained alive or was 
reawakened in the peoples between Germany and Russia.92 
 
Brandts initiatives focused on using the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers to 
Germanys advantage. While Brandt, as an Atlanticist, clashed with de Gaulles vision of 
a French-led Europe in many ways, he admired the French president for using the 
political room that was created by the nuclear stalemate in his own way.93 In a speech 
before an American audience on German self-confidence, he outlined the need for a 
healthy self-confidence and real power of the FRG:  
it is inevitable as the sunrise tomorrow morning, that the German people seek its national identity. 
[] Who can be surprised if the people of the divided Germany ask for their fatherland, which is 
bigger than the Federal Republic. In this context no one should be surprised by the question Why 
only de Gaulle? 94  
 
A strong European Community was of utmost importance for the exercise of this newly-
claimed authority, and a panEuropean detente the prerequisite for Germanys 
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reunification.95 With this linkage, Germany was elevated to a key player in the emerging 
détente policies with the East.96 
The peace order is a common goal between Washington, London, Paris and Bonn. It can be solved 
by varying roles. Germany does not always have to wait for American, French, or British 
suggestions. Even if Washington, London, or Paris want to get things moving, there is no reason 
why we cannot tell them Here is an idea. Lets check it out.97  
 
Unlike de Gaulle, who pursued a nationalistic policy of strengthening France, Brandt did 
not wish for his Europe to become a third superpower.98 Rather, he wished to use de 
Gaulles internationally accepted attempts of an independent diplomacy with the East to 
pursue his axiom from Tutzing of preserve[ing] the status-quo militarily so it can be 
overcome politically. In anchoring his diplomacy within Western Europe, one could say 
he supplemented this axiom with through an alliance with the United States militarily 
and European unity politically. 
 This distinction between military policy on one hand and cultural and economic 
issues on the other allowed him to pursue a strategy separate from that of the U.S. The 
novel element here was to assume that the military aspect would remain constant, no 
matter what developed in cultural or economic areas. And herein lies the heart of 
Brandts ability to pursue Ostpolitik: the conviction that the United States would not 
withdraw its troops from Germany and that West Germany would be part of a united 
Europe.99  
The incomparable power and might of the United States, which is necessary to the retention of 
peace, prevents in itself an American disengagement from Europe. The United States cannot 
withdraw into itself.100 
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Operating under this assumption, Brandt was able to do exactly what he had rejected in 
an interview in 1959, namely to tie the Western powers to supporting Berlin and on 
other issues just move forward.101 He advocated a continued policy of small steps to 
structurally change the area of world politics for the better, but only in economic and 
cultural respects.102 In a sense, he widened the area in which German diplomatic 
initiatives were permissible from humanitarian issues to the area of cultural and economic 
relations. Economic and cultural communication with the Soviet occupied zone are 
primarily a German problem. Agreement and coordination with the three powers are 
natural.103 
When Willy Brandt came into office as the foreign minister in 1967 (as part of a 
grand coalition with the CDU) it appeared as though Johnson had abandoned Germanys 
interest in favor of superpower détente. Nuclear sharing had finally been discarded, 
largely on the basis of opposition by Western allies but also due to heavy opposition from 
the Soviet Union. That year, the doctrine of flexible response would become official 
doctrine, making a global nuclear escalation as improbable as possible, thereby arguably 
exposing the FRG to the threat of invasion, which was winnable by Soviet conventional 
forces. To save face, Germany had been admitted as a permanent member in the Nuclear 
Planning Group, therefore granting an increased level of nuclear consultation without any 
effective military gains for Germany. This policy was in line with general American 
foreign policy. For the U.S., détente primarily meant an understanding between the two 
superpowers in military affairs. Détente was therefore considered a bilateral issue 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, and not a dialogue between all parties 
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involved. Since Germany was utterly dependent on the backing of the United States, 
Soviet-American talks led to extreme tensions and doubts within the alliance, and 
especially so in the German-American relationship. As Bahr put it: 
the responsibility for the avoidance of a nuclear war forced a cooperation between Washington 
and Moscow that went beyond alliances. The vital interests of both made them partners removed 
from their alliances. If their relationship worked, the alliances did not have to function. NATO and 
[the] Warsaw Pact became mutual reassurances, to be kept on a short leash and incompetent to 
disrupt peace seriously or wreak havoc. [] Because and as long as the protectors in Washington 
and Moscow guaranteed the law of nuclear peace, the cold war could continue, subordinated, and 
in accordance to what the subordinated interests of all involved deemed to be correct.104 
 
Despite grave concerns over this superpower détente, he indicated to Bahr that he was 
unwilling to counter it with his own version so as not to strain the new [coalition] 
government to the limit. He had the realization that the issues, [which] he thought 
needed to get done, would not get done with this coalition.105 Thus limited by the 
constraints of the coalition partner, the CDU, Brandt was only able to pursue a watered-
down version of Ostpolitik. The common denominator between the two parties with 
regard to foreign policy was the goal of creating a collective security system that would 
overcome the division of Europe as well as any military aggression.106  
 The military situation in Europe had become highly volatile. On one hand, the 
military security that the United States provided for the FRG was more and more drawn 
into question. One public opinion poll after another indicated the deterioration of German 
confidence in the U.S. as an ally. Figure 6 demonstrates this trend. Throughout the 1960s, 
the desirability of the U.S. as a partner on the international scene had dropped roughly 
twenty points while that of the Soviet Union had risen by that same amount. Slighting the 
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U.S. as an ally resulted from a gradually developing belief that the West Germans had 
placed themselves on the wrong side of history. Increasingly, German public opinion 
pointed to the Soviet Union as the more powerful ally in the long run. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, by 1968 more people believed the Soviet Union would be more powerful 
superpower within 50 years. 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union had recently crushed a democratic movement 
in Czechoslovakia with brute military force, thereby shattering short-term hopes of 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union and renewing fears of military conflict. A stronger 
NATO was called for by the German public while better relations with the Soviet Union 
would be deemed necessary by the majority of West Germans only one year after the 
invasion. As Figure 4 illustrates, by 1969, the German threat perception from the Soviet 
Union had resumed its sharp pre1968 decline. With still no Western nuclear retaliatory 
capabilities and a Soviet threat to invade West Germany, the public opinion polls seemed 
to support the tightrope walk of Brandts new Ostpolitik. 
We will place even more emphasis on coordination with our Western Allies, although this cannot 
be the final solution. There is this tendency to believe that the strengthening of the Western 
Alliance would be a replacement for Ostpolitik. This is nonsense. It is certainly necessary to take 
the cohesion of the West even more seriously after the events in Czechoslovakia. But this is not a 
replacement for Ostpolitik, but a precondition, at best. 107 
 
U.S. military presence and NATO, therefore, remained crucial elements in Brandts 
policies despite his outreach to the East.108 Yet this military protection had shifted from 
being the crucial pillar holding up Germanys independence and future to a necessary 
geo-political element for the pursuit of other diplomatic goals with much greater 
flexibility. 
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Our security interests and the necessity of the Atlantic partnership cannot be pursued against the 
United States but only through an independent policy vis-à-vis the United States, and wherever 
possible in conjunction with it.109 
 
Nothing shows Brandts disillusionment with the United States better than the issue of 
German unification. Before, Brandt was in favor of linking German unification to a 
rapprochement of the United States with the Soviet Union, and had even reminded 
President Johnson of said linkage during his visit in 1965. Now, Brandt attempted to link 
it with European unity. 
Our policy nowadays is rooted more in the linkage between the European development and the 
German problem. It is focused on changing the current status quo of mistrust, the tensions, and the 
controversies for the better.110 
 
With the realization that the United States would continue to be a protective presence in 
Germany, yet not pursue a policy conducive to German reunification, Brandt, as foreign 
minister, introduced the final element of Ostpolitik: a focus away from the superpower 
conflict and on European cooperation, flanked by a European peace order. 
One example where Brandts shifting attitude toward Western military power is 
reflected was the restructuring of NATO in 196768. Here, he not only welcomed, but 
actively fostered, the change in NATO doctrine away from a strong emphasis on nuclear 
deterrent toward an increased emphasis on diplomacy.111 In the resulting Harmel Report, 
NATO saw military security and détente as two sides of the same coin, not contradicting 
but complementing each other. The report further called for involving NATO, along 
with the United States and the Soviet Union, in a policy of détente for the sake of peace 
and stability in Europe. Lastly, it stipulated that a final and stable agreement on Europe 
is not possible without a solution of the Germany question, which constitutes the core of 
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the current tensions in Europe.112 This last goal would be reached with a European 
security conference.113 To this end, a peaceful Europe, based on cooperation and 
relaxation of tensions, became of prime importance for Brandt.114  
The existing European Community played a crucial role in this. It demonstrated a 
possible role model for a community that was economically integrated enough to be 
attractive to East European countries and politically powerful enough to transcend the 
limitations of German foreign policy. As Brandt stated in a speech before the Council of 
Europe, the close Franco-German cooperation, which holds a decisive role for the future 
or Europe, has been revived.115 
 The purpose of Ostpolitik, then, was to lure the East European countries to a close 
cooperation with the West. Brandt strove for such European cooperation through the 
economic, technical, scientific, cultural, andwherever possiblepolitical contacts with 
the peoples and states of Eastern Europe.116 Brandt, then, aggressively tried to normalize 
relations with the states of Eastern Europe, as well as to enhance the relationship with the 
Soviet Union. Much to his credit, the FRG established numerous trade agreements with 
Eastern European states such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and even diplomatic ties 
with Romania. 
A détente with the Soviet Union would play a crucial role in this process. Brandt 
had already mentioned the possibility of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in a 
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conversation with de Gaulle in December 1966 and, as Sarotte argues, the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia gave Brandt a new conviction that his diplomatic initiatives ultimately 
had to go through Moscow.117  
By the end of President Johnsons term, Brandt had moved further away from the 
U.S. diplomatically and was convinced that Germanys reunification would only be 
achieved through close cooperation between European states and by entertaining good 
relations with the Soviet Union. Johnsons superpower détente had not sufficiently 
accounted for West Germanys interests. Quite to the contrary, West Germany was asked 
to submit its interests to that of a superpower détente.118 
 
Nixons Détente 
Richard M. Nixon, returning in 1967 from a five year hiatus from politics, focused on the 
ABJ (Anything But Johnson) vote. The critique of the Johnson administration focused of 
course on Vietnam, but also on his ignoring of the needs of Americas European allies. 
West European allies were essential to Nixons concept of international relations. His 
ideas were rooted in the Cold War ideology so prevalent during his vice presidency, 
albeit with a new twist on détente. The proverbial new wine in old wineskins also turned 
Nixons new era of negotiation into an adulterated version of detente. 
Nixon-style détente focused mainly on an honorable exit from Vietnam, a 
strengthening of the Western alliance, and curtailing Soviet expansion of Communism. 
During his address to the Bohemian Club in San Francisco on July 29, 1967, he 
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articulated the need for an American foreign policy that would undo President Johnsons 
détente policy and bring Western Europe back to a cautious weariness of the Cold War 
enemy.  
Twenty years ago Western Europe was weak economically and dependent on the United States. It 
was united by a common fear of the threat of Communist aggression. Today Western Europe is 
strong economically and economic independence has inevitably led to more political 
independence. The winds of détente have blown so strongly from East to West that except for 
Germany most Europeans no longer fear the threat from the East. As Harold Macmillan puts it, 
Alliances are kept together by fear, not by love.119  
 
This fear of Soviet aggression was clearly missing in West Europeans. Nixon saw Soviet 
rhetoric of détente as a symbol of a superficial change, a change of the head and not the 
heart  of necessity, not choice.120 This characterization (which could be equally 
ascribed to Nixon himself) had implications for U.S. détente in the military, economic, 
and diplomacy arenas. 
The military aspect is a rather telling indication of Nixons continued struggle for 
military superiority despite détente. Unlike Brandts vision of a military de-escalation, 
Nixon felt that 
We must recognize that we have not had a world war for twenty years because of Americas clear 
military superiority. That superiority is now threatened, both because of Soviet progress in missile 
development and because of an attitude in U.S. policy circles that nuclear parity with the Soviets 
is enough. Because the primary Soviet goal is still victory rather than peace, we must never let the 
day come in a confrontation like Cuba and the Mid-East where they, rather than we, have military 
superiority.121 
 
In an even more striking contrast to Brandts visions and policies as foreign minister, 
Nixon sought trade only under very limited conditions. 
We should have a policy which encourages more trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries. We must recognize, however, that to them trade is a political weapon. I 
believe in building bridges but we should build only our end of the bridge. For example, there 
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should be no extension of long term credits or trade in strategic items with any nation, including 
the Soviet Union, which aids the enemy in North Vietnam.122 
 
On diplomatic issues, Nixons views most closely matched those of Brandt. But even 
here, the underlying premise is a different one and would consequently lead to differing 
judgments on what constituted sensible diplomatic relations. 
Diplomatically we should have discussions with the Soviet leaders at all levels to reduce the 
possibility of miscalculation and to explore the areas where bilateral agreements would reduce 
tensions. But we must always remember in such negotiations that our goal is different from theirs: 
We seek peace as an end in itself. They seek victory with peace being at this time a means toward 
an end.123 
 
Ultimately, Nixons conviction rested on just that premise, namely that the Soviet Union 
remained an aggressive power and a realistic threat to the world. Détente was just a 
means to make the conflict of systems more bearable. His conclusion about the 
quintessence of the Soviet Union underscores this point: In sum, we can live in peace 
with the Soviet Union but until they give up their goal for world conquest it will be for 
them a peace of necessity and not of choice.124 This kind of détente was a far cry from 
normalized relations or even cooperation. Ever suspicious of Soviet strategies to resume 
world conquest and militarily prepared to counter such moves, Nixons views were more 
reminiscent of peaceful coexistence than détente policies. 
 During his 1968 election campaign he did attempt to shift toward a more centrist 
approach after having been portrayed as overly hawkish from his days as vice president, 
when he advocated stiff resistance to Communist expansion. Consequently, during a 
news conference in Miami Beach on August 6, 1968, he gave himself a more dovish 
window dressing, suggesting that the era of confrontation with the Communist world 
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has ended, ushering [in] a new era of negotiations with the Soviet Union.125 Despite 
such rhetoric, Nixons view had not substantially changed, and when the Soviet Union 
invaded Czechoslovakia, the Nixon camp saw this as a net plus for the candidacy of 
Nixon since people would see him as realistic, tough-minded, skeptical [] and able to 
negotiate from strength.126 For politics, this was quite convenient, as Nixon could either 
hold up the new wine, the new era of negotiations, or the old wineskins, a tough anti-
Communist stance. For policy, it was quite another matter, as Brandt would take Nixons 
liberal language as indicating support of his own policies. 
In summary, it is evident that Brandt underwent a drastic transformation in his 
ideology throughout the 1960s. While at first he was decidedly proWestern in every 
respect, the more he became disillusioned with American support for German foreign 
policy interests, the more his Ostpolitik took shape. This is more obvious in some areas 
than in others. 
The military role of the United States and NATO, as the guarantors of military 
security of the FRG, changed from a crucial pillar of strength, necessary to the survival of 
the FRG, to a bargaining chip in negotiations with the East. While Brandt had no interest 
in rejecting American military power outright, and in fact continued to need it for the 
security of West Germany, his attitude changed toward the utility of the military. After 
the unwillingness of the United States to defend Germanys interests in East Germany, 
and a subsequent disillusionment with the rejection of nuclear sharing programs by the 
allies, Brandt simply considered American military presence for what it was: a self-
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interested projection of military might by a superpower over a vital territory. This 
allowed Brandt to pursue an independent course without having to fear a loss of security. 
Brandts unilateralism is mostly reflected in diplomatic initiatives. While in 1959 
Brandt was still willing to yield to American diplomatic initiatives as a way to defend 
German interests, he gradually extended the framework within which Germans should 
develop own initiatives. What began with humanitarian efforts to overcome the effects of 
the Berlin wall and was extended to economic and cultural areas a few years later finally 
reached the level of politics. At first only with consent of the allies, later alone, Brandt 
gradually moved out from underneath the blanket of American diplomatic tutelage, 
advocating that in order to achieve Germany unification it would be necessary to shift 
away from a transatlantic to a European framework. 
This shift in Brandts thinking was only possible because of a changed view of the 
nature of the Soviet Union. At first an evil empire with which one could and should not 
negotiate, it became a state with legitimate security interests, however much one was 
appalled by them. Finally, the Soviet Union became the gatekeeper to a unified Germany 
and Europe, a neighbor with whom it was essential to have a good relationship. The East 
European states became acceptable players in an international political game, with the 
ultimate goal of pacification and cooperation in Europe. This idea of a European peace 
order had slowly emerged, from a status-quo peace for Berlin to carefully balanced arms 
reductions, by which the risk of nuclear war could be avoided. Close cooperation on 
cultural, economic, and political levels between the states of Eastern and Western Europe 
would make a German unification, if not on a state level, then on a practical level, 
possible. 
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Such cooperation, however, firmly contradicted Nixons version of détente. 
Entrenched in Cold War thinking, cooperation with Communist states on the lines Brandt 
envisaged would not be possible for him. As Nixon did not subscribe to the idea of 
peace-seeking Communists but only Communists using peace as a means to further 
Communism, Nixons concurrence with Brandts vision of close cooperation could only 
be achieved if the Soviet Union would abandon the Communist philosophy altogether. 
 Both sides had sound reasons for the kind of détente they pursued. For Brandt and 
the FRG, American détente offered little chance of seeing a reunified Germany. A 
rapprochement with the East at least offered this possibility. Furthermore, the strategic 
position of Germany allowed Brandt to take a gamble on Soviet motivations without 
having to fear losing American security commitments. Nixon, on the other hand, was 
quite content with stopping Communist expansion and never suggested a roll-back policy 
akin to the mid1950s. Détente would allow him to solidify Western support and contain 
Communism. Not having any vital American national interest in East Germany, a more 
confrontational policy over East Germany while still deeply involved in Vietnam was not 
sensible. Whether Nixon or Brandt had a better read on the Soviet intentions at the time 
matters less to this study than the fact that the two leaders who would govern their 
nations in 1969 had views of détente that were quite different and would invariably clash.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
HONEYMOON PERIODS AND INITIAL IDEALISM 
 
The beginning of 1969 through the spring of 1970 marked a period of wishful thinking 
with respect to cooperation and consultation on both sides of the Atlantic. Nixons vision 
of greater European leadership in their own regional affairs in exchange for a greater 
West European assumption of global responsibility worked for with all partiesin 
principle. Nixons assurances of a continued commitment to Western Europe, while 
giving them greater political flexibility, led to initial enthusiasm about the new American 
leadership. When, as German foreign minister and later chancellor, Brandt put theory in 
practice, and became the leading figure in an economic, social, and political détente with 
the Soviet Union, his selective détente generated tremendous conflict between himself 
and the Nixon administration. While Nixon resented Brandt for his leftist ideology and, 
therefore, was wary of his policies, Kissinger initially appreciated the apparent flexibility 
that Brandts détente policies afforded the United States. Brandts economic policies vis-
à-vis the Soviet Union, however, actually undermined the negotiation position of the 
United States. Only after a surprising display of German nationalism by the German 
public during the interGerman summit meeting in Erfurt did Kissinger recognize the 
dangers of Brandts policies: Brandts honeymoon period was over. 
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Nixons Vision of a Responsible Europe 
When Nixon was inaugurated as president of the United States on January 20, 1969, he 
had intended to strengthen transatlantic ties. Like most presidential candidates, he had 
sought to set himself apart from his predecessors policies. One of his most pointed 
critiques of Johnsons policies had been of the latters treatment of the transatlantic 
alliance. While recent scholarship by Thomas A. Schwartz has demonstrated that 
Johnsons policies toward Europe had been quite effective, Nixons election slogan We 
have to fix the transatlantic alliance resonated strongly with the American electorate. 
Nixon did not wait long to deliver on this promise. Only two weeks after his 
inauguration he announced at a press conference on February 6, 1969 that he would take 
a trip to Europe to revitalize the transatlantic alliance.127 The underlying hope, as 
Ronald Powaski points out, was to move the European allies away from their European-
focused foreign policy toward more responsibility for global Cold War politics. The 
carrot for such a move was an American promise of more intense consultations.128 Being 
only the first of many envisioned trips, the top political priority this time around was 
undoubtedly to get French president Charles de Gaulle back into the fold of the Western 
allies. Germany, however, held its own personal challenges for Nixon. He did not fear the 
relatively easy visit with German chancellor Kiesinger but the obligatory demonstration 
of American support for West Berlin. As has been illustrated by Ambrose, Nixons 
resentment of the East Coast liberals led to a strong aversion against anything reminiscent 
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of President John F. Kennedys policies.129 Not wanting to stand in the shadow of 
Kennedys famous visit, Nixon was deeply troubled by the possibility that his reception 
would be compared unfavorably to the cheering crowds of Berliners, still vividly in the 
minds of Germans and Americans alike. 
Nixons fears were groundless as the Berliners came through for him. Under 
chants of He-He-HeNixon ist ok, on February 27, 1969 the American president 
committed himself to defending the rightful status of West Berlin and then offered, in 
concurrence with his campaign promise to inaugurate an era of negotiations, to view the 
situation in Berlin as an invocation, a call to end the tension of the past here and 
everywhere.130 
In a foreshadowing of future difficulties with France and Germany, certain 
government representatives were not as easily convinced. In a striking clue of Nixons 
ideological underpinnings, he had great admiration for the conservative French president 
Charles de Gaulle and almost revered him as an idol despite de Gaulles staunch anti
American policies.131 De Gaulle held no such inherent respect for Nixon. He boldly told 
Nixon that Europe must determine its own destiny, not follow Washington or Moscow. 
Of course, more amicable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
would help in this matter, and thus Nixon was able to leave Europe with a sense of a 
common transatlantic interest in détente.132 Upon his return he made two observations 
that contained harbingers of coming problems. 
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I sensed as I traveled to the capitals of Europe that there is a new trust on the part of the Europeans 
in themselves, growing out of the fact that they have had a remarkable recovery economically and 
politically, as well as in their military strength since the devastation of World War II. Also, I think 
I sensed a new trust in the United States growing out of the fact that they feel that there are open 
channels of communication with the United States and a new sense of consultation with the United 
States.133 
 
Nixons assessment of this new European self-confidence was certainly correct as far as 
Germany was concerned. In opinion poll after opinion poll Germans considered their 
country to be of increasing importance in the world.134  
 For most historians, including Wolfram Hanrieder, this German self-confidence 
of the 1970s and 1980s, albeit difficult to reconcile with the image of a submissive and 
apologetic German foreign policy of the 1950s, was systemic, caused by the dissimilar 
socioeconomic conventions which inclined them toward divergent political values.135 
Already during the Truman administration, the West Germans had viewed themselves as 
more than a political underling to the United States. Popular opinion polls in 1957 
showed that at that time, the Germans viewed themselves as contributing as much to the 
transatlantic alliance as the Americans, if not more.136 Frank Costigliola also 
compellingly illustrates that during the Kennedy administration West Germans felt they 
deserved the right to veto U.S. policy.137 What has been neglected by the historiography 
is that Willy Brandt represented a new quality of self-confidence. He not only reiterated 
the need for U.S. consultation with the Germans on foreign policy but made the FRG the 
initiator of a foreign policy, independent of the Western superpower. 
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 This new self-confidence was manifested in the demands of thenForeign 
Minister Willy Brandt, who had concrete demands for the advancement of German unity 
which did not coincide with Nixons desires. During the summit meeting he suggested 
that some real progress toward a stable settlement on Berlin would be highly 
desirable.138 The implication was clear: Nixons vision of detente was not enough to 
bring about the changes wanted by Brandt. 
 Yet such implied criticism was easily glossed over in the overall excitement about 
the success of the trip. Nixon had managed to articulate a new vision for the transatlantic 
partnership. Undoubtedly, the American statements of support for Germany and attempts 
at détente were sincere  in theory. As Kissinger wrote to Nixon, with notable 
enthusiasm, I am convinced that your trip drove the key message home: we are sensitive 
to the critical problems; we respect and value the opinions of our Allies, we will approach 
talks with the Soviets with great prudence and only in full consultation with our friends; 
and we do not intend to try to dictate solutions to international problems anywhere at any 
time.139 Only a little later Kissinger admitted to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, 
however, that when it came to consulting the European allies, The Pres[ident] is not so 
much for consultation in practice as in theory.140 Heavily relying on his foreign policy 
experiences during his tenure as vice president in the Eisenhower administration, Nixon 
wanted to allow for the security and autonomy of the West European allies but within a 
framework in which the United States retained the moral authority to lead global matters. 
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This overall leadership, then, pointed to a cautious coexistence with the 
Communist bloc through tough negotiations, in accordance with the views of German 
chancellor Kiesinger and not of Brandts vision of a full-fledged cooperation between 
Germany and Eastern Europe. In Kissingers reflections on Nixons only presidential trip 
to Germany he asserts that Kiesingers views were closer to Nixons: [and] Brandts 
were more comparable with the convictions of our State Department.141 The fact that 
Nixon would sympathize with a former Nazi officer who looked toward a strong Franco-
German understanding within a new Europe already gives an indication of the strength of 
his ideological differences with Brandt. The key difference between the Nixon approach 
to the Soviet Union and Brandts was that Nixon only needed a Soviet acceptance of the 
status quo, i.e. a peaceful military coexistence that did not undermine the economic and 
ideological competition between the two superpowers and their allies. Brandt, on the 
other hand, saw a true cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe as the only way 
to achieve the ultimate purpose of West German diplomacy: reunification. To achieve 
this goal, an ideological acceptance of the Socialist system and close economic ties were 
necessary, both of which required intensive diplomacy and sacrifices on part of West 
Germany. 
 Unfortunately for Nixon, transatlantic relations had changed considerably from 
the time of his tenure as vice president. Back then, U.S. economic support and military 
protection against Soviet aggression had assured West European compliance with U.S. 
foreign policy. As previously outlined, various international developments during the 
1960s eroded this need for compliance. The same week that Nixon returned home, 
German politics began their watershed transition from a conservative to a Socialist/liberal 
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government. As evidenced by the addresses of the newly elected German president, 
Gustav Heinemann, Brandts visions of reconciliation with the East had become popular 
rhetoric among the left. Upon election to the German presidency, Heinemann unleashed 
the 1969 parliamentary election campaign rhetoric by declaring his election the beginning 
of the changing of the guard.142 He suggested that membership in NATO could not be 
the terminal station of German policy and that West Germany should work with other 
states to get out of this creation of blocs again.143 Heinemann not only asserted German 
national interests that were contradictory to American ones, but in doing so also rejected 
U.S. moral leadership. 
 
Money Speaks Louder than Words: Brandts attempt to reach out to the Soviets 
Long before President Heinemann articulated the desire for a German position beyond 
NATO, Brandt had already initiated attempts to reach out to the Soviet Union. If the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had demonstrated one thing to Brandt, 
it was the failure of Western policy to pry Soviet satellite states away from the Soviet 
Union through trade. To Brandt, political change without the Soviet Union was 
impossible.144 Trade with the Soviet Union represented the key avenue to cooperation 
between Eastern and Western Europe.145 While historions, most notably Seppain, Stent, 
and Jacobsen, have identified Osthandel as complementary to Brandts Ostpolitik, they 
have failed to depict Osthandel as prerequisite to Ostpolitik, nor have they identified 
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Brandt as the driving force in this development.146 Brandt, having tried to establish closer 
German-Soviet ties throughout 1968, had convened a brainstorming session between the 
German embassy in Moscow and the Economics Ministry undersecretary von Dohnanyi, 
also a member of the SPD, on January 15, 1969, on how to create more high level 
contacts between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.147 There, it had 
been decided to invite Soviet trade minister Nikolai Patolichev to the 1969 Hanover trade 
fair.148 Brandt then followed this up, just two weeks before the Nixon visit, when trying 
to lure Soviet Ambassador Semen K. Zarapkin into greater economic relations with the 
FRG by offering close cooperation on cultural, economic, and technical exchange, 
suggesting nuclear physics, molecular biology, and cybernetics as possible fields.149 
Despite Brandts overtures, the Soviet side demonstrated little interest in pursuing 
economic ties with the FRG. Apart from the 1962 pipeline embargo, which had strained 
German-Soviet economic relations, it was widely accepted in German government circles 
that the Soviet Union was deliberately trying to freeze Soviet-German trade. When 
Brandt raised the issue of East-West trade during the luncheon on February 11, 1969, 
Zarapkin only rehashed the old line that oil import quotas would need to be increased 
before German companies could be considered for a sizable contribution in the building 
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of the auto manufacturing plant Togliatti.150 This issue of heating oil import quotas, 
however, was a dead end. The West European market was saturated in this the only area 
of significant Soviet energy overproduction. In January and February of 1969 the German 
demand had risen 29% compared to the same two months of the previous year, yet the 
market was so saturated that the price was below the price level of the summer months 
the previous year. An increase in Soviet imports was not commercially advisable.151 
Since the West German market had already reached the maximum heating oil imports 
that it could absorb, continued exports of the only marketable and plentiful Soviet 
commodity was no basis for any sizable future Soviet-German trade increase. The Soviet 
Union, therefore, was only willing to expand the existing trade structures that would 
result in further hard currency gains. No large-scale projects or fundamental 
reorganization of Soviet-German trade relations was envisioned on the Soviet side. 
 Even if the Soviets were not convinced of a strengthening of German-Soviet 
relations, France was persuaded of the value of better relations with the East. In a 
conversation on March 10, 1969, Brandt and French Foreign Minister Michel Debre 
agreed that President Nixon had shown little concern for European interests and that 
Germany and France would need to pursue their economic and political ties with the 
Soviet Union independently of the United States. Détente with other East European 
countries should also continue in parallel with the United States, if for no other reason 
than to keep the states of Eastern Europe on the right course of a development toward 
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Europe.152 After Brandt showed a certain anxiety over the American reaction toward 
European initiatives at détente, Debre assured him that de Gaulle had stated the French 
intention of a continued dialogue with the Soviet Union and Nixon considered this 
normal.153 This misrepresentation of Nixons attitude toward trade with Eastern Europe 
foreshadowed the many times the Europeans would skillfully claim an inability to 
coordinate export controls with the United States with reference to EC trade guidelines.
 Despite the apparent backing of France and the United States for a new SPDled 
orientation of German foreign policy, Soviet willingness to engage West Germany had 
been less forthcoming.154 The Warsaw Pact Conference in Budapest on March 17 
indicated a possible shift in the Soviet stance. In this summit meeting, widely seen as a 
defeat for the Soviet Union by its satellite states, the Warsaw Pact leaders failed to agree 
on a document denouncing the role of the Peoples Republic of China in the Sino-Soviet 
border clashes earlier that month. To strengthen Moscows strategic position the Soviet 
leaders condoned renewed calls for a European Security conference and sanctioned 
strong economic cooperation between Communist countries and Western Europe. All this 
was clearly done in the hope that these moves would stabilize the situation in Europe, 
placate East European demands for more prosperity, and ultimately to place the Soviet 
Union in a better position to deal with the renegade Chinese sister country, with whom it 
unfortunately happened to share a rather lengthy border. 
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  While the call for a European Security Conference was nothing new in and of 
itself, Brandt, desperate for an opening move by the Soviet Union, jumped on the 
Budapest declaration. As the first major Western statesmen to comment on the 
declaration, he fully embraced the idea. 
We hail such a thought [of a European Security Conference] in itself. Its realization must bring us 
nearer to a solution of the problems of Central Europe that corresponds to the hopes of the German 
people and the just interests of the countries involved. 155 
 
Brandts quick and categorically positive response to the Budapest appeal reveals how far 
he was ultimately willing to go in creating goodwill with the Soviet Union. Since the 
Soviets had repeatedly made it clear that they did not consider the United States or 
Canada party to such talks, the firm stance by Rainer Barzel, CDU party whip, that 
without the United States there is nothing to discuss between East and West European 
governments on issues of peace and security was certainly more in line with American 
interests. 156  
The Nixon administration, for their part, did not consider the Budapest appeal a 
proposal worthy of a response.157 Even after Soviet ambassador Dobrynin indicated 
several days later that the United States would not be barred from participating in such a 
security conference, Nixons speech at the Commemorative Session of the North Atlantic 
Council on April 10 demonstrated his awareness of ideological differences and wariness 
of selective détente. 
Living in the real world of today means recognizing the sometimes differing interests of the 
Western nations, while never losing sight of our great common purposes. Living in the real world 
of today means understanding old concepts of East versus West, understanding und unfreezing 
those concepts, but never losing sight of great ideological differences that still remain. 
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We can afford neither to blind our eyes with hatred nor to distort our vision with rose-
colored glasses. The real world is too much with us to permit either stereotyped reacting or 
wishful thinking to lay waste our powers.158 
 
In this speech Nixon is clearly indicating his determination to exercise leadership in the 
one area that was most dear to him: directing the world balance of power.159 Assuming 
the mantel of the moral leader of the Western world, he warned the allies to take a 
realistic look at the East and refrain from weakening the alliance through selective 
détente. His warnings, however, fell on deaf ears. 
 
Brandts Osthandel succeeds: The Gas Pipeline Deal 
German public opinion had already shifted toward a more reconciliatory approach with 
the East. Despite the Brezhnev Doctrine and its implicit threat to invade the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakian uprising of 1968, the threat 
perception of the Soviet Union dropped from 52 points in November 1968 to its all-time 
low of 7 points in September 1969.160 Furthermore, during the spring of 1969 the 
majority of West Germans began to see the Soviet Union as the superpower on the rise, 
economically as well as militarily.161  
 This change in the public perception of the Soviet Union coincided with Brandts 
opposition to the Americans claim to moral leadership.162 In fact, Brandt had already 
unilaterally followed up on the economic part of the Budapest declaration. Bureaucratic 
inertia had bogged down the discussion over the possible invitation of Soviet trade 
minister Patolichev to the Hanover trade fair, but it was reinvigorated on March 25, 1969 
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by Brandts ally in the Economics Ministry, von Dohnanyi. The Economics Ministry 
finally decided to issue the invitation but since the Hanover trade fair was set to start only 
four weeks later, von Dohnanyi asked Brandt to convey a verbal invitation.163 Brandt 
assured von Dohnanyi that he would ask Economics Ministry Undersecretary Duckwitz 
to take care of the matter within the next week but must have decided to give the issue a 
higher priority as he personally conveyed Economics Minister Schillers invitation in a 
meeting to an only moderately interested Ambassador Zarapkin the next day.164 
The reserved Soviet stance toward the FRG changed with Patolichevs acceptance 
of the invitation on April 23, 1969.165 In essence, this acceptance must be seen as the 
turning point in the Soviet willingness to cooperate with the FRG, albeit at this point only 
on economic matters. While it was certainly easier for the Soviets to engage in high-
profile trade with West Germany after the Warsaw Summit meeting in Budapest had 
paved the way for all Communist countries to engage in trade with the West, the late date 
of acceptance and the immediate demand for a natural gas pipeline to Germany suggests 
a more significant shift in Soviet trade strategy vis-à-vis the rest of Western Europe. 
This turning point was the changed French approach to Franco-Soviet trade. 
During his last few days in office, de Gaulles government tried to reshape the nature of 
Franco-Soviet trade in a manner that was more in line with Western ideas and interests. 
For the Soviets the conclusion of the negotiations on the renewal of the five-year Franco-
Soviet trade agreement, which concluded on April 18, 1969, must have been troubling. 
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The French, while blaming increased EC commitments, effectively limited the political 
and financial rewards for the Soviet Union. 
In the new five-year cycle, France was no longer willing to extend eight-year 
loans, and instead cut back to the commonly accepted five-year loans. Furthermore, the 
French refused to have Finance Minister Francois-Xavier Ortoli lead the negotiations or 
initial the agreement, thus giving the previously much publicized Franco-Soviet 
economic relations a significantly lower profile. But most importantly, the French 
changed the conception of the new five-year trade deals, calling them a new kind of 
extended trade deals in which economic exchange would only represent one element 
among broad exchanges of thought, experience, and services. 166 This, however, flew in 
the face of existing Soviet business practices. The extension of deals beyond strict 
economic interchanges to prospective interchanges of thought and services ran 
counter to Soviet guidelines on economic cooperation. Anything other than an exchange 
of goods and currency was considered by the Soviets an infringement in domestic affairs. 
With these conditions unfavorable from the Soviet point of view, it was a logical tactic to 
explore the possibility of engaging a new player, the FRG, in the Soviet game of divide-
and-conquer. 
According to an assessment of the German Economics Ministry, the French had 
not drawn back as the result of Nixons call for a unified Western front in negotiations. 
Rather, the Franco-Soviet trade was plagued by what would become the hallmark of the 
German-Soviet trade in the years to come: economic exchanges on the basis of barter and 
French credits. Ultimately, the Soviet unwillingness to allow for more sophisticated 
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commercial interactions through joint business ventures and foreign investment left the 
Soviet Union unable to balance its trade deficit and made Western expansion into the 
Soviet market less attractive.167 Even the planned Soviet natural gas pipeline through 
Austria, Italy, and France was of questionable financial benefit, in addition to being legal 
limbo as Soviet-Italian negotiations on the Italian extension of the pipeline had stalled. 
Nor was there a sizable demand for natural gas in either Italy or France. Both countries 
had enough domestic natural gas resources to supply their countries until at least 1975; 
and without the Italian section, the pipeline into France was dead.168 
During the meeting between Patolichev and Schiller in Hanover, Patolichev 
bluntly explained that the Soviet oil sector, as the main Soviet export commodity, had 
only limited potential. As already indicated, the Soviets had unsuccessfully sought to 
boost their export of the one type of oil they had plenty of: heating oil. Of the other two 
types, the Soviet Union had virtually no reserves of crude oil, and only minor export 
capacities in gasoline.169 Consequently, the German proposals for cooperation could lead 
to the development of another hard-currency export commodity: natural gas. Patolichev 
basically only offered one thing: the initiation of Soviet gas delivery negotiations to the 
FRG. Brandt, having just gotten his party honed in on a new, conciliatory foreign policy 
toward Eastern Europe during the Social Democratic Partys convention in Bad 
Godesberg on April 18, jumped on the opportunity. This was done with no sign of Soviet 
willingness to provide political or trade concessions in return. Patolichev was very clear 
about this during his visit to Hanover, and Schiller did get the message:  
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During the conversation it became very clear that the Soviet side is foremost interested in talks on 
specific goods and projects. The continuation of trade agreement negotiations and the possible 
agreement on trade deals have only been mentioned by our Soviet guests in a very casual way. 170 
 
Concerns about becoming dependent on Soviet energy exports were pushed aside with 
the remark that the volume of a potential trade deal would not be big enough to present a 
serious threat. The wisdom of supplying a Communist country that had recently 
threatened to invade the FRG with a significant inflow of hard currency, however, was 
never questioned.171 The most striking display of a wish to create good relations with the 
Soviet Union at all costs was that the Soviet gas was not even of commercial interest to 
the FRG. The German Economics Ministry assessed a potential gas pipeline as only 
feasible if it would connect Italy, France, Austria, Southern Germany, and even 
Czechoslovakia. Northern Germany was well supplied with Dutch and Norwegian gas for 
some time to come. Southern Germany was also well supplied, although here, starting in 
1975, the market could possibly absorb 23 billion cubic meters. Even this relatively 
small quantity would require the creation of strong market incentives for consumers to 
switch from oil to natural gas and heavily discounted prices.172 In essence, the Soviet 
Union offered something that the FRG had no need for. 
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Whether it was the Soviet realization of how desperately the FRG wanted to free 
itself from the Soviet-imposed isolation, how important a role the Soviet Union was to 
play in Brandts political vision, or simply the fact that Soviet negotiators were well 
informed of German negotiation positions through its intelligence services, the roles of 
beggar and chooser were oddly reversed in these interchanges.173 
German Ambassador Helmut Allardt assured a very reserved Soviet minister on 
May 26, 1969, that the German Economics Ministry would try to assist the Soviets in 
selling its natural gas in Germany within the conditions the Soviets had envisioned. The 
German ambassador also suggested an industrial-technological exchange between the 
two countries to provide additional incentives for the Soviet Union to continue the 
dialogue,.174 Further German incentives proved to be more concrete. In connection with 
Undersecretary von Dohnanyis trip to Moscow, the Economics Ministry raised, per 
Soviet request and without any reciprocal gesture, the import quota on heating oil, which 
resulted in a virtual doubling of heating oil imports from the Soviet Union in an already 
saturated market.175 
But not everyone in the German government was happy with the manner in which 
this trade deal was being negotiated. Deputy Undersecretary of trade policy in the 
German Foreign Ministry, Dr. Herbst, observed that in the negotiations with the Russians 
on the proposed pipeline deal, West Germany did not obtain adequate Soviet concessions 
in return. The reason, it seemed to Herbst, was the dependence of large German firms 
such as Daimler Benz, Siemens, and Mannesmann/Thyssen on the proposed agreement 
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on Russian natural gas deliveries to West Germany.176 This assumption, however, that 
German firms depended on the trade with the East was flawed. While Mannesmann stood 
to profit from the proposed natural gas pipeline deal, and in 1975 even built a new plant 
specifically for the steel pipe orders from these deals, they were at full employment and 
production capacity in 19681969, even without the Soviet orders.177 As another case in 
point, the proposed Daimler Benz project, the construction of a truck manufacturing plant 
on the Kama river, held no commercial interest for the German side. In June 1970 a 
Daimler assessment concluded that the entire project is commercially without interest. It 
would be a matter of prestige and not a penetration of the Soviet market by the German 
automobile industry.178 In addition, the Soviets had not firmly earmarked any of these 
projects to the German firms mentioned above. In fact, the Daimler truck 
manufacturing plant was first offered to Ford Motor Co., which turned it down over 
political concerns. In short, these economic benefits for the German economy were not 
nearly as tangible as the proOsthandel faction would have liked them to be. Yet this 
Soviet strategy of dangling industrial projects of unheard proportions before West 
European countries, sometimes without the means or understanding of how to complete 
them, worked well in pressuring West European governments and companies.179 
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It certainly worked in this case. By June 1969, the Economics Ministry had in 
principle already condoned Russian natural gas deliveries as long as they were limited to 
reasonable amounts and that entire industrial regions would not become dependent on 
Soviet deliveries.180 This removed the biggest potential leverage the Economics 
Ministry had had in gaining Soviet concessions from the deal. The Soviet position also 
improved through another fortunate circumstance: the proposed pipeline, with its 
promises of a cheap heating source, stood to benefit the state of Bavaria and thus gained 
the support of the already latently antiAmerican oriented CSU. With the CSU being part 
of the governing coalition, this assured that the gas pipeline negotiations would not 
become part of campaign rhetoric.181 
 
Domestic and International Dissent to a new Osthandel 
Despite the absence of serious public debate on the issue, parts of the German 
government bureaucracy remained concerned. Economics Ministry official Herbst 
pointed to a majority in-house opinion according to which the West German government 
should seek to use this deal for political leverage. Since the annual Soviet revenues from 
the natural gas deliveries would allow the Soviet Union to finance one-fifth of its total 
imports from West Germany, Herbst felt that the federal government could wrestle a long 
sought-after comprehensive trade agreement from the Soviets. 182 This trade agreement, 
which had last been discussed in October 1966, had failed because of the Soviet refusal to 
include West Berlin in the agreement. Herbst and the foreign trade section of the Foreign 
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Ministry, therefore, argued for tougher negotiations with the Soviet delegation on the 
natural gas pipeline deal. Foreign Ministy Undersecretary Harkort concurred with Herbst 
on the need for Soviet concessions and further considered the 20% Soviet natural gas 
import quota proposed by the Economics Ministry to be surprisingly high.183 
 Apparently concerned over the criticism of the proposed deal, Brandt intervened 
personally with Economics Minister Schiller. He outlined the great significance of such a 
pipeline deal for commercial and political reasons and thus wouldnt have any concerns 
about a considerably large quantity of Soviet natural gas deliveries. Further, Our 
interest lies in the expansion of trade, which requires an increase of export capabilities by 
the Soviet Union. Like Herbst, Brandt still sought to use this deal to get a trade 
agreement that would also include West Berlin and advised that the commercial aspects 
of this deal be settled speedily and in such a manner that they could be used as a basis for 
a trade agreement. Lastly, he proposed to form a working group between the Foreign and 
Economics Ministry to further coordinate steps. 184 
 Schiller agreed with Brandt in general on the desirability of a trade agreement but 
did not show the same readiness to sacrifice commercial interests for political ones. With 
a vague reference to interministerial coordination when the time would be right, Schiller 
blocked Brandts interference and referred him to his staff, should Brandt have questions 
in the meantime.185 Here, it becomes more than evident that the discourse on trade with 
the Soviet Union was one of caution and reservation. Even SPD ministers, such as 
Schiller, did not share Brandts enthusiasm for Soviet trade deals and it is thus not 
surprising that Brandt, once he became chancellor, had to rely on Bahr and von Dohnanyi 
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to bring negotiations to fruition, something that a reluctant government bureaucracy was 
unable to do. 
 The importance of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, if not the Soviet 
gas pipeline deal directly, not only led to a rift between SPD members but caused a rift 
within the Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU. German chancellor Kiesinger did 
not place the same value on trade with Eastern Europe as Brandt. He assured the 
American Ambassador Kenneth Rush that he held no illusions in regards to the Soviet 
stance on the German question. The Soviets are perhaps more interested in certain 
economic issues than in previous years, but this does not change their political 
attitudes.186 While he planned to continue a friendly dialogue, he did not have high 
hopes.187 Later on he reassured Ambassador Rush that Germanys security lay with the 
United States as this was  
the most important aspect of German foreign policy. Second is the rebuilding of Western Europe 
and finally, if possible, the reduction of the antagonism between East and West. And even then he 
would not be willing to accept a change in the Russian position if that meant sacrificing national 
interests, i.e. self-determination.188 
 
This rift between the coalition and government bureaucracies was not one of simple 
preference in negotiation strategy. At its core lay the debate over the perception of the 
Soviet Union and its foreign policy ambitions. If the Soviet Union had, under the 
Adenauer and Erhard governments, once been the unquestioned villain, by 1969 the 
image of the Soviet Union as a dangerous enemy had begun, according certain factions, 
to shift to that of a potential partner that promised economic stability and a chance for a 
European peace order. 
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 For Brandt, political visions, not security concerns, were the driving element in 
German-Soviet relations, leading to a sometimes wishful interpretation of Soviet actions. 
Between July 1321, 1969, the director of Thyssen A.G., Ernst Wolf Mommsen held 
high-level talks on trade issues in Moscow and concluded that the Soviets were 
interested in improving the climate in economic respects and to intensify 
interchanges.189 Brandts assistant, Bahr, after talking to Mommsen, accordingly viewed 
the negotiations over Soviet gas deliveries as a political test for the Soviet Union and 
felt that this matter was raised as a political issue, and disregarded Mommsens economic 
concerns.190 To Brandt, close economic ties in the field of energy could be a precursor to 
broader European cooperation. His vision of a Marshall Plan for the East was based on 
the belief that growing economic interdependence would create the basis for a peaceful 
order. Ultimately, he sought to replicate the success story of Western European 
integration in East-West relations under the auspices of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe and the cooperation between the European Economic 
Community and the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).191 
 Despite Brandts optimism, Moscows negotiation style would prove to be less 
helpful than Brandt or Bahr had hoped. Arkady N. Shevchenko provides an insightful 
reflection on Soviet negotiation strategy that makes it readily apparent why most German 
businessmen considered their negotiation with Soviet representatives hard and tedious. 
All Soviet negotiators are agents of limited authority who may not express opinions differing from 
the Politburos position. [] A Soviets first instinct is to be suspicious of goodwill and to doubt 
his counterparts objectivity. Part of this intractable attitude can be blamed upon instructions. In 
order to make them tougher bargainers, Kremlin leaders usually do not include in their 
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representatives directives any fallback position, thus leaving them singing one stubborn note at 
the bargaining table until a compromise is worked out back in Moscow.192 
 
Thus, with the Kiesinger administration torn between the need for Soviet goodwill an 
concessions, and Soviet negotiators not willing or able to make major concessions, it is 
not surprising that by September negotiations had not progressed further than a general 
understanding on the annual delivery of three billion cubic meters of natural gas for five 
to six years, starting in 1972. On September 10, 1969, Herbst reported that the German 
industry had little interest in expanding into the Soviet market due to Soviet 
administrative hurdles.193  
  Most of these dealings occurred under the radar of public opinion. The German 
election campaign was focused on Ostpolitik, not Osthandel, as were the concerns of the 
Nixon administration. Early on, Nixon, too, sought to liberalize trade with the 
Communist bloc. Soon after taking office, he commissioned a study to expand trade 
globally and even had the issue revisited after the initial report did not sufficiently 
elaborate on East-West trade. He felt that the boycott policy of the 1950s was 
anachronistic because Communist states were too important to ignore.194 He also 
suggested Secretary Clifford M. Hardin should visit East European countries on his trip 
to Europe in order to explore economic ties.195  
Nevertheless, the difference between Nixon and Brandts Osthandel lay in the 
fundamental approach to, and value of, Osthandel. For Nixon and Kissinger, it was a 
political tool to continue the ideological struggle with an enemy country. The National 
Security Council, in May 1969, came to the conclusion that trade with Eastern Europe 
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amounted to only $200 million annually. Furthermore, lifting trade restrictions would 
only insignificantly increase trade volume with the East, in part due to a lack of Russian 
currency reserves and partially since the Russian market was not as suited for American 
goods as it was for Western European ones (the U.S. only held a 5% share of trade with 
Eastern Europe).196 The lack of profits, therefore, placed the issue of liberalizing trade 
restrictions in a political rather than economic sphere and Nixons subsequent rejections 
of trade exemptions in the Coordination Committee (COCOM) must be attributed to his 
ideological mistrust of a Communist regime. 
Never once in my career have I doubted that the Communists meant it when they say that their 
goal is to bring the world under Communist control.  [] I have always believed that we can and 
must communicate and, when possible, negotiate with Communist nations. They are too powerful 
to ignore. We must always remember that they will never act out of altruism, but only out of self-
interest.197 
 
Communist countries remained the enemy and economic trade was just another weapon 
of peaceful competition for political achievements. A summary by C. Fred Bergstein 
expressed Nixons views unequivocally. Regarding trade policies with the Soviet Union, 
he wrote to Kissinger that I fully recognize that he [Nixon] wishes to avoid giving the 
Soviets anything at this time.198 The era of negotiation, therefore, was one of tit-for-tat 
in which trade concessions would be bartered for political concessions. The Germans 
were fully aware of this fact: 
When Nixon talks about an era of negotiations he does not insinuate an era of agreement at all 
costs but a phase of balanced agreement on the basis of give and take. While he does not believe 
that the basic rivalry between the superpowers could be changed he assumes that the Soviet Union 
will be amicable to agreements out of self-interest, particularly in the area of nuclear arms. Nixon, 
however, has not gotten any proof in 1970 that the Soviet leadership views arrangements on the 
basis of give and take equally as desirable as he himself. In light of the absence of clear indicators 
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of substantial Soviet readiness to reach a compromise, voices in the Senate and in the East Coast 
media became stronger, recommending a policy of as if to the president. 199 
 
In this light, Brandts decision to pursue the natural gas pipeline deal must be seen as a 
clear break with U.S. interests. The once extremely loyal ally had broken with its strict 
allegiance to U.S. leadership and pursued its own foreign policy. For those parts of the 
Nixon administration not categorically opposed to trade with the Soviet Union, the 
absence of firm economic data paired with the political difficulties of liberalizing trade 
elevated exports controls to an instrument of negotiation. This approach to trade, which 
linked political conditions with trade concessions, fell in line with Kissingers 
geopolitical linkage strategy and Nixons election slogan of détente as an era of 
negotiation.200 Even for this faction, generally supportive of liberalizing trade with the 
East, the Brandt government in essence stole the American thunder. 
The one reason why this has not been explored in the historiography is that the 
issue of whether COCOM was an effective tool and whether negative export controls 
serve the desired purpose is still heavily debated. Gary Bertsch and Michael Mastanduno 
see export controls as valuable tools for Western powers and COCOM as an effective 
institution. The relative decline in U.S. power in the late 1960s and early 1970s made it 
essential to cooperate in COCOM, and through its internal flexibility it remained an 
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effective tool to delay Soviet technological development.201 Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, on 
the other hand, has producedby his own admissiona crude calculation from which he 
concludes that the Western embargo yielded only negligible results.202 Alan Dobson, like 
Adler-Karlsson, sees Nixon and Kissinger as expanding US-Soviet trade, even in the 
early period of 19701972, and slashing export controls wherever possible. To him, the 
political element that retarded Soviet-American trade was domestic pressure, not the 
Nixon administration.203 Dobsons differing view may be informed by his failure to 
understand the primacy of political concessions in exchange for trade in Nixon and 
Kissingers approach to foreign policy. Trade with the Soviet Union only increased 
drastically once the Soviet Union had politically cooperated with regard to Vietnam and 
Berlin. 
The political element of export controls is especially significant with respect to 
Vietnam, the one issue above all that permeated American foreign policy. The Nixon 
administration used trade incentives to make economic advances toward China at a time 
of Sino-Soviet tensions, which was intended to encourage the Russians to show greater 
willingness to be helpful on some of the more vexing problems between us.204 In 
particular, Kissinger and Nixon were hoping that limiting exports to the Soviet Union and 
China would put pressure on them to help in Vietnam and would signal that we are 
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prepared to deal with them after the war.205 The Nixon administration pursued a policy 
of linkage, in which political concessions by the Communist states were necessary to 
foster trade. Nixon decided that the U.S. should be prepared to move generously to 
liberalize our trade policy toward the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European 
countries whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations with them.206 
Or, as Kissinger put it, expanding trade without a political quid pro quo was a gift; there 
was little the Soviets could do for us economically.207 Brandts policy of economic 
liberalization in return for goodwill could not have been very pleasing to Nixon. In fact, 
European business deals with Eastern Europe were observed with a sense of helpless 
frustration in the U.S. 
At the heart of the problem is the fact that in our East-West trade policy as it relates to peaceful 
trade we are going it alone. Today only American industry has such heavy bureaucratic 
governmental licensing requirements and controls for the export of many kinds of peaceful goods 
to Eastern Europe. If the governments of the European industrial nations of NATO followed a 
policy similar to ours, it would be one thing. [...] But European NATO and other free-world 
governments are actively supporting their business communities to expand exports to East Europe 
by assisting in long-term credits, subsidizing export, encouraging barter arrangements, etc. [...] 
Our policy of denial denies very little and simply forces the satellite nations to obtain comparable 
products from Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and other European nations, and Japan at the 
expense of American business and industry.208 
 
Ultimately, though, Nixons focus quickly moved away from trade issues. In early March 
1970, Nixon sent a memorandum to Kissinger, arguing that it was necessary to farm 
out issues of lower priority. Trade policy is a case in point. This is something where it 
just isn't going to make a lot of difference whether we move one way or another on the 
glass tariff. Oil import is also a case in point. While it has some political consequences it 
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is not something I should become deeply involved in."209 It was Nixon and Kissingers 
focus on politics rather than economics that lead to a clear advantage for the Soviets in 
Germany. As Shevchenko explaines in his memoirs, the Soviets stressed the importance 
of trade as a supplement to the political process. 
Gromyko and others often remarked that although the Federal Republic belonged to the West, its 
geopolitical interests would gradually push it toward neutrality and eventually perhaps closer to 
the Soviet Union than to the United States. [] Soviet policy was to encourage Bonn to think that 
only the U.S.S.R.  not the United States  could alleviate the terror of nuclear war. We intended 
to support the theme with a refrain that Moscow was Germanys natural and historic economic 
partner.210 
 
This failure is even more striking when one considers Keith Nelsons argument that it 
was economic exhaustion that drove the Soviet Union to the conciliatory stance that 
made détente possible.211 Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich take the argument even 
furtherthey see in détente nothing but a breathing spell for the Soviet Union to 
recuperate economically by purchasing food stuffs at favorable prices from the West 
while overcoming the Western embargo on strategic materials at the same time.212 
 
Black or a Different Shade of Red: The German Election Campaign 
For the Nixon administration, Germanys 1969 election campaign brought about some 
interesting possibilities as Brandts policies of reconciliation with the East stood to 
benefit U.S. foreign policy interests. By the late 1960s, both superpowers hoped to 
resolve tensions in Europe in order to focus on more pressing matters in the Asian 
theater: the Soviet Union had to deal with an increasingly hostile China while the United 
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States became more and more hampered by the Vietnam War. Resolution of the deadlock 
over Germany was the key element for an understanding and the possibility of reducing 
troop levels and military expenditures in Europe. Kiesingers stubborn refusal to revise 
Germanys foreign policy and participate in American détente policies became a major 
issue of contention between the FRG and its Western allies in several respects. 
The first problem arose from Germanys continued application of the Hallstein 
Doctrine, which claimed that the FRG was the sole representative of the German people 
and made it policy not to recognize the GDR until a peace treaty between the World War 
II allies had been negotiated successfully and the East Germans were able to freely 
express their political will. Furthermore, no government that recognized the illegitimate 
government of the GDR could also entertain diplomatic relations with the FRG. While it 
proved a rather divisive doctrine at times, it nevertheless succeeded in keeping the 
German question in the forefront of international diplomacy and forced third world 
countries to side overwhelmingly with the economically stronger West Germany, even as 
they would play the two Germanies against each other for economic aid.213 Yet the 
Hallstein Doctrine effectively blocked the way for diplomatic relations with East 
European countries, which naturally had recognized the Communist GDR over the 
democratic FRG. This confrontational policy was felt to be anachronistic by Nixon, as 
Communist states were too important to ignore.214 This issue became a hot topic in the 
election campaign when Cambodia recognized East German statehood on May 8, 1969. 
The SPD faction of the government under Brandts leadership was opposed to breaking 
relations with Cambodia over this recognition, and it was Chancellor Kiesinger who cast 
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the decisive vote in a party-line split on the issue. Even though Brandt remained in the 
grand coalition for the time being, it became clear that the internationally divisive issue 
of the Hallstein Doctrine would be discarded if Brandt were to become chancellor.215 
The second hurdle that West Germany presented to American détente was the 
issue of nuclear proliferation. NPT was a key agreement in the relaxation of tensions 
between East and West. The United States was concerned about Chinese nuclear 
weapons tests in 1964 and initiated a push for a NPT.216 The Soviet Union was gravely 
concerned about the possibility of the FRG obtaining nuclear weapons, either by 
acquiring them independently, or by means of allied nuclear sharing.217 For Germans, 
though, nuclear strike capability was seen as the only way to assure the credibility of a 
nuclear counterstrike, should the Soviets single West Germany out for an attack. As 
German foreign minister Gerhard Schroeder noted, Soviet interest in a nuclear-free 
Germany and German interest in reunification needed to remain connected.218 This stance 
isolated Germany from all Eastern bloc countries as well as most of its Western allies, 
since no one wanted to see Germany acquire nuclear weapons, even on a sharing basis.219 
Not even the United States was interested in allowing Germany to have nuclear 
weapons.220 Brandt had pushed for a quick West German signature to the NPT and had 
only been curtailed by Kiesingers insistence to postpone the decision until after the 
September 28 elections.221  
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Lastly, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the final border between Poland 
and Germany was deemed essential to relaxation of tensions between Germany and its 
East European neighbors. As long as the FRG would not recognize the Oder-Neisse line, 
fear of German revanchism remained strong. The powerful political lobby of refugee 
organizations, however, made it a difficult task to formally surrender territories that were 
already under Soviet control. While this was true in the case of the SPD, it was even 
more so for the CDU. With most refugee organizations sympathetic to the more 
conservative CDU, it would have been political suicide for a CDU politician to recognize 
the Oder-Neisse line as Germanys Eastern border in the 1960s. Insisting on these old 
positions not only hindered FRG diplomacy, jeopardizing the trust it had been able to 
rebuild in the international community, but it also upset U.S.-Soviet negotiations on 
détente. Brandt, in contrast, was clearly willing to accept the Oder-Neisse line. On May 
19, 1969, Brandt indicated he was ready to talk with Poland over such an acceptance, 
despite Polish skepticism over the fruitfulness of such an endeavor while the conservative 
CDU was still in power.222 
Furthermore, Brandt appeared to be more than Chancellor Kiesinger on issues of 
international monetary policy. The strength of the German mark had been a source of 
contention throughout the Kiesinger administration. On the European side, the French 
demanded tight monetary control, wishing to stem the flow of currency into West 
Germany. American interests, stemming from a financial overextension in Vietnam, 
demanded a revaluation of the mark so as to relieve the dollar. With fixed exchange rates 
as the cornerstone of the international monetary system of the time (known as the Breton-
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Woods system), any alteration of the exchange rate would be a political act, rather than 
an automatic economic mechanism. When the Breton-Woods system experienced two 
explosive runs on the mark in May and September 1969, German fears of inflation and a 
sense of frustration vis-à-vis the loosely handled monetary policy of the other Western 
countries brought the issue of international monetary policy to the forefront of the 
German election campaign. Brandt, again on the side of Atlantic interests, advocated a 
revaluation while Kiesinger refused to do so out of a need to cater to his constituency:  
farmers, who stood to lose export opportunities, and conservatives, who retained a fear of 
currency manipulation from the experiences of the Weimar Republic.223 
In an odd twist of fate, then, the Nixon administration saw an opportunity in 
Brandt to pursue its foreign policy more effectively. There has been little trace of Nixons 
interest in Germany during the hot phase of the German election campaign. Undoubtedly 
preoccupied with Vietnam, the German election campaign was of less significance. 
Beginning with the student protests at Harvard on April 9 over the leakage of the secret 
bombing raids in Cambodia at the beginning of May to the New York Times, and 
followed by the fiasco of Hamburger Hill in late May, to the publication in Life magazine 
on June 27, 1969 of images of recently killed American soldiers in Vietnam, a highly 
media-conscious Nixon must have remembered the old adage that all foreign politics is 
domestic politics. 
The American public certainly agreed with the primacy of Vietnam over other 
issues. When asked in January 1969 about the most important problem the United States 
faced, Vietnam by far topped the list with 40%, the highest it would ever be, leaving 
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other international problems at an insignificant two percent. The largest antiwar 
demonstrations in U.S. history, during October and November 1969, certainly 
underscored that message to the president. 
Another reason for the relative American silence on the German election might 
have been an American presumption that Kiesinger would win again. When Nixon asked 
Kiesinger about the election during their meeting on August 7, Kiesinger exuded 
confidence by saying that most Social Democrats were resigned to losing and most 
Christian Democrats convinced of winning.224  
When the election results came in on the night of September 28 Kiesingers CDU 
had won, albeit with only a narrow majority in the Bundestag. Nixons eagerness to 
congratulate Kiesinger on his victory is probably indicative of the American hope for a 
continued conservative German government, despite the possible advantages Brandt had 
to offer.225 Within the next couple weeks, however, Brandt managed to convince the 
German Liberals (FDP), to participate in a coalition with the SPD, giving them a razor-
thin majority in the Bundestag and making him the new chancellorelect of Germany. 
The American response to Brandts sudden rise to power was divided. Nixon, 
maintaining a cold war warrior ideology, was opposed to Brandt in principle for being a 
Socialist and in particular for the general thrust of his Eastern policy. As Hillenbrand 
recalled, Nixon viewed Brandt as ideologically suspect and his attempts at selective 
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détente as downright treasonable.226 Kissinger, on the other hand, approached Brandts 
election with more pragmatism. 
I cannot maintain that I came to this view [overcoming the outdated policies of Adenauer and 
adapting to the changing international situation] immediately. But once I recognized the 
inevitable, I sought to channel it in a constructive direction [] We were determined to spare no 
effort to mute the latent incompatibility between Germanys national aims and its Atlantic and 
European ties.227 
 
Kissingers more pragmatic support of Brandt stemmed from two main reasons. One was 
the previously mentioned prospect of the removal of German obstacles to an American 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union: Ostpolitik would necessitate Germanys signing of 
the NPT and the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border. The other reason for lending 
support to Germanys new foreign policy was Kissingers inherent suspicion of Soviet 
intentions. 
The Federal Republic needed the support of its allies. Linkage was inherent. If Ostpolitik were to 
succeed, it had to be related to other issues involving the Alliance as a whole; only in this manner 
would the Soviet Union have incentives for compromise.228 
 
The White House, therefore, had every reasonbarring Nixons ideological concerns
to support Brandt in the same fashion it had supported Kiesinger. Kissinger viewed the 
FRGs attempt at unification legitimate and unalterable. Any American attempt to block a 
policy leading to unification would force the FRG to abandon the Western alliance. 
Ostpolitik was therefore a must. This was, however, not very troubling to Kissinger 
since he assessed Brandt as severely limited in his attempt to be much more flexible 
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toward the East.229 In short, Kissinger concurred with the large segment of the American 
public who did not think much would come of Ostpolitik. 
 
Initial Ostpolitik: Brandts Honeymoon Period 
Since Kissinger underestimated the dangers Willy Brandts Ostpolitik posed to German-
American relations, he was pleased that what he saw as Kiesingers outdated foreign 
policy had come to an end. This explains Kissingers willingness to agree to see Germany 
as a partner, not a client when notified by Egon Bahr, as Brandts emissary, that under 
SPD leadership Germany would pursue a more independent policy toward Eastern 
Europe.230 While the language Bahr employed was rather direct for the previously so 
submissive FRG, Kissinger seemed to have appreciated Germanys more independent 
approach toward alliance politics. He is said to have responded Thank God once Bahr 
elaborated on the fact that Germany would not seek constant reassurances of friendship 
with the United States.231 Kissinger even remembered from the meeting that to him 
[Bahr], America was a weight to be added to West Germanys scale in the right way at 
the right time, but his priority was to restore relations between the two Germanies above 
all.232 Clearly, Kissingers assessment of Bahr in his memoirs is less flattering than that 
of Brandt.   
Though Bahr was a man of the left, I considered him above all a German nationalist who wanted 
to exploit Germanys central position to bargain with both sides. He was of the type that had 
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always believed that Germany could realize its national destiny only by friendship with the East, 
or at least avoiding its enmity. Bahr was obviously not as unquestioningly dedicated to Western 
unity as the people we had known in the previous government.233 
 
Regardless of the harsh tone and the exploitative policy he attributed to Bahr, Kissinger 
promised Bahr to deal with Germany as a partner, not a client and the two statesmen 
agreed on establishing a backchannel that bypassed the state department in order to 
facilitate a closer cooperation between the two countries.234 This pleased Kissinger for 
two reasons. First, it enhanced his position within the Nixon administration and second, it 
allowed him to conduct foreign diplomacy the way he liked it: through unofficial 
backchannel dialogue. For Kissinger, the establishment of backchannels, which had been 
initiated with numerous other countries, allowed him to bypass the State Department and 
consolidate the decision-making of the United States foreign policies in the White 
House, i.e. under President Nixon and himself. Nixon clearly approved of this policy and 
had initiated backchannels for Kissinger with other governments, such as France and the 
Soviet Union. Backchannels also reflected the way in which Kissinger thought foreign 
policy should be conducted: as agreements between gentlemen, away from the scrutiny of 
the public eye. 
On the official level, Brandts inaugural address to the German parliament on 
October 28, 1969 was even more promising. He elaborated on all the policies that the 
United States could have wished for from a German rapprochement with the East but still 
placed the FRG squarely in the Western camp. 
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The North Atlantic alliance, which has proven its worth in the twenty years of its existence, 
continues to guarantee our safety in the future. Its firm cohesion is the basis for the common effort 
to reach a détente in Europe.235 
 
He emphasized that the German people need peace in the full sense of the word, also 
with the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the peoples of Eastern Europe, and went on 
to commit his presidency to formal negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the 
approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.236 Brandt further abandoned the Hallstein 
Doctrine altogether and accepted the GDR as a political entity with which one could 
negotiate.237 
One harbinger of the coming tensions between the U.S. and Germany was also 
included in Brandts speech. He criticized Nixon where it hurt most: Vietnam. As 
Kissingers advisor, Helmut Sonnenfeld, summarized, Brandts public view of the U.S. 
role in Vietnam was extremely critical. 
 In contrast to recent statements of support for the President from British and Dutch leaders, 
Brandt, in his Government declaration, deals with Vietnam as follows: We unite with all states, 
and not least with the tortured human beings involved, in the wish that the war in Vietnam will 
finally be ended by a political solution.238 
 
He cited Brandts key passage on their relationship with the United States as a possible 
reason for Brandts outspokenness on Vietnam. Brandt self-confidently assumed a more 
independent role for West Germany within the transatlantic partnership.   
Our common interests require neither additional assurances nor recurrent declarations. They are 
capable of supporting a more independent policy and a more active partnership on the part of 
Germany. 
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In other words, the Brandt administration realized that it did not need to defer to 
American interests because the United States was so committed to Europe that it could 
not afford to withdraw, barring a direct political affront to the United States. Henry 
Kissinger added a handwritten comment on the memo, noting that we will come to 
regret German flexibility.239 
Despite this small blemish, on a political level, the White House had good reason 
to be pleased with Brandt and support his policies. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was 
signed on November 18, 1969 and German talks with the Soviet Union and Poland began 
in December 1969 and February 1970, respectively. Accepting Bahrs antiAmerican 
intentions must therefore have been a small price to pay, especially since Kissinger 
considered Brandt solidly in the Western camp.240 American public opinion, while 
cautious, was also convinced of Brandts loyalty to the West. New York Times 
correspondent Roger Berthoud outlined Brandts Ostpolitik in detail and concluded that 
as former mayor of Berlin Herr Brandt is fully aware of the value of solidarity and has 
none of the illusions about communism which his political opponents love to attribute to 
him.241  
In his memoirs Kissinger remembered the initial White House approach to 
Brandts Ostpolitik as very supportive. Driven by the realization that without the support 
of her allies the FRG had a very weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the 
White House stood ready to support Brandts initiatives toward the East without 
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reservation.242 Whether this support of Ostpolitik extended to Nixon is not clear, but it is 
unlikely. Kissinger recalls that in January 1970, roughly three months after Brandt came 
to power, Nixons suspicion of Brandt had not abated.243 Nixon also was concerned 
that selective détente would act as a Soviet means of dividing the West. In a statement at 
the NATO ministerial conference in April 1969 he warned against Soviet tactics of 
isolating individual NATO partners. Since we approach a time of negotiations, it is 
important that we do not agree to a selective form of rapprochement that Moscow 
determined.244  
 Nixons relative quietness on Brandts Ostpolitik in the winter of 1969 must be 
viewed in light of Nixons other priorities, specifically Vietnam. His failure to stall the 
American antiwar movement until an honorable withdrawal from Vietnam could be 
achieved, in conjunction with the North Vietnamese refusal to give way in diplomatic 
negotiations, left Nixon with a conflict that had an impact on both the American economy 
and his popularity.245 His announcement of troop withdrawals from Vietnam in 
September 1969 and the subsequent talks in Paris with the North Vietnamese held a much 
greater political risk for Nixon than did Brandts Ostpolitik. In addition, negotiations with 
the Soviet Union, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), began in Helsinki in 
November, which also stood to impact the United States more directly than Germanys 
foreign policy. Once Germany had taken all the steps the Nixon administration 
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considered crucial in adjusting German foreign policy to the new era of détente, Brandt 
and his Ostpolitik held less interest for President Nixon. Through the removal of the 
German problem, the United States was now able to consolidate her position in Europe, 
leaving her strengthened to deal with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Americans viewed 
Brandt and his Ostpolitik with the grandfatherly benevolence of an impulsive child who, 
when confronted with the realities of life, would soon come to understand the limits of 
his idealism. With regards to German-American relations, Brandt was in his 
honeymoon periodfor the first hundred days, he stayed within the acceptable 
political framework that Kissinger had predicted: a limited rapprochement with the East 
without upsetting the status quo. 
Yet Kissinger and Nixons preoccupation with political issues blinded them to 
economic and social developments that stood to profoundly affect the German 
international position. Unlike the Nixon administration, the Soviets highly valued 
economics. It is unlikely that they were simply reinvigorating Lenins economic doctrines 
and sought to buy the proverbial rope on which to hang the Western capitalists, as 
Shevchenko claims. But they clearly did see an opportunity to gain influence in West 
Germany and improve their hard-currency position. Soviet premier Kosygin sent his son-
in-law, Professor Belonov, on November 20, 1969 to reiterate strong Soviet interest in 
forming a commission on industrial-technological cooperation. This time the Economics 
Ministrys assessment of Soviet intentions and the Belonov visit was entirely positive. 
There are many indications that the Soviet Union is ending its policy aimed at conducting trade 
agreements with other Western industrialized nations while isolating the Federal Republic. It 
appears that they will now also suggest to the [German] Federal Government a closer cooperation 
in economic matters and its institutionalization on a governmental level. 246 
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With all the stops pulled out, the chancellors office, under Bahrs auspices, was now 
able to move the talks along at such a pace that in January 1970 the long-negotiated 
pipeline deal could be finalized. The conservative faction within the German government 
could do little but voice its concerns that Germany had not managed to obtain a basic set 
of rules, regulating trade deals between Western countries and the Soviet Union in its 
negotiations over the pipeline deal.247 Deputy Undersecretary Herbst, representing this 
view, pointed to the unprecedented conditions in which West German banks had 
extended loan guarantees to the Soviet Union that exceeded the customary five years 
limit by eight to ten years. The West German government also secured the loan with a 
Hermes credit of unusually high proportions (50%). Even the repayment procedures 
proved to be extraordinary: the Soviet Union provided only 1/11 of the value of the trade 
deal as down payment and did not have to start repaying the loan until roughly three 
years after delivery and then at an interest rate that was 1.5% below the customary rate. 
Additionally, installments would increase significantly toward the end of the loan, 
providing further financial flexibility for the Soviet Union.248 In short, the Brandt 
administration had bent over backward to make the deal as lucrative as possible for the 
Soviet Union and quietly made up the difference between the customary market rate of 
6.5% and the 5% the Soviet Union received.249 
Undersecretary Harkort voiced an even stronger condemnation of the deal. 
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1) It can be that special conditions become necessary for trade deals with the East if they exceed 
common standards. But in that case they should be chosen due to their unusual size, not because 
they are deals with the Eastunusual deals with the West should then receive the same treatment. 
2) One and a half decades have we fought against a race to undercut credit rates and conditions in 
the trade with the East, among others. If new conditions have now become necessary, one should 
try to coordinate them with the other large export countries.250  
 
According to Harkort, this deal also demonstrated a clear preference for business deals 
with the East over those with the West. This, of course, was true in the sense that German 
deals with other West European or American companies were not subsidized with such 
outstanding credit conditions. On a more permanent level, though, Harkorts criticism 
extended to the attitude of the German government in general. Government intervention 
by the chancellors office or the Economics Ministry often brought a stalled business deal 
to completion, where no such activities are apparent with respect to American companies. 
Quite the contrary, German officials many times expressed strong concern about 
American businesses investing too heavily in the FRG. Already in 1966 CSU leader 
Franz Josef Strauß had pushed for a German opening to the Soviet Union as a means to 
balance the American purchase of the German DEA petroleum company. 251 Brandts 
own blunt refusal to consider U.S. objections to the preferential trade system set up by 
the European Economic Community also indicates his unwillingness to foster US 
economic interests. 252 
 Lack of intergovernmental and international consultation on a deal of such 
political consequence was the final point of criticism advanced by Herbst and Harkort. 
No specific reference to the U.S. is made here, which alone is significant in that even the 
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faction of the German government that was critical of Osthandel did not feel a special 
obligation to the Western superpower. This probably can be traced back to the previously 
mentioned visit by Bahr to Kissinger in which he outlined a new relationship built on 
information, not consultation, among equal partners. 
 Diplomatically, 1970 brought to light some miscalculations on the part of the 
Nixon administration, if not Nixon himself. Still holding a strong interest in the 
transatlantic alliance, Nixon had already suggested to Kissinger an informal meeting with 
some major European ambassadors to restore U.S. moral authority and leadership 
within the alliance.253 Kissinger rejected Nixons concern and assured him that his 
European policy was on the right track. Nixon, however, was not as convinced and 
suggested the possibility of another visit to Europe.254 On January 19, 1970, Nixon 
reiterated his desire to retake the initiative in alliance politics rather than stand by and let 
Italy, France and Germany go off in all directions and NSC member Alexander Haig 
noted that the president had raised similar concerns several times already.255 Nixons 
somewhat disillusioned view of West European foreign policy initiatives must have been 
informed, at least in part, by the unsuccessful European intervention in Middle East 
diplomacy.256 Yet Nixons vision of reasserting strong transatlantic leadership was falling 
on deaf ears within his own administration. By late January, the National Security 
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Council had not even managed to conduct a systematic review of U.S. policy vis-à-vis its 
European allies, despite Nixons prodding for some months.257 
 Essentially, the discrepancy between Nixons wishes and their implementation by 
the National Security Council stemmed from a difference in opinion between Nixon and 
Kissinger. Kissinger did not advance a tough ideological line in the NSC but embraced 
the flexibility offered by Brandts Ostpolitik. The National Security Council staff also 
took a lax stand on European issues, arguing that there may be no particular urgency to a 
reexamination of our European policy, nor any clear ordering of issues that must be 
decided as the United States faced no imminent crisis in Europe.258 
This approach, however, left the Nixon administration somewhat dumbfounded 
when Brandt scored sweeping diplomatic successes within his first 100 days in office. In 
the first move that exceeded Kissingers expectations on German diplomatic 
maneuverability, the FRG intensified diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union, 
conducting high-level talks between Bahr and Soviet foreign minister Gromyko from 
January 30 through February 18, 1970. Despite this flurry of activity, Kissinger stood 
behind Brandts integrity. In a memo to Nixon he wrote:  
He [Brandt] rejects the idea that Germany should be free-floating between East and West and he 
remains strongly committed to NATO and West European integration. Indeed he believes his 
Eastern policy can be successful only if Germany is firmly anchored in the West. He has in effect 
renounced formal reunification as the aim of German policy but hopes over the long run to achieve 
special ties between the two German states which will reflect the fact that they have a common 
national heritage. 259  
 
He followed this up with a concluding assessment that Brandt, and the other two leaders 
within the SPD, Herbert Wehner, and Helmut Schmidt, are conducting a responsible 
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policy of reconciliation and normalization with the East.260 Kissingers concern was 
therefore not directed toward Brandt or his Ostpolitik but toward the Soviets ability to 
use this new approach to its advantage.261 Unlike Nixon, he saw no necessary 
incompatibility between Western integration on the one hand, and some degree of 
normalization with the East, on the other, but warned of the possibility of long-term 
leverage for the Soviets.  
The Soviets, having achieved their first set of objectives may then confront the FRG with the 
proposition that a real and lasting improvement in the FRGs relations with the GDR and other 
Eastern countries can only be achieved if Bonn loosens its Western ties. Having already invested 
heavily in their Eastern policy, the Germans may at this point see themselves as facing agonizing 
choices. It should be remembered that in the 1950s, many Germans [] enthralled by the vision 
of Germany as a bridge between East and West, argued against Bonns incorporation in Western 
institutions. 262  
 
He feared that the Soviets could use Ostpolitik to pursue selective détente, which would 
create more demands and concessions from Brandt.263  
Eastern policy is acquiring its own momentum and will lead Brandt into dangerous concessions. 
[] Having staked much prestige during the electoral campaign and, since, on progress with his 
Eastern policy, Brandt is now under some compulsion to demonstrate that he can deliver.264 
 
Brandt must have, indeed, felt such pressure as he tried both economic and political 
avenues to reach the Soviets. While it is not clear if the Soviets truly felt more confident 
in the new West German government through its economic gestures or simply saw an 
opportunity to consolidate their hold on Eastern Europe politically, Ostpolitik soon 
showed results. 
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The InterGerman Summit Meeting: The Rude Awakening 
Thanks to Brandts insistence, a meeting between the heads of the two German states, 
Willy Brandt and Willy Stoph, occurred on March 19, 1970. Brandt had responded to one 
of Walter Ulbrichts propaganda tools, a proposal for a summit meeting to ratify a treaty 
on basic relations between East and West Germany. One day before Stoph invited Brandt 
to the GDR, the Soviet Union had also expressed interest in talks with the three former 
allies to commence in only eight days time.265 For Kissinger, the idea of new 
partnership between Germany and the U.S. turned sour over those proposals. Both 
Bahr and Brandt, rejected American advice on when and how to negotiate with the East. 
Kissinger had viewed the shorttime frame as impossible and thereby clashed with 
an eager Brandt, who wanted to see this through without giving the East Germans an out. 
As mentioned previously, Kissinger had had concerns about Ostpolitik all along because 
he felt that it might revive the vision of Germany as a bridge between East and West as 
well as generating suspicions among Germanys Western associates as to its reliability 
as a partner.266 Brandts willingness to initiate talks with East Germany, against 
Kissingers advice, demonstrated a level of interGerman independence that was clearly 
uncomfortable to the Nixon administration.267 More importantly, the Americans loss of 
control over the West German-East German dialogue eliminated intervention against a 
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panGerman nationalism. This might have threatened the division of Germany, which 
was seen as crucial to the status quo of the Cold War.268 
In a memorandum to Nixon on March 10, 1970, the very day the discussion over 
the eight day time-limit would arise between Kissinger and Brandt, both Nixon and 
Kissinger agreed that there was little chance of success for West Germanys negotiation. 
Nixon summed this up the following way: It looks like Brandt is over his head. He has 
very little to offer and they have a great deal. More importantly, though, he already saw 
an opportunity in these negotiations for the fall of Brandts government. Next to 
Kissingers concern that there were serious misgivings over Brandts policiesBrandt 
might feel compelled to give away more than would be prudent in order to succeed and 
keep his coalition with the Liberals in placeNixon remarked on the memo that if 
Brandt continues on this soft headed line- this would be in our interest.269  
Yet it was Kissingers other fearof a reviving German nationalismthat 
ultimately brought Kissinger to side with Nixon on opposing Ostpolitik. Despite heavy 
security precautions by the feared East German secret police, the Stasi, East German 
citizens in Erfurt broke through the road blocks to cheer on Willy Brandt for his attempts 
to establish interGerman dialogue. This unusually emotional response by the German 
people sent a warning signal to all involved parties, but especially to a German-born Jew, 
that German nationalism was alive and well. Little was achieved on the diplomatic level 
during the summit, but the peoples reaction had shown how destabilizing interGerman 
rapprochement could be. An alliance between the two Germanies could create a situation 
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in which Germany would maneuver between the East and the West in the tradition of 
Bismarck.270 Kissingers emerging reluctance toward Ostpolitik can be seen by his 
Baloney remark beside the Sonnenfelds statement describing Ostpolitik as 
advantageous for the United States. 
German Ostpolitik has advanced Western unity by enabling all Western countries to approach the 
East more flexibly, reducing fears of an eventual united Germany and permitting and stimulating 
the FRG to conduct a more active Western policy.271 
 
To Kissinger, the Erfurt meeting must have demonstrated that the very opposite was 
becoming more and more likely. Nixon, however, viewed the Erfurt summit as a problem 
for the East. His acceptance of Cold War realities, i.e. the Soviet sphere of influence, was 
rather obvious in his remark on the popular reaction to Willy Brandts visit in Erfurt. On 
his daily news summary, next to the report of shouting and cheering East Germans in 
Erfurt, he noted K[issinger].- Good. This will scare [the] hell out of the Soviets. They 
have their problems and may now come to us to pull them out.272 
The American media had also begun to voice objections to Ostpolitik. Even the 
leftist magazine, The Nation, highlighted the emotional atmosphere with which the East 
Germans welcomed Willy Brandt, and pointed to the role of the superpowers in 
watching developments with interest  and a certain trepidation as well as asking the 
rhetorical question whether the division of Germany was necessarily bad, considering 
the exploits of German militarism over the past hundred years.273 In response to the 
second meeting of the two German heads of state in Kassel on May 21, 1970, the 
National Review, a magazine more representative of Nixons voters, had an even more 
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negative reaction to Ostpolitik. Under the heading Willy Brandt turns East, Brandt was 
depicted as a spineless politician who was being influenced by radicals such as Bahr, 
Bauer, and Wehner, who wished to appease the East and sought eventual neutrality. In 
the long run, this article predicted, Ostpolitik could cause the line between free world and 
totalitarian regimes to be eradicated and called for a check on the destruction of the 
Western defenses in Europe and the Soviet penetration of the European West.274 
 Nixons views of Brandts Ostpolitik were consistently negative. He saw the East-
West conflict in a strongly ideological light. In his own memoirs, Nixon belabors his 
suspicions of the Soviet Union and the limits to which one can cooperate with them. 
I felt that I had to put Europe at the top of the list. Only when we had secured our Western alliance 
would we be on a sufficiently solid footing to begin talks with the Communists. [] Never once 
in my career have I doubted that the Communists meant it when they say that their goal is to bring 
the world under Communist Control. [] I have always believed that we can and must 
communicate and, when possible, negotiate with Communist nations. They are too powerful to 
ignore. We must always remember that they will never act out of altruism, but only out of self-
interest.275 
 
What changed in the spring of 1970 was Kissingers stance on Ostpolitik. Kissinger had 
felt confident that through the backchannel negotiations between Bahr and himself that he 
could contain Willy Brandt and his Ostpolitik, even use him for U.S. foreign policy goals. 
For Brandts honeymoon period, his first hundred days in office, this approach had 
certainly worked well, and Kissinger was able to moderate Nixons ideological dislike for 
Brandt and his Ostpolitik. Yet, overconfident in his ability to control Germanys foreign 
policy and underestimating Brandts political successes with the East, he had ignored 
Nixons repeated call for a more assertive American leadership within the alliance. The 
very fact that Brandt managed to arrange an interGerman summit meeting, much less 
the stunning display of latent German nationalism, forced Kissinger to reevaluate his 
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stance on Ostpolitik. But having no long-term strategy to deal with the display of German 
nationalism in Erfurt, or the threat of a selective West German détente with Eastern 
Europe, left the Nixon administration with no effective strategy to address the issue. 
While the end of March 1970 finally saw Nixon and Kissinger in agreement on the 
undesirability of Ostpolitik, the opportunity to implement a long-term strategy had 
passed. Willy Brandt had scheduled the traditional ritual of every German chancellor to 
visit the White House upon his inauguration, albeit six months late, for the beginning of 
April. It was then that Nixon would have to show his hand on Ostpolitik.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE HEIGHT OF OSTPOLITIK 
 
There was an element to Ostpolitik that meant capitulation to the Soviet Union. 
James Schlesinger, 2003276 
 
The inter-German summit in March 1973 in Erfurt demonstrated to the rest of the world 
that the German question was still unresolved. Worse yet, enthusiastic East Germans had 
overrun barriers set up by the secret police and rendered the carefully choreographed 
script of what should have been a stilted and ultimately meaningless meeting into a 
shining beacon for a vibrant German nationalism. Willy Brandt tried not to encourage the 
East Germans chanting Willy, Willy, but the world took notice. Gone was the 
grandfatherly benevolence the Nixon administration had displayed towards the 
illusionary policies of the first West German chancellor from the SPD. With Germanys 
neighbors concerned about the renewed prospect of a reunited Germany, Nixon and 
Kissinger had to decide how to deal with the man who had emerged as the front-runner in 
détente politics with the Soviet Union, a position that the Americans thought they should 
lead.  
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The German-American Summit on Ostpolitik (April 1970) 
The American response to West Germanys foreign policy maneuvers was still blinded 
by Kissingers disregard for economic issues, and thus resulted in only a mild and low-
key critique of Brandts policies. There was an apparent link between Osthandel and 
Ostpolitik that Kissinger overlooked, despite the suggestion of such a connection in a 
report by the American Embassy in Bonn on the natural gas pipeline deal. 
The SPD/FDP government continued the previous governments support of the negotiations, and 
some believe that the signing of the agreement (February 1, 1970) was arranged to lend 
atmospheric support to the Moscow visit of Egon Bahr, the State Secretary in the Chancellors 
Office [] 
It is clear that the FRG hopes for an improvement in the political climate from improved 
economic relationships. It regards the gas deal as the first big step towards closer economic 
relations with the USSR.277 
 
 The embassy report also cited a CDU expert as opposing the deal on the grounds that 
one should not entrust to ones foe the responsibility for providing basic energy 
supplies and that it is foolish to finance Soviet economic development at the cost of the 
FRG.278 Yet Kissinger only valued the political arena, and thus expressed little concern 
over the intensification of trade with the Soviet Union, and even pushed Nixon to be 
more lenient on COCOM export controls. Kissinger did not appreciate the emphasis the 
Soviets placed on trade as a sign of goodwill and as a means to complement any 
deficiencies in the Soviet Five-Year plan. Thus, for the Soviet Union, trade was a crucial 
component to any détente policy.279 
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 Indeed, Brandt hoped that the German-Soviet natural gas pipeline deal would be 
the cornerstone for a much desired trade agreement. The inter-departmental 
communication between the chancellors office and the Economics Ministry revealed the 
importance Brandt placed on these economic dealings. When Economics Minister 
Schiller seemed reluctant to take further steps to intensify trade with the East, as he saw 
significant problems in trade liberalization and the inclusion of West Berlin, Brandt 
intervened, asking that the chancellors office be involved in any consultations between 
the Economics Ministry and the Foreign Office on this trade issue.280 After consultations 
between Schiller and Brandt, the understanding was reached that a trade agreement 
would be in the general interest of the FRG but seemed too unrealistic at the moment.281 
 For West Germany, economic ties and incentives had to be the key to 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The FRG was in no position to offer a meaningful 
military or strategic concession that in and of itself could have led the Soviet Union to 
pursue détente. The special emphasis the German government placed on intensification of 
trade was also reflected in the fact that Egon Bahr would become a special envoy for 
international business relations under the Schmidt government.  
 Brandts emphasis on relations with the East also created discomfort on a political 
level among the opposition as well as within his coalition. He had demonstrated 
Germanys newfound independence by postponing the customary White House trip for 
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any new German chancellor soon after the October inauguration until far into the New 
Year. As Kissinger explained to Nixon, Brandt is trying to carve out for himself an 
image of greater independence from us (he referred to this in his inaugural address) and 
that, for this reason, he does not wish to seem to be rushing to see you.282 Yet this 
greater independence only went so far. Unlike U.S. presidents who wield absolute power 
over their secretaries, a majority of German ministers have to agree to a policy before it 
can be implemented. After the Erfurt meeting in March of 1970 the German cabinet 
forced Brandt to postpone a decision on whether to move into full-fledged negotiations 
with Moscow on renunciation of force or merely to continue exploratory conversations 
until Brandt had coordinated his foreign policy with Nixon. An American assessment of 
the chancellors trip also suggested that Brandts association with the American President 
would help him silence the conservative opposition in the FRG.283 Brandts visit to Nixon 
was of paramount importance to the new German chancellor. Brandt needed to come 
away with Nixons blessing of his Ostpolitik to quiet concerns both among the opposition 
and his own ranks. In a way, the German public wanted to see how the U.S. president 
would react to Germanys independent maneuvers.  
 Brandt also had a very clear sense of what this summit meeting should look like. 
For one, he wanted it to happen in April, which caused a scheduling conflict for the 
White House. Nixon had implemented a new rule restricting the visits of foreign 
dignitary to two days per month to cut down on the number of foreign visitors to the 
White House. As the Danish prime minister had already been invited for two days in 
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April Nixon had to make an exception to this rule so they could schedule the German 
chancellor. 284 Brandt also caused uproar by insisting that the time he was allotted for his  
appointment with Nixon was insufficient. Dealing with Nixon the subject of rearranging 
his schedule to please Brandt certainly must have been difficult. In a memo to Al Haig, 
Special Assistant to the President, Dwight Chapin, offered Brandt a time that did not 
please the visitor and notes Lets work out Saturday [the day of the meeting] problem  
but the P[resident] wont do 9 am and maybe not 9:30 [the originally scheduled time].285 
The way Chapin worded the note provides a hint of how difficult it must have been to 
convince Nixon of the necessity of a longer meeting with Brandt. 
 Kissinger recalls the summit between Brandt and Nixon in early April 1970 as 
surprisingly cordial, given the fact that neither man would have sought out the others 
company had not fate thrust the leadership of great nations upon them. Kissinger then 
elaborates on the ideological reasons for this, pointing out that Nixon had genuine 
doubts about those he saw as personalities of the left.286 In this, Kissingers assessment 
was probably accurate. For Nixon, close ties with the Communist bloc were problematic 
and Brandt, as a person of the left, highly unreliable. Nixons two memoirs, The Memoirs 
of Richard Nixon and In the Arena, confirm this point. In them, Brandt is only mentioned 
once, in passing, whereas Nixon treats other Germans, such as Otto von Bismarck, with 
much more respect.   
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 The summit meeting demonstrated a fundamental generational 
miscommunication between the German and U.S. leadership. To Nixon, support for his 
conduct of the Vietnam War would have been the greatest gift Brandt could have 
brought with him from Europe; but Brandt was only willing to give tacit support. 
Brandts neutral stance at his inaugural address had been observed with a critical eye. 
In contrast to recent statements of support for the President from British and Dutch leaders, 
Brandt, in his Government declaration, deals with Vietnam as follows: We unite with all states, 
and not least with the tortured human beings involved, in the wish that the war in Vietnam will 
finally be ended by a political solution [] You will recall that Bahr said that Brandt and 
Heinemann have no guilt complex about the past and consequently can be expected to be more 
self-assured, less inhibited in expressing German views and, hence, more unbequem. 287  
 
 
Given this wary approach to Brandt and his delegation, disagreement was unavoidable. 
Brandt clearly saw himself speaking for a new generation in a speech at a White House 
dinner given in his honor.  
Our primary goal has to be to conceptualize the 1970s in such a clear way that it helps the younger 
generation create an appropriate and convincing perspective. You in America and we in Europe 
[] are dealing with a new generation. It is full of movement [], experiences the many 
transitions of our time and searches for long-lasting concepts. It is our task to achieve this goal. 288 
 
As Nixon was facing student riots and the U.S. population viewed domestic unrest as the 
most important problem facing the nation at the time, it seems unlikely that Nixon 
appreciated Brandts lecture.289  
The personal trust between Kissinger and Bahr also suffered a blow when it 
became clear that the Brandt government was not fully revealing its hand to the 
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Americans. Only when confronted by Kissinger about papers that were exchanged during 
Soviet-German talks, did Bahr admit to holding in writing formulations that had been 
discussed. He summarized these formulations as drafts dealing with the renunciation 
of force, and the respect for (not recognition of) all European frontiers.290 In short, 
Bahr had withheld drafts to key elements of the Soviet-German negotiations. 
Despite all this, the Nixon administration would not openly oppose Ostpolitik. No 
U.S. administration could publicly stand in the way of West German efforts to reestablish 
economic and cultural links with the East, especially after Nixon campaigned on the idea 
that his presidency would be one of negotiation and détente. So the Nixon administration 
had to resort to off-hand comments that hinted at American reservations about the 
divergent German policy. Kissinger indirectly conveyed his fears to Defense Minister 
Schmidt during the German delegations visit in April, when he questioningly stated that 
Ostpolitik surely would not jeopardize German loyalties to the alliance while following 
this with an implied threat of political repercussions should Brandt stray from the 
Western line.291 Nixon duly reiterated this point in a private conversation with Brandt on 
April 11. He confessed faith in Brandts policies and was certain that [the Germans] did 
not think of jeopardizing proven friendships. Similarly he warned that insecurities 
might arise in France, England, and the United States with regards to Ostpolitik and that 
the German agreement needed to stay in close contact in all East-West issues.292 Even 
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more bluntly, Nixon advised Brandt not to ever drop an old friend for a new friend unless 
he was sure that the new friend was better than his old one.293  
Officially, Brandt left the summit with the Americans blessing for Ostpolitik, not 
because Nixon began to appreciate Brandts ideology but simply because the Nixon 
administration could not afford to be portrayed as the one allied power that obstructed 
détente in Europe and a rapprochement of the two Germanies. Despite its misgivings 
about the ultimate direction of Brandts foreign policy, the Nixon administration had little 
choice but to publicly endorse Ostpolitik. Brandts later claim that Nixon and Kissinger 
did not understand the novelty of a European Security Conference in that it was designed 
to transcended the post-war political order, is symbolic of the White House approach. 
Kissinger responds to this claim in his memoirs. He was wrong. We got the point. We 
were simply not persuaded by the argument and we thought it more tactful not to pursue 
it.294 Nixon disliked the idea of a European Security Conference even more than 
Kissinger, yet retained his cautious support in public. 
Nixon: I had a thought. In the morning paper I noticed that Pompidou and Brezhnev were making 
a lot of noise about the European security conference. And I think itd be well, and we can talk 
about it when you come here tomorrow, if you keep the thing very very cool on the thing, as you 
of course have said, we dont want the damn thing. We may have to have it at some point. Those 
damn Europeans, the way they play it, I think its very very much in our interest to do that. Also 
we have laid the foundation with the Russians because, you know, we played it very cool with 
Brezhnev, I mean with  what the hells  
Rogers: Gromyko 
Nixon:  Gromyko. And when I said well wed have to wait and look into it and so forth.  So in 
talking if we have any friends left in Europe, would you of course the Italians, the Italians are 
for it. The British, when I spoke to Hume, and I think he must have told you the same thing, hes 
not too keen on the darn thing. But lets just 
Rogers: They all run with the tide, though. 
Nixon: Yeah I know, I know. But lets not get that damn tide going so that it comes before our 
Soviet thing or even that we indicate too much I think if we could just indicate every time 
youre the one to do it  Im gonna lay off of it by miles. But you just sort of indicate well this is a 
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gingerly thing and weve gotta consider it and what weve talked about. Because the press would 
love to push us into this god damn thing. 295 
 
If the issue of the European Security Conference is any indication, Brandt did not 
understand the subtle reservations the Nixon administration articulated during the summit 
meeting. One can only speculate on why the U.S. did not lean stronger on the German 
delegation to follow the leadership that Nixon claimed for himself. Certainly, as indicated 
in the above transcript, the sense of losing their European friends and the weakening U.S. 
self-perception must have played a role in Nixons treatment of the Europeans. Blocking 
Brandts efforts at détente would have further alienated world opinion. Ultimately, 
Brandt was able to return to Germany with the U.S. officially backing his Ostpolitik, and 
he quickly intensified the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. 
 
Advances in Osthandel 
Had Brandt heeded American warnings, he would have pursued a more cautious 
approach. As it was, though, the possibilities of intensifying trade with the Soviet Union 
seemed better than ever. The eighth Soviet Five-Year Plan, which ended in 1970, saw 
significant growth in national income (41%) and industrial production (50%).  The 
standard of living in the Soviet Union already presented a problem to Brezhnev, however, 
for improvements made in the early 1960s gradually leveled off in 1968, at a position 
well below that of many Western industrial countries. Throughout the 1960s agricultural 
production also had been a problem. During the late 1960s, Brezhnev even had to raise 
prices for agricultural products and the Soviet Union had to import an increased amount 
of grain from the West. By 1970 the Soviet Union, as a developed industrial country, 
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found it increasingly difficult to maintain the high rates of growth in the industrial sector 
that it had sustained in earlier years. Increasingly, large investment and labor inputs were 
required for growth, but these inputs were becoming more difficult to obtain. Although 
the goals of the Five-year plans of the 1970s had been scaled down from previous plans, 
the targets remained largely unmet. The industrial shortfalls were felt most sharply in the 
sphere of consumer goods, where the public steadily demanded improved quality and 
increased quantity. 
 For the ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75), it was hoped that Western imports on 
credit would add production capabilities and improve the efficiency of already existing 
structures. Offering large-scale contracts to Western companies with little or no down 
payment and to be paid for by the products of these manufacturing plants was the strategy 
the Soviet leadership pursued to increase their economic output without depleting their 
hard currency resources. For Soviet officials, in the process of devising the ninth Five-
Year Plan and counting even more heavily than before on foreign imports, the beginning 
of 1970 seemed an ideal time to intensify German trade with the Soviet Union. 
 
The Soviet Approach to Trade 
To avoid contamination of the Socialist society, the Soviet government tried to minimize 
contact with Western companies. By strictly refusing joint ventures, investment of 
foreign capital in the Soviet Union, or multi-national corporations, the Soviets managed 
to keep the upper hand in negotiations. They offered large-scale orders for industrial 
goods that nearly exceeded the capacity of a single West European country, the prestige 
and benefits of which were often too significant to overlook. By limiting contractors to 
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national groups, the Soviet trade representatives were also able to play one Western 
country against another. One such example was Patolichev, who spelled out quite clearly 
that he had to take a business approach and compare whether credit offers from the FRG 
are worse than those of other countries. [] If the FRG is not competitive here, it will 
lose big and lucrative deals.296  
 Interestingly, the United States was almost entirely excluded from any of these 
dealings until 1972. With various countries of Western Europe seeking these orders, the 
Soviet Union was not just able to involve the government of these nations in negotiations 
but alsodirectly and indirectlyable to exert considerable pressure on the national 
governments to subsidize the loans the Soviet Union demanded and to clear 
administrative hurdles. Naturally, the emergence of the European Economic Community 
and the transfer of negotiation authority for imports and exports to Brussels greatly 
troubled the Soviet Union. Concerned about losing the advantage in their effective 
negotiation strategy, they repeatedly voiced their objection to anything but bilateral deals 
and did not recognize the European Economic Community as a valid negotiation 
partner.297 
 In addition, dealing with the Soviet Union often proved challenging from a 
Western perspective. Despite confirmed business meetings and schedules, many Western 
businessmen frequently had to return home the same day because their hotel had not been 
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reserved by their host and they were unable to find suitable arrangements. Even when 
Economics Minister Schiller visited Moscow on a state visit (September 23-27, 1970), he 
ran into logistical problems. The pilots who flew Minister Schiller were neither able to 
pay with the usually accepted vouchers nor with cash, and thus had to ask the German 
embassy to cover the incurred expenses.298 
 
The Kama River Plant 
One example of a typical deal with the Soviet Union was the Kama River truck 
manufacturing plant project. The Soviet Union managed to exert enormous pressure on 
various Western countries despite its dire need for such a plant. An apparent remedy to 
overcome the poor performance of the Soviet agriculture was the production of more 
trucks. In 1968 and 1969, the lack of trucks prevented the proper harvesting and storing 
of the harvest, which resulted in a disastrous waste of otherwise perfectly good crops. 
Furthermore, the shortage of trucks crippled progress on numerous industrialization 
projects that were vital to the Soviet economy.299 German involvement in the planned 
Soviet Kama River truck manufacturing plant is not only exemplary of the difficulties 
West Germany faced in dealing with the Soviet Union, but also indicative of the policies 
the Soviets pursued in dealing with the West.  
 Initial German attempts by representatives of the Daimler Benz Corp. to engage 
in a dialogue with Soviet industry representatives at two 1968 fairs in the Soviet Union 
failed, for lack of Soviet willingness to engage with West German firms. After the 
                                                
298 Memo, Besuch von Minister Schiller in Moskau, October 1, 1970, BA 102/100023. 
 
299 Letter, German Ambassador in Paris, Ruete, to German Foreign Office, Sowjetisches LKW-Kombinat 
an der Kama, October 21, 1970, BA 102/100011, 1-2. 
 114
reversal of that policy in 1969 the Soviets sent a high-level delegation to visit the Daimler 
Benz manufacturing plant in September 1969.300 During a follow-up meeting in Moscow 
in June 1970 the Soviet conception of the deal became evident and would be highly 
representative of future deals.  
Daimler Benz was to build a turn-key plant and act as general contractor and  
financier. The creation of a multi-national consortium or a joint venture with a Soviet 
company was categorically ruled out. There was to be no penetration of the Soviet 
economy, ownership of Soviet capital, or even interaction with the Soviet population. 
The Soviets wanted Western technology and labor to design, construct, and develop the 
manufacturing plant.301 However, Soviet representatives were either unwilling or unable 
to comprehend the intricacies of Western financing. 
 One such example was the Soviets insistence on low-interest loans. When they 
continued to demand a federally subsidized loan, comparable to that of a French 
competitor, Economics Ministry Undersecretary von Braun suggested to Soviet 
ambassador Zarapkin that it was not the interest rate per se but the overall cost to the 
Soviet Union that should be the deciding factor.  In other words, if a German company 
could sell a product cheaper, the interest rate made no difference, as the German 
company was the debtor, not the Soviet Union. Von Braun concluded his account of the 
meeting with the assessment that this consideration had apparently never crossed Mr. 
Zarapkins mind before.302 As Shevchenko explains, Soviet negotiators usually would 
not have a fallback position so even a new insight such as this would leave them singing 
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one stubborn note at the bargaining table; accordingly, Zarapkin continued to insist on 
low-interest loans.303 In a discussion between Soviet Minister for Automobile Industry 
Aleksandr Tarasov and Economics Minister Schiller on September 30, 1970, the Soviet 
side mentioned in every statement that they wanted the same interest rate (6%) as in the 
gas pipeline deal, despite a rise of interest rates to 10% at the time.  They also insisted on 
a flexible bank loan (Rahmenkredit), rather than a much more controllable line of credit 
(Lieferkredit), again as in the gas pipeline deal. This, of course, caused the Brandt 
government considerable headaches as the financing of the gas pipeline deal had 
apparently increased the expectations of the Soviets for low-interest long-term financing 
of a large majority of the deal. However, it was especially this long-term low-interest 
financing that had sparked heavy criticism from other EC countries.304 
 Soviet behavior during the gas pipeline deal caused the German banks to balk at 
granting another flexible bank loan. After the Soviets had been granted a flexible bank 
loan of 1.2 billion marks by the German bank consortium to buy steel pipes, they only 
used two thirds of the amount for that purpose and used the other third to purchase non-
related items. This caused the German banks considerable difficulties, as the exporters of 
the smaller orders were reluctant to accept the ten-year financing connected with the 
deal.305 
 Finally, Daimler Benz could look to the difficulties that the Italian car 
manufacturer Fiat had experienced as the general contractor at the Soviet car 
manufacturing plant in Togliattigrad. There, the Soviets were not even able to keep the 
deadlines for earth movement and pouring foundations. Daimler Benz thus concluded 
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that the entire project was simply too risky for one company alone. Despite the general 
belief that Brandt shied away from trade and economic matters, he was being 
meticulously informed about the developments on Soviet trade through the German 
Industry Committee on Trade with the East [Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft].306 
This trade with the East turned into a highly politicized exercise that pitted the Western 
European allies against each other.    
Interesting to note is how easily the Soviets managed to play the various West 
European powers against each other. Out of concern for the German industry, Minister 
Tarasov informed Schiller that both France and Italy had agreed to a flexible bank loan of 
6% (subsidized by the national governments) and since the Soviet side had to unify 
their financing, he was afraid that the German firms would not be competitive.307  Indeed, 
the Russians had already concluded deals valued at over 350 million marks for equipment 
for Kama from the French. A prospective cooperation between Daimler Benz and 
Renault for the complete plant failed because Renault did not want to be a minor partner, 
working under the supervision of Daimler Benz.  
 To gain the upper hand in this deal, both the French government and French 
industry brought security and efficiency concerns to the Soviets attention. In an absurd 
twist on security concerns from an ideological point of view, the French argued that it 
would be in the Soviets best security interest to build several small plants, rather than 
one big one, thereby providing less of a target (presumably from NATO forces). The first 
of these smaller plants, furthermore, could be in operation much quicker, providing a first 
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batch of badly needed trucks. This smaller plant could be provided entirely by the French 
company Renault, and other European firms would only have to be involved to the extent 
that the other plans exceeded French capacities.308  
 Another interesting aspect is the American position on this deal. In the May 11, 
1970 issue of U.S. News and World Report, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had 
moved the debate about a possible involvement by Ford Motor Co. in the Kama River 
project to the center of the public debate by voicing concern about such a deal. 
Before giving away the technology to construct trucks in the Soviet Union, and establishing plants 
for them, there should be some indication on the part of the Soviet Union [that] theyre not going 
to continue sending the trucks to North Vietnam by the shiploads for use on the Ho Chi Minh trail. 
We have many American pilots who are today prisoners of war in North Vietnam because they 
had to attack trucks provided by the Soviet Union to North Vietnam.309 
 
Democrats only questioned this line of reasoning in form, not substance. Senator Edward 
Kennedy thought the criticism was heavy-handed and that the plant would only be 
operational by 1974. Kennedy hoped that by then the Vietnam War would be over. 
However, no one voiced criticism concerning the general problem of whether trade 
sanctions were a valid tool in achieving a foreign policy goal. 
Laird countered Kennedys criticism by saying that  
as long as the Soviet Union is supplying 80 percent of all of the trucks that are being used on the 
Ho Chi Minh trail [] I cannot in good conscience as secretary of defense support the exportation 
of those trucks from the Soviet Union on the basis of the importation of United States technology 
from Russia at this time. [] This is not the time for us to move our technology to the Soviet 
Union in order to produce those trucks in a more efficient and more economical basis.310 
 
Despite this controversy and Fords rejection of the proposed deal (after being pressured 
to do so by its shareholders), there was no great concern on part of the German 
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government or industry about its involvement in the project. 311 The waning fear of U.S. 
unhappiness with German trade policy is also evident in a question asked by two 
members of Parliament from the CDU/CSU, who inquired whether the federal 
government is willing to consult about the deliveries to the East of strategically 
significant value, such as a truck manufacturing plant, with our allies, so as to find a 
common approach.312  
 Dr. Klarenaar of the Economics Ministry laid out the answer for Minister Schiller 
that stated that the truck plant did not fall under export controls and that furthermore, we 
will consult with our allies should the negotiations of German companies lead to concrete 
agreements. This formulation was crossed out in the draft and replaced by a non-
committal furthermore, we will research the necessity of consultations, should the 
negotiations of German companies lead to concrete agreements.313 
 Ultimately, the Soviet Union assumed the general contractor role itself, 
outsourcing high-tech individual plants and elements to various Western companies. 
However, West Germany provided the parts of the plant that the U.S. deemed as too 
high-tech for export.314 This clearly conflicted with Nixons interests and ideas. 
Kissinger, on the other hand, had little ideological interest in maintaining export controls. 
In several instances, Nixon not only went along with Kissingers recommendation to 
continue a policy of restricting trade with Eastern Europe but even disapproved some of 
Kissingers own suggestions on moderately liberalizing trade with Communist 
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countries.315 This did not reflect a firm belief in the effectiveness of existing prohibitions 
on trade, as Nixon had repeatedly voiced his convictions that the present prohibitions on 
trading with Communist countries are obsolete.316 Instead, it demonstrated a moral 
conviction in doing the right thing by maintaining export controls vis-à-vis Communist 
countries. 
 Nixon partially blocked the Kama River foundry plant, assembly plant, and gear 
and transmission plant, the three most technologically complex elements of the proposed 
Soviet Kama River truck manufacturing plant.317 But Nixon went further than just 
blocking manufacturing capabilities in the Soviet Union. He also blocked a proposal for 
the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines in the Soviet Union.  
 
Natural Gas Pipelines 
By mid-1970, additional Soviet oil and natural gas deliveries to Germany were being 
considered. Shortly after the conclusion of the first deal, negotiations were underway for 
another four billion tons of natural gas per year (in addition to the three billion from the 
first contract).318 Once this deal was concluded, the proposed pipelines capacity would 
be fully utilitzed. Soviet gas, it was estimated, would to provide roughly 11% of the total 
German natural gas supply for 1980. The yet-to-be constructed gas pipeline would further 
use roughly one third of its capacity to support East European allies, such as the GDR 
and Czechoslovakia. Having already committed the other two thirds of the delivery 
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capacity to West Germany and Italy, the Soviet gas delivery capabilities would be 
exhausted, and a maximum of 7 billion cubic meters per year could not be exceeded for 
the second contract.319 Support for this proposed second deal was more ambivalent than 
toward the first one. Helmut Schmidt, at the time Germanys finance minister, was 
particularly opposed to the heavy subsidies wanted by the Soviet Union. But even though 
support had waned the Soviets demanded the same favorable conditions they had 
received for the first deal. Soviet Vice President Kirill Novikov was very reluctant to 
commit to an increase in steel pipe orders without concessions on the financing. One has 
to first look at the figures of the natural gas deal because the Soviet Union only wants to 
make commitments it can keep. he remarked to Brandt. Novikov further added that the 
U.S. had expressed interest in Soviet natural gas, as well.320  
 In his position as finance minister Helmut Schmidt was able to block an interest 
rate subsidy by the German government and the lowering of the customary fees in 
connection with federal loan guarantees.321 Otherwise though, the cabinet bent over 
backwards to make the second gas pipeline deal lucrative for the Soviet Union. To equip 
Economics Minister Schiller with incentives for the deal, on September 18, 1970 the 
cabinet approved a loan guarantee volume for the Soviet Union of 1.5 billion marks 
annually. This could have even triggered a parliamentary vote on increasing the ceiling of 
the federal budget.322 
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 General consent for a second pipeline deal and its layout was already agreed on in 
April 1971. The financing, however, presented problems as the Soviets insisted on the 
same financing as with the first deal. As Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Victor Osipov 
stated, in complete ignorance of the changed market conditions, we desire an 
improvement in the financing conditions. We cannot agree to worse conditions. Here 
again, the Soviets made the purchase of 1.5 billion marks of German steel pipes 
contingent on the successful completion of the financing of the second gas deal.323 On the 
German side, the Soviet demands appeared outrageous. With the free market interests 
rates already up to 9%, the 6% rate the Soviets wanted seemed unrealistic.  Furthermore, 
the Deutsche Bank consortium only wanted to finance 800 million marks, in two stages, 
and cut the last rate of 300 million from the old deal by increasing the interest rate 
payments. The second credit, they argued, should only range between five and eight 
years, because the Soviets would be able to pay higher installments as they realized 
higher gas deliveries. The Economics Ministry was not interested in a repetition of the 
severely critical reaction of our EC partners to the exotic conditions of the first 
pipeline deal.324 
 The second pipeline deal did finally go through in 1972, but a certain dependency 
on the Soviet contracts was already discernible. As the American consul in Düsseldorf 
reported to the state department, [Chairman of the Mannesmann Board of Directors] 
Weisweiler admitted that Mannesmann eventually would have to do just that [concede to 
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Soviet interest rate demands] in order to keep the Mühlheim operation going after the end 
of the year. 325 The Mühlheim plant, which had been specifically constructed for the 
large-diameter steel pipe orders from the Soviet Union, now depended on continued 
Soviet orders. The welfare of certain German industrial sectors, such as steel, became 
more and more intertwined with the development of the Soviet economy and the political 
climate between the two states. 
 Schmidt was quick to alleviate American fears of a German dependence on Soviet 
energy. In a conversation with Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, Schmidt tried 
to emphasize the minimal commitment on the part of the German government: even with 
the second gas pipeline deal, the proportion of Soviet gas on the total energy 
consumption would be no more than seven to eight percent. Germany also did not grant 
government-sponsored loans, just loan guarantees, because otherwise there would be no 
deal. To this, Peterson responded that the U.S. did not grant any guarantees and the 
current loan negotiations ranged from three to five years. In fact, Peterson was apparently 
so interested in exchanging information on trade and loan conditions with the Soviet 
Union that he suggested U.S. experts consult with Economics Undersecretary Mommsen 
during the current visit.326 
The triangular negotiations between the FRG, Iran, and the Soviet Union also 
shed an interesting light on the German approach to its natural resource supplies. Given 
that Iran was a country rich in natural gas resources, supplying the German natural gas 
                                                
325 Airgram, American Consul Düsseldorf to Secretary of State, German-Soviet Natural Gas-Pipeline 
Deal, June 8, 1972, folder FSE W-Ger 9 1/1/70, Box 994, RG 59, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, 
Economic, NA. 
326 Telegram, German Ambassador in Washington, Pauls, to German Foreign Office, Gespräch zwischen 
Bundesminister Schmidt und US-Secretary of Commerce Peterson, September 26, 1972, BA 102/111905, 
1-2. 
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system would be rather lucrative. Already in 1971, the FRG planned on importing natural 
gas from Iran. Of the two proposed routes, the FRG early on discarded the route through 
Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia in favor of one through the Soviet Union. The rejected 
route could have tied the NATO countries Greece and Turkey closer to the West and 
realized considerable transit revenues for these economically weak countries.  It would 
have also been an ideal means to foster the independence and Western orientation of 
Yugoslavia. Instead, a route through the Soviet Union was chosen that, after long and 
difficult negotiations, made the Soviet Union not only a transit country that would collect 
hard currency revenues, but the buyer of Iranian gas and in turn the seller of Soviet gas to 
the FRG. Once again the FRG increased its reliance on Soviet natural gas rather than 
gaining access to an independent source. To add one more layer of dependence to the 
issue, the FRG sided with the Soviets against their interests in granting the Soviet Union 
the status of a middle-man. Bahr, in a conversation with Soviet Minister Kulov, agreed to 
negotiate with the Shah of Iran for the Soviet option.327 Chancellor Brandt also expressed 
his pleasure about the positive stance the Soviet delegation was taking towards the 
planned triangular agreement with Iran because such a joint agreement demonstrates 
what such different countries could accomplish if a perspective of a secure peace 
exists.328 The prospective deal did not come to fruition as the revolution in Iran 
overthrew the Shah before delivery could begin. All deals were aborted and the idea 
discarded.  
 
                                                
327 Telegram, German Embassy Moscow to German Foreign Office, Gespräche von Bundesminister Bahr 
in Moskau, March 2, 1974, BA 102/99998. 
328 Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow to German Foreign Office, Aufzeichnung des Gesprächs des 
Herrn Bundeskanzlers am 18. Januar 1974 mit dem Stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden des Ministerrats der 
UdSSR, Herrn Nowikow, March 2, 1974, BA 102/99998, 8. 
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Soviet Crude Oil Exports 
West Germany exercised its own leverage to entice Soviet officials. The desperate need 
for hard currency and Western products continued with more barter trade. Since the FRG 
and the Soviet Union did not have a trade agreement in place, every import needed to be 
approved by the Economics Ministry. The import quotas were not designed for much 
fluctuation and the Soviets continually pushed for a liberalization of the oil market. 
Ultimately, the Soviets linked the purchase of German machinery with the responsibility 
of the German seller to obtain more German import licenses for Soviet products. 
Especially in the late 1960s, when the oil market in the FRG was saturated, German 
companies often tried to make a deal by petitioning the Economics Ministry for import 
licenses, which were usually declined since a coupling of purchase orders with import 
licenses would have set a dangerous precedent and upset the local energy market.329 
 The Soviet trade mission in Cologne became very creative at circumventing 
import licenses. Once they insisted on the fulfillment of an oil shipment to the FRG that 
was part of a trade deal, but which the Economics Ministry had not approved.330 Another 
time, the Soviet trade mission indicated that a shipment had been readied for a German 
company and should be quickly approved by the Economics Ministry despite the fact that 
it had previously been declined.331 Attempts to import Soviet oil imports via third 
                                                
329 For examples see Letter, Rheinische Stahlwerke to Economics Ministry, August 26, 1965, BA 
102/100003 and Letter, Mühlheimer Rohstoffhandel GmbH to Economics Ministry, Erteilung zusätzlicher 
Lizenzen für die Einfuhr von Benzin aus der UdSSR gemäß unserem Vertrag vom 2.1.1964 mit der Firma 
Sojuznefteexport, Moskau, July 26, 1966, BA 102/100003; also Memo, Dr. Steidle, 
Kompensationsgeschäft der Fa. Henschel-Export-GmbH mit der Sowjetunion, October 17, 1966, BA 
102/100003. 
330 Letter, Handelsvertretung der UdSSR in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland to Economics Ministry, April 
18, 1967, BA 102/100003. 
331 Letter, Handelsvertretung der UdSSR in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland to Economics Ministry, 
October 23, 1967, BA 102/100003. 
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countries, such as the attempts of Maxoil to import Soviet heating oil through 
Switzerland, were also explored. 332  
By 1969 Soviet attempts to enter the German market had become more 
sophisticated. The Soviet Union now tried to lure large German corporations with sizable 
orders, as when Soviet trade commissioner Volkov, who visited the Economics Ministry 
on February 2, 1969 after a hiatus of several years indicated that the Soviet Union was 
interested in giving orders worth 300 million marks to German companies in order to 
partially equip the car manufacturing plant in Togliattigrad, which FIAT had been 
contracted to built.333 This is a very telling strategy as the talks to extend the natural gas 
pipeline from Austria through Italy into France, which would have provided a sizeable 
hard-currency inflow, had apparently stalled. The Italians must have been interpreted the 
giving of a sizable order to German, rather than Italian companies, as a sign of 
displeasure.334 But it also helped Volkov to negotiate for an increase in import licenses 
with Germany, as he indicated that only with increased exports to Germany could the SU 
afford to order the proposed car manufacturing machines from the FRG. After Volkovs 
visit, the FRG granted the Soviet Union a sizable increase in import licenses (heating oil 
from 0.7 to one million tons and gasoline from 0.1 to 0.3 million tons), which the Soviet 
side received with satisfaction.335 Even so, they pushed for even more import 
concessions from the FRG, as the already negotiated deals between German and Soviet 
firms had a volume of 1.8 million tons of heating oil versus the one million the German 
                                                
332 Letter, Dr. Lucas to Ref. III C2, May 2, 1969, BA 102/100003. 
333 Memo, Besuch des sowjetischen Handelsrats Woltschkow im Bundeswirtschaftsministerium am 
5.2.1969, February 11, 1969, BA 102/100003. 
334 Letter, Dr. Lantzke to Economics Ministry Undersecretary Dr. Arndt, March 18, 1969, BA 102/100003 
335 Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow, Stempel, to German Foreign Office, Einfuhrerleichterungen 
für leichtes Heizöl und Rohbenzin, March 24, 1969, BA 102/100003. 
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government was willing to issue. The Soviet trade commissioner promptly repeated his 
concern that the order of German machinery, now increased to 400 million marks, would 
be in jeopardy if no more concessions were made on the Soviet side.336 
 Volkov wasted no time waiting for the initially negative response from the 
Economics Ministry.337 He visited numerous trade and industry associations, such as the 
German Machine Tooling Association (Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten), and 
requested in a persistent manner for them to push the federal government to allow an 
increase in heating oil and gasoline imports from the Soviet Union.338 
 This near total dependence on increases in heating oil exports to finance 
additional manufacturing capabilities from the West was very troublesome for the 
Soviets, as the heating oil market in Germany was completely saturated and the German 
government had already hesitated to increase the import licenses from 0.7 to one million 
tons. When the Soviets played their trump card, a prospective gas pipeline deal with the 
German companies Mannesmann and Thyssen, along with the tacit offer of forgiveness 
for the still lingering ill will over the pipeline embargo of 1963, they linked any future 
prospects of this deal with an increase in heating oil imports from the Soviet Union from 
the one million tons to 1.8 million tons.339 
 The trump card worked. During his visit to Moscow in May, Undersecretary von 
Dohnanyi promised Patolichev another increase of 0.3 million tons in heating oil imports 
                                                
336 Memo, Lucas, Maßnahmen zur Erhaltung der Preisstabilität, March 13, 1969, BA 102/100003; 
Memo, Economics Ministry Undersecretary Dr. Arndt, Erteilung von Einfuhrgenehmigungen für 
sowjetische Erdölerzeugnisse, April 2, 1969, BA 102/100003. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Letter, Verband Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten, Stäcker, to Economics Ministry, Dr. Steidle, 
Erdöl und Erdölderivaten, May 9, 1969, BA 102/100003. 
339 Volkov made this clear to Mannesmann in writing and Thyssens chairman, Mommsen, was reminded 
of this by the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. See Letter, Mannesmann Export GmbH to 
Undersecretary Arndt, April 24, 1969, BA 102/100003 and Memo, Dr. Lucas, Besuch von Herrn Wilhelm 
A. Kleberger, May 8, 1969, BA 102/100003. 
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and 0.15 million tons in gasoline imports. At a subsequent visit by Volkov at the 
Economics Ministry on August 19, 1969, the Soviet trade representative still showed 
himself unhappy about the gap between the 1.3 million ton heating oil quota and the 1.8 
million tons desired by the Soviets. When the Economics Ministry mentioned the 
problem the Berlin company Brenntag GmbH was having in getting the Soviet company 
Sojuznefteexport to fulfill its deliveries of 50,000 tons of oil, the Soviet delegation 
declined to speak about it since West Berlin was not part of their responsibility. Only 
after the Economics Ministry promised to increase the import quota by another 0.25 
million ton of heating oil did the Soviets promise to honor its agreement with Brenntag. 
The Soviets did not desire a further increase in the gasoline quota, as it had only been 
able to deliver 60,000 tons of gasoline of the 150,000 tons for which von Dohnanyi had 
issued Soviet import licenses in May. Furthermore, the Soviets were very interested in 
maintaining the then-negotiated quotas for the year 1970.340 
 It is significant to note that the Soviets had a clear interest in more Western 
imports but could not find the means to acquire them. Only through unusual pressure on 
German companies, as well as concessions on Berlin, was it possible to get heating oil 
exports to Germany to anywhere near the level (1.5 million tons versus 1.8 million tons) 
necessary for the completion of existing trade deals. The Soviets were also unable to 
fulfill the quota offered by the German side on gasoline exports, leaving virtually no 
trade goods that the Soviets could have used to boost their export balance. Despite a 
heavily saturated market that had already led to a price deflation of 4.5% compared to the 
                                                
340 Memo, Dr. Lucas, Wesentliches Ergebnis der Besprechung am 19. August 1969, August 21, 1969, BA 
102/100003. 
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previous year, the German Economics Ministry was very liberal with its import quotas 
over the next two years.341 
 An interesting aspect here is the question of a trade agreement between the two 
countries. Despite their almost desperate attempts to gain more import concessions from 
Germany, the Soviets did not even acknowledge German attempts to initiate talks on a 
trade agreement between the two countries.342 This might have been linked with the 
understanding that a trade agreement would have to include West Berlin and the fact that 
the Soviet Union was not willing to do so. 
 Things seemed to change on the Soviet side soon after Brandts election to 
chancellor. On November 20, 1969, Kosygin sent his son-in-law, Professor Belonov, to 
Germany to reiterate the Soviet Unions strong interest in forming a commission on 
industrial-technological cooperation. The German assessment of the Belonov visit was 
that  
Many signs indicate that the Soviet Union wants to end its current policy of signing cooperation 
agreements with other Western industrial nations and isolating the FRG. It will also offer the 
federal government closer cooperation in the economic sector and will suggest its 
institutionalization on government level. Even if the model of French-Soviet cooperation, which is 
tailored to the French economy, can only be transferred in a limited way, an institutionalization of 
German-Soviet economic relations through an economic commission would nonetheless be 
desirable for economic and political reasons. 343 
                                                
341 Memo, Dr. Lantzke, Sowjetische Wünsche auf Erhöhung der Einfuhrkontingente für 
Mineralölprodukte, October 27, 1972, BA 102/100002. This Memo detailed the following heating oil 
import quotas in million tons/ year: 
 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Basic quota 700 700 700 1500 1500 
Additional licenses 273 850 1250 600 600 
Total 973 1,550 1,950 2,100 2,100 
Used 1,145 1,340 1,870 1,941 1,483 (Jan-Jul) 
 
342 The positive effects of a trade agreement and the German willingness to engage in talks had, most 
recently, been suggested by Dr. Arndt and Dr. von Dohnanyi in Letter, Dr. Arndt to Handelsrat E. Volkov, 
Erteilung von Einfuhrgenehmigungen für sowjetische Erdölerzeugnisse, [n.d. but after March 25, 1969], 
BA 102/100003. 
343 Memo, Dr Lucas, Deutsch-sowjetische Arbeitsgruppe für wirtschaftliche und industriell-
technologische Kooperation, November 20, 1969, BA 102/99989. Original: Viele Anzeichen sprechen 
dafür, daß die Sowjetunion ihre bisherige Politik, die darauf gerichtet war, mit anderen westlichen 
Industrieländern Kooperationsabkommen abzuschließen und die Bundesrepublik zu isolieren, aufgeben und 
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It was the clear desire of the German industry to work under the umbrella of a trade 
agreement that bound the Soviets to any deals and offered a sense of security and 
longevity for German investors. Yet the perceptions of the industry representatives and 
politicians about the Soviet Union had an even stronger impact than the political pressure 
of some of the leading companies in West Germany. 
 
The German Paradigm Shift of the Soviet Union towards a Normal State 
With the advent of communication and visits between the two countries, the perception of 
the Soviet Union changed drastically in the FRG. A multifaceted blend of a sense of 
ownership in the new Ostpolitik, a necessity of its success, desperation over the status 
quo, and a healthy dose of wishful thinking led German business representatives to depict 
the Soviet Union as a benign power with virtually unlimited economic potential. This 
aspect of the gas pipeline deal, perhaps the most profound one, was not readily apparent 
at the beginning of 1970. No one could seriously argue that 23 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas per year could make the FRG dependent on the Soviet Union. However, by 
tying German business and governmental interests to the successful development of the 
Soviet economy, the FRG came to have a vested interest in the prosperity of the Soviet 
Union. The old adage, Lend a man a dollar and he owes you, lend him a million and he 
owns you comes to mind. Once the natural gas pipeline had been constructed (it was 
scheduled for completion in October, 1973), the FRG would have to rely on the good 
                                                                                                                                            
nun auch der Bundesregierung eine engere Zusammenarbeit auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet und ihre 
Institutionalisierung auf Regierungsebene vorschlagen wird. 
Wenn auch die Übertragung des auf die Wirtschaftsordnung Frankreichs zugeschnittenen Modells 
der französisch-sowjetischen Zusammenarbeit auf die Bundesrepublik nur in beschränktem Maße möglich 
ist, so wäre doch eine Institutionalisierung der deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen durch eine 
gemischte Regierungskommission aus politischen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen zu begrüßen.  
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faith of the Soviets that the gas would continue to flow. The initial investment of the 
Brandt government, as well as many German firms, depended on maintaining good 
Soviet-German relations. This led to an approach based on wishful thinking that often 
glossed over harsh Soviet economic realities and significantly improved the Soviet 
position. 
This paradigm shift occurred through visits of German government and industry 
representatives to the Soviet Union. From the reports of these travels two somewhat 
contradictory images emerged: that of a poverty-stricken third-world economy and that of 
a booming and flourishing, yet foreign, economic system, with nearly infinite 
resourcesimages that constantly collided. As Foreign Minister Walter Scheel observed 
during a tour of the Togliatti auto plant: 
Eighty percent of the presses are from the West []. Just 10% of the presses were manufactured 
in the Soviet Union, in Barnaul. They work only smaller pieces and are not comparable to the 
finished product of the Western presses.344 
Often German specialists complain that thegenerally stringentSoviet work 
environment regulations are not enforced so that there have already been many deadly accidents 
among the Soviet workers. Fortunately, they [German workers] have been spared so far. Indeed, 
there are many deep open holes on the production site. People are welding in the factory buildings 
while the machines are already running. Mr. Poljakov, the plant director, commented that if 
someone believed that the regulations are not kept, he could quit his work.345 
 
Yet, ironically, Scheel actually marveled at the Western technology of the plant, still 
using it as evidence of Soviet advances: 
It is impressive to witness how the chassis and the chassis production line flow into each other. 
Through hydraulics the transmission and the front axle are lifted into the chassis from below and 
then installed. On this point, this plant is more modern than the VW-plant in Hanover.346 
 
Other reporters outlined the total dependence on foreign technological assistance even 
more pointedly: 
                                                
344 Memo, Foreign Minister Scheel, Bericht über meine Dienstreise nach Togliatti vom 25. bis 30. Oktober 
1970, November 24, 1970, BA 102/100023, 2-5. 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ibid. 
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The ardent observer should notice immediately that many plants and equipment are of foreign 
origin. Various large lathes, among them torrent lathes, carried the logo of a West German 
company. The surface preparation for rotors (drive shafts) is conducted with the highest demand 
for precision. Over and over it is quite disarming that for Soviet experts it is a matter of course that 
these demands on quality can only be fulfilled with foreign assistance.347 
 
Potentially destabilizing social problems were also readily discarded, as in this report: 
 
Basically, you cannot begin to compare the economic tasks that the Soviet Union has to complete 
with the ones of a market economy such as the West German one. The Soviet Union commands a 
population of 240 million and incredible natural resources, which it can only mobilize one at a 
time but which it will mobilize, even if it takes longer.  [...] 
It is wrong to assume that the Russians would be influenced by the discontent of its 
population. The Russian people do not compare their standard of living with that of the Western 
countries. Instead, they contrast it to their worse life of the past, recognize gradual improvements, 
and save money so they can buy once the offering is more plentiful and qualitatively better.348 
 
A good example of the German fascination with the Soviet economy, akin to the 
California Gold Rush, are the dealings of the Dieffenbacher GmbH, which delivered 
three plywood manufacturing plants to the Ukraine. Due to the revaluation of the mark in 
1969, it completed these contracts at a heavy loss.349 The firm, however, considered this 
an initial investment since the Soviets displayed interest in more large-scale orders should 
the plants work to satisfaction. Although the plants did work to Soviets satisfaction, the 
completely perplexed company owner wrote to his Bundestag representative that the 
large-scale orders instead had been given to a Finnish firm that produced inferior 
products but could operate under a Soviet-Finnish barter trade agreement (oil for 
machines).350 
 
 
                                                
347 Report, BfA-Correspondent, Klaus Dürkoop, Visit of the Elektrosila Plant, November 28, 1971, BA 
102/100023, 3. 
348 Letter, Otto A. Friedrich to Economics Minister Schiller, Ergebnis-Niederschrift über 
Orientierungsbesuch in Moskau und Leningrad 23.11-27.11.1970, BA 102/100023, 2-4. 
349 See also Karsten Rudolph, Wirtschaftsdiplomatie im Kalten Krieg: Die Ostpolitik der westdeutschen 
Großindustrie 1945-1991 (Campus Verlag: Frankfurt, 2004), 297-300.  
350 Letter, Dieffenbacher GmbH to MdB Baier, Geschäfte mit der UdSSR, August 26, 1971, BA 
102/100001. 
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Strained Ties with the United States 
Soviet Anti-American Rhetoric 
The usefulness of relying on trade to get a hostile government to cooperate is a matter of 
debate. Undoubtedly, though, economic ties with the Soviet Union and the political 
capital Brandt had invested in his Ostpolitik drove the FRG to ever-increasing 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, at virtually the same time disregarding American 
and/or NATO interests. The perception of the Soviet Union, fostered by Soviet 
representatives, became one of an economic wonderland that, as a result of its planned 
economy and large-scale orders, could provide Germany with an economic stability that 
was much more advantageous than the fickle throes of a weakening U.S. economy. Thus 
in the FRG the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union changed significantly 
through the level of personal and business interactions between the Germans and the 
Soviets. Early on, in 1970, Kosygin indicated to Bahr that he would like to conclude the 
negotiations with the FRG during the next three to six months, while the Americans were 
still involved in Vietnam.351 Finalizing negotiations while your ally is otherwise occupied 
should have sent up a warning flag. However, it did not. 
 German diplomats often tolerated or consented to Soviet anti-American rhetoric 
as part of the business negotiations. Upon German economics minister Schillers visit to 
Moscow, Kosygin immediately tried to sow discord within the alliance. One of his initial 
comments was that the Dutch sell their gas pretty expensively. We took note of this but 
                                                
351 Letter, Egon Bahr to Chancellor Brandt, March 7, 1970, Ordner 429B, Mappe 1, Depositorium Egon 
Bahr, Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, 4. Original: Besonderes Schutzbedürfnis hat die Information, daß 
Kossygin dazu neigt, die ganze Sache in den nächsten drei bis sechs Monaten, solange die Amerikaner 
noch Krieg führen in Vietnam, unter Dach und Fach zu bringen. 
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of course do not mind.352 This was followed later by an abrupt change in topic when he 
questioned whether the German payment for U.S. troops were a heavy burden on the 
federal budget. After Schillers objection that these were measures to balance payments, a 
well-informed Kosygin objected that German offset purchases were used to acquire 
weapons and U.S. bonds which the FRG could not resell.353 While Kosygins statement 
was not entirely true, it nonetheless demonstrated a strong preoccupation with the 
German-American relationship and a readiness to remind the German visitor of sore 
points in the transatlantic alliance. 
Kosygin, however, went one step further and outlined his vision of a future 
German-Soviet nuclear energy policy that would alleviate the one-sided orientation 
toward the West in these matters. He recalled Chancellor Brandts statements after the 
signing of the Moscow treaty, in which Brandt had offered cooperation on the 
development of nuclear technology. Without mentioning the U.S. by name, Kosygin 
argued that other countries might be angered by such cooperation or might fear it and 
suggested that we can work without much noise and want to build our economic 
relations on a firm basis.354 
Schiller actually played along and reiterated the FRGs interest in nuclear 
cooperation with other countries.  He agreed with this [Kosygins] presentation of 
economic issues and declared bravery and patience as necessary preconditions for the 
solution of economic and political tasks of the treaty of August 12th [Moscow Treaty].355 
                                                
352 MemCon, Visit of Economics Minister Schiller with Prime Minister Kosygin, September 26, 1970, BA 
102/100023, 3. 
353 Ibid, 5-6. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid. 
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In another instance, Kosygin explained that continued U.S. devaluation of the 
dollar turned the U.S. into strong competitors with the Europeans; uniting the resources 
of European countries such as the FRG, France, Italy, and GB would create a firm 
foundation for continued negotiations.356 Furthermore, he elaborated on the monetary 
situations by which today, the FRG credits the USA  just like a reverse Marshall Plan. 
After sufficiently discrediting the Western economic system, he portrayed the Soviet 
Union as the steady rock that would continue to expand according to plan and which, 
benevolently, would continue to engage in trade with the FRG, even if the dollar-
devaluation adversely affected the competitiveness of West German products.357 
 While it is debatable whether Soviet rhetoric in these talks had any impact on 
German foreign policy per se, the economic shift toward the Soviet Union certainly did. 
The transatlantic alliance only stood to lose from this development. Despite strong 
proclamations to the contrary, in the bipolar world of the Cold War any movement 
toward the Soviet Union precipitated a distancing from the United States. Even though 
the two poles were themselves coming closer together, Brandts administration moved 
faster and with a different quality than Nixons, resulting in a profoundly different 
approach and attitude toward the Soviet Union, one that altered the perception of German 
industry and society alike. Despite a stagnating economy, a lack of the financial 
resources, and the technological inability to exploit its vast natural resources, the Soviet 
Union managed to gain the upper hand economically in its dealings with the West 
Europeans, as several European countries were willing to trade with it and accept barter 
                                                
356 Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow, Sahm, to German Foreign Office, Gespräch O. A. Friderichs 
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357 Letter, Otto A. Friedrich to Economics Minister Friderichs, Zusammenfassende Notiz über einen 
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deals. This, however, created a split in the transatlantic alliance over strategic interests, 
even if no immediate political controversy arose.  
 
EU Preferential Tariffs and Agricultural Subsidies 
With all the economic activity between the FRG and the Soviet Union, it was clear to the 
Brandt government that the vitalization of trade with the Soviet Union was eyed very 
suspiciously in the United States. Since the Soviets demonstrated a much less 
forthcoming attitude toward trade with the United States during the 1970s, the Nixon 
administration would have wished for a more cautious approach. The Germans certainly 
recognized this difference in treatment. German ambassador Pauls reported of several 
fundamental elements that made Americans suspicious of Soviet trade policy. Among 
them was  
Moscows lack of willingness to compromise in the question of Berlin despite the advantages that 
the German Ostpolitik promises for the Soviet Union and the Soviet policy towards a Europe 
from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic, which includes the  CSE [would turn into the CSCE] 
initiative as well as bilateral agreements. 358 
 
 Ultimately, this led to an American suspicion that the Soviet policy is much more than 
previously concerned to erode NATO. This is done by applying a split-level policy with 
promises of détente for Central Europe while maintaining at the same time hostile stance 
towards the American rival. 359 Despite the clear recognition of U.S. perceptions of the 
                                                
358 Telegram, German Ambassador in Washington, Pauls, to German Foreign Office, Bemerkungen zur 
amerikanischen Außenpolitik, December 21, 1970, BA 102/111915, 2-3. Original: Die mangelnde 
Konzessionsbereitschaft Moskaus in der Berlin-Frage trotz der Vorzüge, die die deutsche Ostpolitik auch 
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erodieren durch Anwendung einer split-level-Politik von Entspannungsverlockungen gegenüber 
Mitteleuropa, bei gleichzeitig unverminderter Feindschaft gegen den amerikanischen Rivalen. 
359 Ibid. 
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Soviets split-level policy, Smiles for Europe, Frown for Washington,360 the German 
government did not alter its course of intense economic cooperation with the Soviet 
Union. In a sense, however, this reflected American fears of Western Europe moving 
away from the United States as a whole. Reports of German and French heads of state 
coordinating their approaches when dealing with the U.S. further strengthened this 
notion.361 
 To further strengthen that notion of an American isolation, the preferential tariff 
system of the European Economic Community, which sought to protect trade interests of 
French colonies, put U.S. exports to the EC at a distinct disadvantage. Even before the 
German-American summit meeting in April 1970, the German assessment of this trade 
conflict was dire. It cautioned that, despite Nixons assurances in his address to Congress 
that the U.S. would be willing to pay a price for the unification of Europe, the 
unequivocal American support of the West European unification process was wavering 
because of certain economic considerations. 362  
 Agricultural Secretary Clifford M. Hardin articulated the same concern during his 
visit to Germany and even threatened that the American government not only considers 
the regional preferential policy of the [European] community as incompatible with GATT 
but also toys with the idea of concluding a preferential agreement with Latin America as 
a counter measure to the policy of the community.363 In January of the following year, the 
growing conflict loomed even larger. The Economics Ministry suggested a speedy visit to 
                                                
360 Joseph C. Harsch, Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 1970, 23. 
361 Charles Hargrove, French align policies with Germans before Nixon talks, The London Times, 
December 6, 1971, 4, column F. 
362 Memo, Verhältnis Europa - USA // Handelspolitik betrifft Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in den 
USA am 10./11. April 1970, March 13, 1970,  BA 102/111903, 1-2. 
363 Memo, Dr. Schilling, Besuch von US-Landwirtschaftsminister Hardin bei Staatssekretär Dr. 
Rohwedder am 9.12.1970, December 9, 1970, BA 102/111915. 
 137
the new Secretary of the Treasury, John B. Conally, and cautioned of a stronger 
protectionist policy in the U.S. 
Relations between the U.S.A. and the European Community appear to worsen  at least in the near 
future. [] The mayor problems are the agricultural policy of the EC and the preferential customs 
agreement. If the EC believes it cannot or should not be flexible in this regard, one must expect 
that the agricultural groupings in the U.S., which had been a very important group with liberal 
trade tendencies, will also turn protectionist.364 
 
Europeans, on the other hand, pointed to a consistently favorable balance of trade with 
the EEC. In their opinion, the United States chronic balance-of-payment problem 
resulted in pressure on them to alleviate a problem caused by unreasonable fiscal policies. 
Being indirectly volunteered to partially finance the U.S. involvement in Vietnam made 
many Europeans unsympathetic to the economic plight of the U.S.365 
 Willy Brandts Osthandel and the protectionist EC tariff policies continued to 
create strong concerns in the U.S.366 In a sense, a stronger emphasis on Europe and less 
on the Atlantic alliance fell in line with the French policy. EC agricultural policies were 
mostly set up to benefit French interests. Brandt, implicitly, had made a decision for a 
Franco-German emphasis rather than a transatlantic one. Not surprisingly, Brandt early 
on offered the French government cooperation in dealing with the Soviet Union 
economically. In a meeting with French President Georges Pompidou, Brandt seemed 
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quite convinced of the sincerity of the Soviet Union and the merits of his approach, and 
so he encouraged cooperation between French and German companies in undertaking 
deals with the East.367  
 
COCOM and Export restrictions 
With stronger economic links between the Soviet Union and the FRG, the issue of export 
restrictions became more and more pressing. Again diverging from the U.S. position, 
which saw no intrinsic value in the lifting of restrictions but wanted to use it as a 
bargaining tool with the Soviet Union, the Brandt government now advocated a 
liberalization of COCOM restrictions without any concrete Soviet concessions in return. 
In a meeting with Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson it became clear that the Brandt 
government considered Soviet moves at détente sufficient grounds for liberalization.  
In light of the technological and scientific development in the East and the West and the desired 
increase in the exchange of goods and services between both regions I wonder if the volume of 
current COCOM restrictions is still reasonable. 368 
 
It is a telling aspect of the internal dynamics within the FRG that Finance Minister 
Schmidt attributed pressures for liberalization to the German industry, with the 
government supporting these initiatives, and not vice versa. This demonstrates that by 
1972 the Soviet Union had managed to turn the dynamics between trade and politics to 
their advantage. While Brandt had pushed the German industry to pursue trade with the 
East in 1970 in order to bring about political concessions, now the Soviet Union could 
count on the German industry to advocate their case in the political arena. 
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The German industry views the many embargo rules as an intolerable export hindrance in these 
times and demands a stronger liberalization for computers, electronics, transistors, electronic 
devices, and communication equipment and parts, chemical products as well as ships with higher 
speeds. [] The federal government supports this view. 369 
 
This advocacy in fact occurred in a rather forceful way. Schmidt pointed to differences in 
interpretation of the COCOM agreement on the part of different member states, as other 
member states, most notably Great Britain, had refused outright to abide by the 
agreement. He also mentioned the special circumstances of the FRG, for its smaller 
market hindered the development of research-intensive high-tech products that could only 
be profitable in a large market.370 
 This line of reasoning, however, neglects the possibilities within the EEC, as by 
1972 the EC was one of the largest economic blocs in the world. Using the EC on one 
hand to argue that tariff and agricultural policies could not be altered according to U.S. 
interests, and on the other hand not considering its member states as a potential market 
for domestic products, is reminiscent of Timothy G. Ashs thesis that the Brandt 
government used the term Europe semantically and diplomatically to foster its ends. 
The Brandt government hid behind a strong Europe to shield itself from American 
criticism and portrayed a weak, unfinished Europe when the need arose. While this 
strategy was successful in preventing a direct clash with the Nixon administration, it 
could not contain public criticism from non-governmental circles. 
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U.S. Opposition to Ostpolitik 
In the United States, Ostpolitik became a highly divisive issue that was quickly 
incorporated into the ideological confrontation between liberals and conservatives. 
Jabbing at the liberal news media for approving of Willy Brandt just because he was a 
Social Democrat, the conservative National Review criticized Willy Brandt for giving in 
to the East as early as June 1970. Portraying Brandt as flip-flopping between an anti-
American left-wing position with an emphasis on the Social and a pro-American right-
wing position that emphasized the Democrat, the author, Norbert Muhlen, saw Brandt 
as fully surrounded by left-wing Social Democrats. Ostpolitik was seen as a dangerous 
policy of appeasement, as Willy Brandt could be preparing the way for the destruction 
of the Western defenses in Europe and the Soviet penetration of the European West.371 
 After the signing of the Moscow treaty, conservative U.S. opposition became 
even fiercer, and comparison was drawn to the treaty with the Hitler-Stalin pact. An 
article in the National Review portrayed a vision of a Europe free of U.S. influence, 
seeing many advantages for the German industry in expanding into the Soviet Union, and 
remembering Lenins dictum that German technology plus Russian space, resources, and 
manpower would rule the world.372 By September 1970, conservative criticism focused 
on Brandt. Chiding the U.S. administration for not recognizing the fateful doings of 
Brandt, that experienced and resourceful Marxist, the Moscow treaty was now 
portrayed as an even more damaging agreement than the Hitler-Stalin pact. Brandt was 
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portrayed as purposely trying to link Germany to the Soviet Union, destroy NATO, and 
expel the United States from the FRG.373 
 This damning critique was countered by the liberal magazine The Nation, which 
did not feel Brandts policies went far enough.  Joe Morris applauded Brandts overtures 
to the East as a long overdue step in overcoming the Cold War divisions brought about by 
the Dulles-Adenauer team, but wished for a more conciliatory German stance on the 
permanence of the post-war borders.374 This turned into open praise and excitement about 
the Moscow treaty in August, 1970.375 To The Nation, Brandt was the hero who had 
implemented badly needed détente policies, yet was undermined by Nixon and other 
hawks in the U.S.  Conservative critiques were brushed aside with the remark that these 
hawks operated under yesterdays Cold War philosophy, which assumed that 
Communism was evil and could not change.376  
 A year-end assessment by the German embassy of U.S. media coverage on 
Ostpolitik found a turn for the worse in the mainstream media. A worsening Soviet-
American relationship, resulting from the situation in the Middle East, Cuba, SALT, and 
reports of the abuse of Soviet dissidents, changed the mood of the media coverage. Citing 
comments like Many Faces of Kremlin, Smiles for Europe, Frown for Washington and 
 keeping the American bogey now that the Soviets relations with China and West 
Germany are better, the media depicted a more aggressive Soviet stance that clearly 
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translated into a more cautious approach to Ostpolitik.377 The previously conservative 
arguments became more forceful, focusing on American interests concerning Ostpolitik. 
Issues like threats to the Western alliance, the disadvantages of high-tech exports, and 
whether West Germany received enough in return for its concessions were of crucial 
importance in the latter half of 1970. The issue of Berlin, however, remained benchmark 
for any evaluation on the value of Ostpolitik.378 
Despite the ideological division between conservatives and liberals in this debate, 
one of the most forceful opponents to Ostpolitik ironically came from the American labor 
unions. The AFL-CIO Executive Council clearly recognized the link between Osthandel 
and Soviet influence. In a damning critique of Brandts Ostpolitik, the diplomatic 
advances of Ostpolitik were portrayed as giving away the Western powers diplomatic 
leverage for nothing in return. 
The most disturbing feature of the present world situation is the continued growth of Soviet 
military power and political influence [] But the greatest diplomatic victory for Moscow in the 
last year has been its Treaty of August 12, 1970 with the Federal Republic of Germany. In this 
treaty, a Western power has, for the first time, recognized the post-war Soviet conquests and 
hegemony in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Federal German government has promised an 
expansion of trade, long term credits, scientific, technological, and cultural contacts and 
arrangements with the USSR. The Soviet Union has given nothing in return for these great 
concessions. The Federal German negotiators did not succeed in having the Soviets recognize, in 
the treaty, the German peoples right of self-determination or in obtaining Moscows renunciation 
of its right of intervention on the basis of Article 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter. [] 
Though Bonn has made the ratification of the treaty [] dependent on a satisfactory 
Berlin settlement, there has been no improvement regarding the plight of this city. In the Four 
Power talks on Berlin, the USSR has, to date, shown no willingness to make any concessions. On 
the contrary, the Kremlin continually demands concessions by the West.379 
 
How bad public opinion with the American labor force really was can be seen by German 
reaction to the article, Willy Brandt: Remaking the Face of Europe, published by the 
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American Automobile Workers Union (UAW). The German embassy in Washington 
commented that this article belongs to one of the relatively few comments from 
organized labor in the U.S. which finds the Ostpolitik of the [German] Federal 
Government to be positive. 380 
Some members of the U.S. Congress also were critical of Ostpolitik. After a 
prominent SPD leader, Steffen, accused the allied forces of being in Germany under 
precisely the same moral, political, and juridical conditions under which the Soviet 
occupiers were in Czechoslovakia, conservative Congressman Philip M. Crane linked this 
attitude with Brandts Ostpolitik and voiced his displeasure. 
We have heard so much of the alleged differences between Chancellor Brandt and his defense 
minister. We know also that some members of Mr. Brandts coalition partner, the free democrats, 
were so displeased over Ostpolitik that they resigned and joined the opposition. [] 
It can be said that extreme statements such as this one [Mr. Steffens] should not be 
dignified with an answer. However, the point is that these kinds of remarks show what is 
happening in [the] SPD in Germany. 
Our government must be aware of these pressures as they continue to deal with 
Ostpolitik. I am confident that the voters of West Germany will appropriately deal with political 
irresponsibility when their turn comes. Meanwhile, however, we must recognize reality and 
unfortunately reality suggests that Chancellor Brandts party is being influenced by a far leftist 
faction whose intentions do not coincide with those of the United States or our NATO allies.381 
 
It must be noted that not all Members of Congress shared this view. Senator Jacob K. 
Javits, for example, was very adamant about his support for Brandts Ostpolitik. In a 
conversation with von Dohnanyi, he assured the minister that his use of the term 
Finnlandization in reference to German Ostpolitik had been politically abused and he 
claimed that it would be stiken from the transcripts. He explicitly wanted to convey to 
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Brandt that he was in full agreement with the foreign policy of the German 
government.382 
 Criticism, however, was not just limited to the Eastern Treaties, themselves. 
Former Undersecretary of State George W. Ball criticized Ostpolitik on the basis that it 
rested on a faulty paradigm shift in the German perception of the Soviet Union. Implying 
that Willy Brandt viewed the Soviet Union as a peaceful nation while it was only 
strategically dormant, he discarded the diplomatic significance of the two Eastern treaties 
and questioned their long-term effect on the mentality of the German people. 
Today Willy Brandts initiative, which seeks to revivify that policy [of French détente], has, I 
think, been badly understood in America, largely because the two treaties negotiated so farone 
with Moscow and one with Warsawcontain so little of substance that it is difficult for 
Americans to see just what purpose they serve. [] 
The danger is not that the Bonn-Moscow Pact will lead Germany into too intimate 
relations with the Soviet Union, but that it may instead lead it to a dangerous complacency. This is 
the essence of my own reservations. Will a new generations of Germanwho feel no 
responsibility for the obscenities of Nazism, for the war, the defeat or the occupationbe prepared 
to make the exertions necessary for a protracted holding of the line against the continuing, though 
presently frustrated, objective of the Soviet Union to push the boundaries of its empire farther to 
the West? Will they be prepared to exercise the patience and pay the cost which the continuance of 
this policy entails, particularly when pressures will almost certainly build up in America for some 
phasing out of our own overseas deployment?383 
 
Germans attending Balls speech observed a long and agreeing applause, indicating just 
how unpopular Ostpolitik had become.384 
 The perception of a weakening U.S. economy increased drastically in early 1972. 
The shock of having a negative trade balance called for a harsher policy to remedy the 
trade deficit and financial situation. The German embassy observed that protective tariffs 
and a harsher criticism of the EC policies would probably be forthcoming. At the same 
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time, the German ambassador commented that a trade deal between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union of $1 billion in grain deliveries over the next three years was a sign of 
liberalization.385 The subsequent peak in trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
was mentioned often by German delegates when discussing trade policies with their U.S. 
counterparts. The Germans frequently took these grain deliveries as a sign that the U.S. 
and the FRG were on the same page with their trade policies, especially in 1973 when the 
U.S. increase in trade with the Soviet Union rivaled that of the FRG. However, this 
assessment was incorrect. For one, the U.S. did not think that agricultural goods 
improved the strategic situation of the Soviet Union to the extent that manufacturing 
plants or the building an energy infrastructure did. For another, the creation of steel 
processing plants (as done by the Mannesmann AG), or constructing a natural gas 
distribution system in Bavaria created much stronger and long-term ties with the Soviet 
economy than selling surplus grain. 
 As a result, the situation of the FRG was decidedly more dependent on the 
goodwill of the Soviet Union than that of the U.S. The intense interlinking of the German 
and Soviet economies paralleled the intense cooperation and friendship that Brandt 
envisioned for German-Soviet relations. Americas loose economic ties with the 
occasional condition on strategic exports exemplifies the quid-pro-quo attitude of an 
equal partner who pursues cooperation only far enough to maintain a strategic advantage.  
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Political Games over Berlin 
Soviet Pinpricks 
The issue of Berlin was probably the most important issue for the FRG in which the 
Soviet Union could make its superiority felt. The German side repeatedly insisted on 
including Berlin in the treaty negotiations, but the West German position was apparently 
not strong enough to have the Berlin inclusion spelled out in a binding and clear manner 
in their agreements with the Eastern bloc. The Soviets had a history of using economic 
interactions to undermine the status of Berlin.  One such example was the Soviet 
company Prodingtorg, which had filed a complaint about over the illegal re-export of 
Russian caviar by a West Berlin company to West Germany. Since the sales agreement 
prohibited re-exports to third countries and the Soviets considered Berlin a separate 
country, in their view this constituted a break in the sales agreement.386 With such 
harassment tactics the Soviets were able to keep the issue of West Berlin in the forefront 
of political debate. 
 The Bonn government sought to pursue a trade agreement as it had an interest in 
strengthening economic ties with the Soviet Union. Since they could not command 
German companies to pursue trade deals with the Soviet Union as the Soviets could do, 
the security a trade agreement provided was of utmost importance for the revitalization of 
trade. The problem with concluding the agreement was not one of economics but politics. 
In no prior trade agreements between the FRG and the Soviet Union were there 
references to West Berlin. The only treaty still valid was the 1958 German-Soviet 
Agreement on Trade and Shipping. In this treaty the Germans had handed the Soviet 
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delegation a letter stating that the FRG assumed that West Berlin was included in the 
treaty. The Soviet delegate apparently took the letter unopened and in a later negotiation 
the Soviets denied the validity of the said treaty for West Berlin.387 Negotiations in 1967 
on the reinstatement of a general trade agreement faltered on the issue of Berlin.  
 The Soviets were also adamant in insisting that trade with German companies in 
Berlin was to be conducted in U.S. dollars. Soviet firms rejected German credit lines and 
even insisted that German companies have their trade with the Soviet Union funneled 
through branch offices in West Berlin. In one instance, when a German company did not 
have such a branch the Soviet firm involved recommended to the German owner that he 
find one.388 The Soviets turned the issue any way they pleased. They gladly accepted 
West German import licenses issued to Berlin companies as it provided them with 
sought-after hard currency. On the other hand, they strictly separated West Berlin from 
West Germany in their trade statistics, during fairs when raising the Berlin rather than the 
West German flag, and in insisting on payment of clearly West German goods in U.S. 
dollars.389 
 For the German government the inclusion of Berlin in any prospective trade 
agreement was of paramount importance. Even in talks with the Soviets on forming a 
commission that would negotiate a trade agreement, the German side stated that the 
work of the German-Soviet trade commission would take into account the ties between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin (West), especially in the area of economics, 
science and technology. Should this not be possible, it was concluded that we will have 
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to wait with the formation of the German-Soviet Trade Commission until the Four Power 
Agreement on Berlin will be in force.390 
 Including West Berlin in any treaty with the Soviet Union was not simply a 
priority for the Brandt government. In a sense, the Berlin issue provided a tangible 
measurement of the effectiveness of Ostpolitik. Not to include West Berlin would have 
been a public relations disaster for the SPD/FDP coalition. As Brandt explained to Bahr 
in August 1970 after failing to find satisfactory coverage of the Berlin issue in Bahrs 
account of his Soviet negotiations: The [Berlin Declaration] is a substantial element and 
a crucial point domestically. [] The Soviet side has to understand that our government 
has to explain in parliament in which way the foreign minister has articulated our interest 
in this crucial question. He further explained that a de-facto inclusion of West Berlin in 
the East-West trade would be very helpful. Finally, he warned Bahr that we need a 
substantial discussion, an agreed-on formal declaration and an agreed-on terminology.391 
 Brandt was further concerned about the spirits of West Berliners. He saw the 
current situation as unattractive, depressing, and devoid of youthful energy. 
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In the current condition time is working against us. The aging of society progresses, the longing of 
the people for normal circumstances, as well. [] Maybe we can even get back what has been lost 
many years ago. [] The spirit of West Berlin is more important to me than the unavoidable 
acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line. [] West Berlin is even more important to me than good or 
not so good relations to the GDR. 392 
 
With the political stakes that high domestically, West German politicians categorically 
required the inclusion of West Berlin in the treaty. Economics Minister Schiller, for 
example, upon being asked by a journalist during his trip to Moscow in October 1970 
whether he had felt that the Russians agreed to consider West-Berlin as part of the FRG, 
answered that West Berlin must be included in the territorial delineation of the treaty. 
The Soviet reaction to this was reluctant, as usual. The question of the territory will, 
therefore, be a major element of the upcoming negotiations.393  
 The Soviets did their best to heat up the issue. The chair of the Foreign Relations 
committee, Jury A. Zhukov, explained in a speech on September 22, 1970 that we are 
not of the opinion that the Federal Republic has a right to assume that West Berlin is part 
of it. It is not politically united with it. West Berlin is the only territory that still remains 
under occupation. No one can change these facts.394 In backdoor negotiations, Soviet 
Premier Kosygin was even more direct. Prodded by Schiller about whether using the 
jurisdiction of the German Bundesbank would be an appropriate term for a new trade 
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können. Die Lebenskraft West-Berlins ist mir wichtiger als die ohnehin nicht vermeidbare Hinnahme der 
Oder-Neiße-Linie, die außer der CSU niemand in der Welt mehr in Frage stellt. Mir ist West-Berlin sogar 
wichtiger als gute order weniger gute Beziehungen zur DDR. 
393 Letter, Economics Ministry, Schulte-Steinberg, to Economics Minister Schiller, Interview von Herrn 
Minister für die Pariser Zeitung Les Echos, October 12, 1970, BA 102/10001, 2. Original: West-Berlin 
muß also in den räumlichen Geltungsbereich [der BRD] einbezogen werden. Die sowjetische Reaktion 
hierauf war zunächst verhalten. Die Frage des Geltungsbereichs wird daher ein wesentlicher Punkt für die 
kommenden Verhandlungen über ein neues Handelsabkommen sein. 
394 German Foreign Office, Dr. Bräutigam, to Economics Ministry, Lukas, Vortrag von Jurij A. Shukow,  
December  4, 1970, BA 102/99988. 
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agreement, Kosygin simply replied: This is a complicated question. I think it should not 
be included in parts of the trade agreement so as not to complicate the economic issues. I 
therefore ask you not to pose that question here. 395 
 The German foreign office, however, picked up Schillers suggestion. Rather than 
insisting on an agreement on Berlin before negotiations could begin, the German Foreign 
Office wanted to send a letter to the Soviet embassy, insisting that the FRG could only 
conduct a trade agreement if it referred to the jurisdiction of the Währungsgebiet der 
Bundesbank.396 In another German push for movement on the issue, German 
ambassador Allardt informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry through Ambassador 
ValentinFalin that the FRG was willing to negotiate a trade agreement, but that an 
agreement on the jurisdiction over West Berlin had to be reached before it could be 
initialed. Falin, on the other hand, presumably in accordance with a Soviet stance that 
was designed to leave the Germans sweating, stated that he could not comment on this, as 
this was part of the ongoing allied four-power-negotiations in Berlin.397 
 When the Soviet delegation for the negotiations finally met in Bonn on February 
25, 1971 the German delegation leader, Dr. Hermes, reiterated that an agreement without 
the inclusion of Berlin was out of the question and the Soviet delegation leader, 
Manzullo, replied that this had nothing to do with the current negotiations. While the bulk 
of economic questions were resolved quickly, the question of Berlin remained as the 
major problem. The delegation agreed to end the first round of negotiations on March 5, 
                                                
395 MemCon, Visit of Minister Schiller with Prime Minister Kosygin, September 26, 1970, BA 102/100023, 
7-8. Original: Das ist eine komplizierte Frage. Ich meine, sie sollte nicht in Elemente des 
Handelsabkommens aufgenommen werden, um die wirtschaftlichen Fragen nicht zu komplizieren. Ich bitte 
Sie deshalb, die Frage hier nicht aufzuwerfen. 
396 Memo, Dr. Becker, Deutsch-sowjetisches Handelsabkommen,  September 30, 1970, BA 102/99988. 
397 Letter, Economics Ministry, Dr. Thieme, to Economics Minister Schiller, Aufnahme der deutsch-
sowjetischen Verhandlungen über ein Handelsabkommen, December 15, 1970, BA 102/99988. 
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1971 and reconvene in Moscow at some future date, presumably after the Four Power 
negotiations on Berlin had been concluded.398 When the negotiations were aborted, there 
were only two issues that posed substantial problems: a) trade liberalization for German 
imports and b) the issue of Berlin.399 While trade liberalization was a matter of degree 
and quite negotiable, Berlin was a matter of principle. The Eastern treaties, a trade 
agreement, and German domestic support of Ostpolitik, all hinged on the issue of Berlin. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Brandt government saw its political fate as 
intricately connected with the Four Power Agreement. 
 
The Four Power Agreement on Berlin 
With the fate of Brandts government riding on the outcome of the Four Power 
Agreement it should have been relatively easy to boycott the process and end Brandts 
overtures to the East. Regardless of their public posture, both Nixon and his national 
security advisor agreed that Ostpolitik contained significant risks, especially since it 
would give the Soviet Union a lever to pry the alliance apart. 
[t]he objective obstacle facing Brandt is that he cannot keep Soviet friendship if he emphasizes 
West Germanys ties to NATO. German ties to the European community can be agreeable to the 
Soviets only if they see it as a means to weaken NATO. [] Brandt has maneuvered the situation 
so that we have been pushed into the position of being responsible for both Berlin, and for the 
success of his Eastern initiative [] As a result of the signature of the German-Soviet treaty, 
European political relationships have turned a corner, and we will be facing a new period in our 
relationship with Europe. [] The impact of the German-Soviet treaty might very well lead to an 
increased interest on the part of the Europeans to deal more independently with Moscow. 
Moscow, in turn, will find it useful to encourage this in order to split off the various Western 
Allies from each other. 400 
 
                                                
398 Memo, Dr. Becker, Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsverhandlungen, March 2, 1971, BA 102/99988. 
399 Letter, Economics Ministry, Dr. Hanemann, to Economics Minister Schiller, Deutsch-sowjetische 
Wirtschaftsverhandlungen, March 5, 1971, BA 102/10001. 
400 Memo, Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, September 1, 1970, The German-Soviet Treaty, 
folder: Germany Vol VII. 1 August 70 - Nov 70, Box 684, Country Files - Europe, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 
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 Nixon deemed this decisive and an excellent perceptive analysis (and somewhat 
ominous).401 The Nixon administration also had clear alternatives to the SPD-led 
government. On September 13, 1970 Kissinger called the CDU our friends whom the 
U.S. must not demoralize by openly supporting the policy of the SPD.402 Ironically, 
Kissinger even expressed his regret that the German ultra-right party had not entered 
parliament, since this would have shifted political power in the German Parliament in 
favor of the CDU. 
The worst tragedy is that election in 69. If this National Party, that extreme right wing party, had 
got three-tenths of one percent more, the Christian Democrats would be in office now.403 
 
Nixon also followed this line when he assured CDU party chairman, Rainer Barzel, that 
we stand by our old friends.404 This stance was never pronounced in public, and indeed 
was a tricky policy to enforce. Any tensions between the Nixon administration and 
Brandts government would have undermined the alliance and further exposed Germany 
to Soviet influence. Furthermore, Germany was a key element in the American version of 
détente, and therefore not to be alienated. On the other hand, Nixon wanted to avoid 
helping Brandt remain in office by only offering his tacit approval of Ostpolitik. In short, 
the Nixon administration tried to pursue the course that would best suit the United States, 
which was not to offend the SPD while leaning towards the CDU.  
 In a National Security memorandum dated November 6, 1970, Kissinger pursued 
this policy to perfection. He outlined the need to  
                                                
401 Ibid. 
402 Memo, Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, September 13, 1970, folder: Germany Vol VII. 1 
August 70 - Nov 70, Box 684, Country Files - Europe, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 
403 Recording of Conversation between President Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, May 29, 1971, White 
House Tapes, Conversation 507-4, NPMP, NA.  
404 Rainer Barzel, Im Streit und umstritten: Anmerkungen zu Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard und den 
Ostverträgen (Frankfurt a. Main: Ullstein, 1986), 172. 
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develop a sense of confidence and trust in relations with the FRG, whether governed by the CDU 
or SPD [] to avoid to the fullest extent feasible any involvement, either indirectly or directly, in 
the internal political affairs of the FRG and, in particular, to avoid any impression that we favor or 
support any political party in the FRG.405 
 
While this document, at first glance, seemed to have played towards the SPD interests, it 
was in fact a masterpiece of Kissingerian political maneuvering. Since Kissinger 
announced that this policy will be communicated to the British and French governments 
and to the FRG as part of the normal consultative process, it gave President Nixon good 
reason to decline any statement that supported Brandt or his Ostpolitik. The CDU could 
not be offended since this policy welcomed relationships with either party. While it 
supported the FRGs Eastern policy in general, the United States did not obligate itself 
to support particular tactics, measures, timing or interpretations. It further stated an 
assertive American policy in which our juridical position with respect to Germany as a 
whole is in no way impaired and strengthened the Americans negotiating position with 
the Soviet Union in that a new four power agreement is, therefore, not an essential 
requirement in terms of our interests or our policy.406 In essence, this policy severely 
limited American cooperation in the pursuit of Brandts Ostpolitik while endorsing it in 
general terms. 
 Such a policy of delay was, of course, not acceptable to Brandt. In December 
1970 Brandt emissary Horst Ehmke met with Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State 
for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand on short notice to discuss the lack of progress 
on the Four Power Agreement on Berlin. Unofficially, reports of unhappiness in the 
Nixon administration over West German Chancellor Willy Brandts Eastern policy had 
                                                
405 National Security Decision Memorandum 91, United States Policy on Germany and Berlin, November 
6, 1970, folder Germany BERLIN Vol III. Jan - Apr 72, Box 691, Country Files - Europe, NSCF, 
WHSF, NPMS, NA, 1. 
406 Ibid, 2.  
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spread to the news media.407 These sentiments were certainly true with respect to 
Nixon.408 Two months before the conclusion of the Four Power talks on Berlin, in May 
1971, he still retained his aversion to Ostpolitik and the liberal German chancellor. I 
dont want to hurt our friends in Germany [CDU] by catering to that son-of-a-bitch 
[Brandt].409 
 Kissingers stance was more oblique but ultimately carried the day. While he had 
been concerned about Ostpolitik, this was mostly due to the lack of his personal 
involvement, not its effect on international relations. In his memoirs he triumphantly 
declared the linkage between the Eastern treaties and the successful completion of a Four 
Power Agreement as successfully harnessing of the beast of détente. 410 Using such 
terminology not only indicates the strong desire for the U.S. to take the leadership in 
détente policies but also the reluctance to engage in it altogether. Yet he failed to take the 
initiative and continued to work closely with Bahr on the Four Power negotiations. Bahr 
had apparently learned from past mistakes and continued to outline in great detail his 
talks with Soviet representative Falin, even recounting personal aspects of Falins wifes 
illness.411 Kissinger, on his part, involved Bahr extensively in the preparation for the 
talks. Kissinger remembered that he had given Ambassador Dobrynin a draft that 
suggested a focus on practical aspects rather than legal issues as a way to overcome a 
deadlock in negotiations. Kissinger apparently had not modified many of Bahrs 
                                                
407 Marilyn Berger, Bonn Official, Kissinger Confer, The Washington Post, December 22, 1970,  A18.  
408 This is in sharp contrast to Stephen Ambrose, who depicted Kissinger as suspicious of Ostpolitik while 
Nixon embraced it. Ambrose, 464. 
409 Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, May 29, 1971. [NARA NPMP] White House 
Tapes, Conversation 507-4. 
410 Kissinger, White House Years, 534. 
411 Letter, U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, Rush, to Henry A. Kissinger, March 28, 1971, folder Ambassador 
Rush - Berlin Vol. I [1 of 2], Box 59, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files-Europe, NSCF, 
NPMS, NA. 
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suggestions in this draft, which was discussed during a weekend retreat, since he simply 
gave Dobrynin Bahrs German version of the draft.412 Furthermore, Bahr was invited to 
be a third party in backchannel meetings between Ambassador Rush and Soviet 
representative Falin, who was the key Soviet representative in the negotiations.413 Thus, it 
must have been an issue of hurt pride for Kissinger that Bahr had excluded him from the 
initial Soviet-German consultations. Far from harnessing Bahr, however, he involved 
the West German side heavily in developing acceptable language and diplomatic 
solutions for the American side during the Four-Power Agreement negotiations. 
 Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Nixon administration was less than 
enthusiastic about the Berlin talks. Fundamentally, Nixon viewed Berlin as a bargaining 
chip with the Soviets: Berlin is something they need from us a hell of a lot more than we 
need it from them. [] We are going to make them [the Soviets] pay.414 Kissinger made 
extensive use of the Berlin accords as a negotiating tool. According to David Geyer, 
Berlin was always a means and never the ends in Soviet-American relations.415 The 
Berlin accords were used to speed up SALT negotiations and help pressure the Soviets to 
provide assistance to the American cause in Vietnam. Only when the Soviets linked the 
success on the Berlin talks with the possibility of a Soviet-American summit did the 
                                                
412 MemCon between Henry A. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Dobrynin, on April 27, 
1971, Tab 1 of Memo, Henry A. Kissinger, Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 27, 1971, folder 
''Berlin - Vol.3 [1 of 2]'' Box 59, NSCF Henry A. Kissinger Office Files Country Files-Europe, NPMS, NA. 
413 Letter, U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, Rush, to Henry A. Kissinger, May 5, 1971, folder Ambassador Rush 
- Berlin Vol. I [1 of 2], Box 59, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files-Europe, NSCF, NPMS, 
NA. For Falins role, see Letter, U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, Rush, to Henry A. Kissinger, May 28, 1971, 
folder Ambassador Rush - Berlin Vol. I [1 of 2], Box 59, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files-
Europe, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 
414 Recording of Conversation with President Nixon in the Oval Office, June 14, 1971, White House Tapes, 
OVAL 519-15, NPMP, NA.   
415 David C. Geyer, The Missing Link: Henry Kissinger and the Back-Channel Negotiations on Berlin in 
David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer, eds., American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972 
(Washington, DC: Supplement 1 to the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, 2004): 80-92, 91-92. 
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Nixon administration move into high gear, finalizing the Four Power Agreement on 
September 3, 1971.416 
 Ultimately, though, the Four Power Agreement did not deliver to Bonn what they 
had desired: a clear and indisputable agreement that linked West Berlin with West 
Germany. Instead, the result was a vague formulation that each side could interpret the 
way it pleased. Even with the agreement in force, West Germany depended on case-by-
case negotiations to include West Berlin in bilateral treaties. However, to the Brandt 
government this was not immediately apparent. Operating under the firm assumption that 
the Berlin issue was resolved, Brandt gave his foreign policy a new sense of 
independence from the United States. 
 
The Height of Brandts Ostpolitik 
Ever since Brandts ascension to the chancellorship, the public emphasis on balancing his 
Eastern policy with an active Western policy was part of the new foreign policy credo. 
According to both Brandt and Bahr, the policy of a European unity [in this case not the 
EC but East and West Europe] cannot be pursued without the support and the backing of 
the U.S.A.417 
 On the other hand, there was a very real sense of distinction between the U.S. and 
West European stature in world politics. Economic and political turmoil in the U.S. 
portrayed a sense of weakness and insecurity to the outside world. As Günter Grass, a 
confidante of Brandt and intellectual leader put it: 
                                                
416 Ibid. 
417 Talking Points Memo, Visit Chancellor Brandt to the U.S. on April 10/11, 1970, Verhältnis Europa-
USA // Handelspolitik, March 13, 1970,  BA 102/111903, 1. Original: Die Politik der europäischen 
Einigung [...] ist nicht durchzuführen ohne den Rückhalt und die Unterstützung der USA. 
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The United States are in an apparent irreparable crisis. The signs are many: Overconfidence gave 
way to aggressive insecurity. The liberal minorities resign or place their hope in mostly short-lived 
political actions. The youth, which had still protested yesterday is now preoccupied with itself and 
drugs. [] Many predictions point to a second (creeping) civil war. Political assassinations occur 
daily in the countryside and have become entrenched practices. The country is sick. Europe, if it 
does not want to become infected, must distance itself. 418 
 
Yet, distancing West Germany from the United States was impossible during 1970, nor 
was it even thinkable during the Four Power Agreement negotiations.  
Consequently, Brandt backed Nixon and his policy in public. In a letter to a 
member of the Bundestag, Horst Krockert, he defended the fact that he had not critiqued 
the Vietnam War since his inaugural address.  
Since then I have declined to publicly comment [on Vietnam], not even to the reports on the 
events of My Lai. I think it inappropriate to comment on this in light of the strong condemnation 
by President Nixon and in light of the moral debate that the media coverage has triggered within 
the American nation. [...]  
The American government under President Nixon seeks peace in Vietnam. There can be 
no doubt about this. [...] I believe we should support the American government in its will to end 
this war on that basis [self-determination of the Vietnamese people]. 419  
 
Brandt also defended Nixons policies internationally. In a letter to Jean Monnet, for 
example, he praised Nixons approach to the EEC. He wrote that in particular Nixons 
                                                
418 Letter, Günter Grass to Chancellor Brandt, March 25, 1970, Mappe 6, Bundeskanzler, WBA, 1-3. 
Original: Die Vereinigten Staaten befinden sich in einer, wie es den Anschein hat, durch nichts zu 
behebenden Krise. Die Anzeichen sind vielgestallt: übersteigertes Selbstbewußtsein ist aggressiver 
Unsicherheit gewichen. Die liberale Minderheit flüchtet sich in Resignation oder in zumeist kurzlebige 
politische Aktionen. Die gestern noch protestierende Jugend ist mit sich und ihren Drogen beschäftigt. [...] 
Viele Prognosen deuten auf einen zweiten (schleichenden) Bürgerkrieg hin. Der politische Mord findet in 
der Provinz täglich statt und ist zur Gewohnheit geworden. Das Land ist krank: Europa wird, wenn es nicht 
infiziert werden will, auf Distanz gehen müssen. 
419 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to MdB Horst Krockert, January 23, 1970, Mappe 41, Bundeskanzler, WBA, 
1-2. Original: Ich habe es seither abgelehnt, mich öffentlich zu äußern, auch nicht zu den Berichten über 
die Geschehnisse von My Lai, weil ich angesichts der scharfen Verurteilung aller Ausschreitungen durch 
Präsident Nixon und des durch die Presseberichterstattung ausgelösten Gewissenskonflikts in der 
amerikanischen Nation eine eigene Stellungnahme für unangemessen halte. 
Die amerikanische Regierung unter Präsident Nixon sucht den Frieden in Vietnam. An dieser 
Tatsache kann es keinen Zweifel geben. Sie ist bereit zu einer in Verhandlungen zu erreichenden Regelung 
des Konflikts mit ihren Gegnern, die eine einzige aber unverzichtbare Forderung erfüllen muß: die 
betroffene Bevölkerung muß das Recht erhalten, über ihr Schicksal selbst zu bestimmen. 
Ich glaube, wir täten gut daran, die Berechtigung dieser Forderung anzuerkennen und die 
amerikanische Regierung in ihrem Willen, den Krieg auf dieser Grundlage zu beenden, zu unterstützen. 
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clarity of attitude impressed me, as he wants to continue to use the community as an 
important means to strengthen the position of the West. 420 
 By the summer of 1971, however, with the Four Power Agreement on Berlin all 
but completed, Brandt placed less emphasis on his Westpolitik. He declined to make 
small gestures of goodwill, such as giving a short speech in front of the American 
chamber of commerce in Frankfurt, where he could have strengthened relations at a time 
when the U.S. business community was very much suspicious of him. Instead, he sent 
then-Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt to give the talk.421 
Brandt displayed an even stronger attitude when Kurt Birrenbach, a member of 
the Bundestag, indicated that the current years agreement to offset the costs of U.S. 
military troops in Germany might fail as the U.S. was facing a particularly difficult 
situation and the FRG had not agreed to the demands put forth by the U.S. (such as a 
larger percent of payments rather than loans, and a 0% interest rate on the remaining 
loans). Birrenbach outlined the fact that election year policies would blow a failure of an 
offset agreement out of proportion. He strongly advocated committing to the increased 
payments as the lesser of two evils. As we have to fear that the Democratic Party will 
not be choosy with propagandistic demands, one should try to support this president, who 
is truly an atlanticist and shows concern for the problems of Europe. 422 
                                                
420 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to Präsident des Aktionskomitees für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa,  
Jean Monnet, May 11, 1970, Mappe 43, Bundeskanzler, WBA. Original: Insbesondere die Klarheit der 
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421 Letter, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär, Dr. Katharina Focke, to Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt, 
July 28, 1971, BA 136/6220. 
422 Letter, MdB, Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, to Chancellor Brandt, Devisenausgleich mit den Vereinigten 
Staaten, July 2, 1971, BA 136/6220, 2. Original: Da zu fürchten ist, daß die Demokratische Partei in ihrer 
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diesen Präsidenten, der wirklich atlantisch orientiert ist und Verständnis für die Probleme Europas hat, zu 
unterstützen.  
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Chancellor Brandt replied, rather coolly, that the German federal government has 
agreed to provide the Americans appropriate compensation for the currency expenditures 
for their troops in the Federal Republic. However, Brandt, for political, psychological, 
and economic/financial reasons refused to commit to the customary 80% compensation, 
despite his realization of the danger for a continued military presence in Europe.423 In 
the next sentence he reaffirmed a previous statement for which Birrenbach had criticized 
him. I am indeed of the opinion that we cannot buy an agreement by Congress to the 
American governmental policy of keeping troop levels in Europe the same.424 While 
Brandt certainly was correct in stating that he could not purchase American soldiers to be 
stationed in Germany, the unwillingness to help finance the expenses of positioning U.S. 
troops in the FRG would certainly strengthen the position of more isolationist members 
of Congress. When compared with previous governments, to whom this issue was a top 
priority, it seems evident that Brandt felt less need to fret over U.S. troop levels in 
Germany. Ostpolitik afforded him an unprecedented level of independence from the U.S.   
 Even within NATO, Ostpolitik had lost much of its controversy by the fall of 
1971, making a strong display of pro-American support unnecessary. The German report 
on the NATO meeting in September 1971 explained that the question of East-West 
relations is far less explosive today as compared to a year ago. [] Apparently the Berlin 
Accord has convinced many that our policy is in the interest of everyone.425 
                                                
423 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, July 22, 1971, BA 136/6220, 1-2. 
424 Ibid. Original: Ich bin in der Tat der Auffassung, daß wir die Zustimmung des Kongresses zu dem 
Entschluß der amerikanischen Regierung, ihre Truppenstärke in Europa unverändert aufrechtzuerhalten, 
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 A more independent Brandt now found it possible to be less forthcoming with his 
support for Nixons Vietnam policy.  A proposed letter by a staffer commended Nixon on 
his policy. 
In your eight-point-plan of January 25, 1972, and most recently in your declaration of May 8 1972 
you have shown the way by which the Vietnam problem could be solved in a short period of time. 
This, however, requires the goodwill of all parties involved. I hope your opponents realize this 
soon and act accordingly. 426 
 
Brandt revised this letter, removing the part that implied his support of Nixon. Instead, all 
he wrote was an assurance that he was closely monitoring the situation and appreciated 
those policies that led to an end of the conflict. 
I assure you, Mr. President, that I watch the developments in Southeast Asia with much care and 
that I fully appreciate those measures of yours, which aim at ending the conflict and lead to a 
negotiated solution. 427 
 
Later that year, after the Christmas bombings, Brandt became even more critical than 
before, and on December 23, 1972 instructed his foreign minister to sound out the idea of 
issuing a critical statement on these new developments. He wished, however, for a 
European statement rather than a German one. While Scheel viewed the prospect of this 
idea with justifiable misgivings, he nonetheless, consulted with the other West European 
allies. Nothing came of the idea as the British refused to do so and the French were 
concerned about their role as mediator in the Paris peace conference. One interesting 
element here is that even though Brandt tried to hide behind a European front, the 
German government was fully aware that by consulting its West European allies, this 
                                                
426 Draft Letter, Chancellor Brandt to President Nixon, [n.d.], BA 136/6921. Original: In Ihrem am 25. 
Januar 1972 veröffentlichten Acht-Punkte-Plan und zuletzt in Ihrer Erklärung vom 8. Mai 1972 haben Sie 
selbst, Herr Präsident, den Weg aufgezeigt, durch den das Vietnam-Problem in kurzer Zeit gelöst werden 
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427 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to President Nixon, May 15, 1972, BA 136/6921. Original: Ich versichere 
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führen sollen, volles Verständnis habe. 
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attempt would be reported to Washington. Apparently, Brandt felt he was in a strong 
enough a position to advance the idea anyway.428 
 Brandts shifting orientation toward Western Europe at the cost of the 
transatlantic partnership can also be found in his response to the suggestion for regular 
consultations between NATO and Members of the European Parliament under the 
auspices of NATO. As the Parliamentary Commission of NATO suggested, this would 
increase contact between U.S. Representatives and Members of the European Parliament.  
Brandt was not very enthusiastic. Using the weak argument that Ireland was not part of 
NATO, he said that he preferred to leave any possible contacts under the auspices of the 
European Parliament. Interestingly enough, Blumenfelds response had merit. He argued 
that the fact that there were non-NATO members in the European Parliament would 
mean more intensive consultation between the Americans and Europeans.429 Brandt, 
however, did not want to strengthen the role of NATO in the European integration 
process. This was explained very clearly in an accompanying letter, which clarified his 
reasoning: 
This draft avoids a [positive] commitment to the suggestion by the political committee to 
recognize the North Atlantic Council as an official North American-European parliamentary body. 
In the past we have, in accordance with the Foreign Office, followed the principle that it would be 
against the parliamentary principle to escalate parliamentary groups that have no real authorities. 
430  
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While this procedural objection was not explicitly directed against the United States, 
there can be no doubt that an increased consultation between the European Community 
and representatives of the United States would have been advantageous. As Brandt was 
not usually a stickler for formalities, the intent behind this objection must have been to 
limit the influence the U.S. would have on European decision-making. Quite confident in 
Europes ability to develop its own foreign policy, Brandt must have seen too much 
interference from the U.S. as a hurdle. 
Brandts strategy was clear: engage the Soviet Union as much as possible. For 
this, the United States was more of a hindrance after the signing of the Four Power 
Agreement. Only closer cooperation with the East could bring about the pan-European 
peace order that Brandt desired, for which trade, politics, and culture were the crucial 
elements. As he remarked to Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev during the signing of the 
trade agreement, the area of economy, politics, and culture show first a realization [of 
detente]. This is not only important in light of German-Soviet relations but beyond that 
for the European development in general, which leads to a cooperative coexistence 
because of this. 431 
With the Four Power Agreement out of the way, Brandts Ostpolitik was able to 
score one success after another. The first was his visit with Brezhnev in the Crimea. Here, 
trade issues played a vital role. Both Brezhnev and Brandt agreed that the trade volume 
was still too small. Brandt picked up on Kosygins earlier suggestion of a trade 
                                                
431 MemCon, Chancellor Brandt with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolicev,  July 5, 1972, July 12, 1972, 
BA 102/100026. Original: Im Bereich der Wirtschaft, der Politik, und der Kultur seien erste 
Verwirklichungen zu verzeichnen. Dies sei nicht nur im Blick auf die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen 
sondern darüber hinaus auf die europäische Entwicklung im allgemeinen wichtig, die dank derartiger 
Schritte zur ,kooperativen Koexistenz führe. 
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commission and explained that the FRG was now ready to form such a commission.432 
Brezhnev, in turn, suggested even more deals in the oil and gas sector. He also added the 
possibility of high-quality plastics production by a plant to be constructed by German 
companies.433 Brezhnev had further, concrete ideas on how to expand the trade volume 
with the FRG. He mentioned radio electronics, machine tooling, and the construction of a 
nuclear power plant. He also baited Brandt with the possibility of exploiting Soviet 
natural resources.434 
 Despite such a clear and open attitude towards trade, the Soviets political 
obstinacy was quite striking. Brezhnev voiced concern about West German attempts to 
twist the text and meaning of the Four Power Agreement by translating it into German. 
No one will consent to the skewing of the text that is available in three languages 
through a German translation.435 Brezhnevs continued political reservations on the 
subject of détente with the FRG must be viewed in light of a lingering reservation about 
German unity and German political influence. 
A far more realistic consideration, however, was the need to maintain an element of confrontation 
in Europe in order to block the likely hazards of a runaway détente process. Kremlin decision 
makers seemed to understand that an all-embracing relaxation of tensions in the region, pushed 
onward by a full-scale disarmament, would ultimately play into the Wests hands. By spurring 
desires for East-West economic interdependence and even political liberalization in the countries 
of the Soviet bloc, it would above all play into West Germanys hands, chipping away at the 
rationale for the fortified barriers and repressive controls dividing the two halves of Europe. [] 
Throughout the 1970s and the first half of 1980s, Soviet leaders regarded the main threat 
emanating from West Germany as political, not military.436 
 
Anti-American rhetoric was also plentiful during this meeting. Brezhnev suggested , 
without prompting, that he would not wish the FRG to develop relations with the Soviet 
                                                
432 MemCon, Meeting Chancellor Brandt and General Secretary Brezhnev in Oreanda, September 17, 1971, 
Mappe 1, Ordner 430, Depositorium Egon Bahr, 3. 
433 Ibid, 8. 
434 Ibid, 12. 
435 Ibid, 19. 
436 Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca : Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 394.  
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Union at the expense of its relations with other states, especially the U.S. He assured 
Brandt that we had and have no such conniving plans. 437 Yet at the same time he 
differentiated between the role of France and Great Britain on one hand, and that of the 
U.S. on the other. Brezhnev suggested that his main criterion for good and promising 
relations was the independence with which a country pursued its goals.438 Ironically, he 
attributed the lack of political and economic interaction between the FRG and the Soviet 
Union during the 1960s to the fact that the FRG was in a position vis-à-vis the East until 
recently in its foreign policy that didnt allow it to make fundamental decisions. 
Forgetting that it was the Soviet Union that had isolated the FRG and not vice versa, 
Brezhnev continued to portray the Soviet Union as Germanys new friend, one that would 
enable the FRG to assume a place in the world that corresponds with its economic and 
technological prowess, so that the FRG could utilize its influence for the security and 
cooperation in Europe. 439 In a stab at the Americans, he continued, we know that there 
                                                
437 Memo, Chancellor Brandt, Gespräch mit Breschnew, August 12, 1970, Mappe 1, Ordner 429A, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr, 3. Original: Während Kossygin. Ganz  oder fast ganz  auf kritische 
Bemerkungen über unsere Verbündete oder einzelne von ihnen verzichtete [] machte B[rezhnev] eine 
gewisse Differenzierung zwischen Frankreich/England und den USA. Andererseits sagte B. unaufgefordert, 
er möchte betonen, daß wir nicht die Absicht haben, eine Politik zu führen, die darauf hinausliefe, daß die 
BRD ihre Beziehungen zu uns auf Kosten der Beziehungen zu anderen Staaten, insbesondere zu den USA, 
entwickelt, da wohl die USA Ihr wichtigster Partner in der Außenpolitik sind. Wir hatten und haben keine 
solchen hinterhältigen Pläne, und ich glaube, daß dies ein wichtiger Faktor ist. 
438 Ibid. Original: Gleichwohl bleibt festzustellen, daß B. es  unter Hinweis auf Frankreich unter bzw. seit 
de Gaulle  zu einem Kriterium für gute und zukunftsträchtige Beziehungen zu machen versuchte, ob wir 
eine unabhängige, and unseren eigenen Interessen orientierte Politik führen wollten. 
439 Translators Protocol, Conversation of Chancellor Brandt with General Secretary Brezhnev on August 
12, 1970, Mappe 1, Ordner 429A, Depositorium Egon Bahr, 7. Original: Offen gesagt, es war völlig 
anormal, daß die BRD bis vor kurzem in ihrer Außenpolitik gegenüber der SU und den sozialistischen 
Ländern in einer Lage war, die es nicht gestattete, grundsätzliche Entscheidungen zu treffen. Die SU tritt 
dafür ein, daß die BRD in der Welt den Platz einnimmt, der ihrem wirtschaftlichen und technischen Stand 
entspricht, daß die BRD ihren Einfluß auf die Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa nutzt. Solch ein 
Kurs ist bestimmt nicht schlecht für die BRD selbst. Wir wissen, daß es Kräfte gibt, die Profit aus den 
Spannungen zwischen der BRD und der SU und den sozialistischen Ländern schlagen wollen. 
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are powers that want to benefit from the tensions between the FRG and the Soviet Union. 
440 
 Brezhnev then continued his policy of playing the generous friend toward the 
subjugated Germany.  
Deviating from my prepared notes, I would like to say that the Americans have really entrenched 
themselves in Europe after the war, especially in the FRG. [] I have no clear intelligence, how 
far the Americans have penetrated the economy of the FRG, but it is without doubt, that they did 
and continue to try. You have to make up your mind on what you want to read into this fact. I do 
not know if the FRG likes this situation but I could imagine that your people and party wonder 
how to free themselves from this oppression. I only want to say that you do not need such 
supervision, for example in economic and technological areas. I am sure that the FRG could be 
much more successful when deciding political, economic, and other questions independently. In 
the U.S. they understand this all too well. That is why they pursue a certain policy or swear loyalty 
to the allies and portray the Communists as the bad guys. And the people believe that these are 
now our protectors, the democrats, and the others are the bitches, the communists. I am convinced 
that it is the other way around and that history will prove me right. I remember very well the 
images of fraternization between Russians and Germans during World War I. 441 
 
The protocol does not reflect whether Brandt in any way argued for or contradicted these 
statements. While it is doubtful that Brandt actually believed this twisted rhetoric of the 
past, the fact remains that Brezhnev had offered Germany an active and leading role in a 
future Europe that would be marked by security and cooperation. While Brezhnev only 
provided a vague sense of what this new Europe would look like, he was very clear on 
the prerequisite for this Europe: Germany would have to act more independently from the 
                                                
440 Ibid.  
441 Ibid, 10-11. Original: Abgehend von meinem vorbereiteten Konzept, möchte ich sagen, daß nach dem 
Krieg sich die Amerikaner in Europa festgesetzt haben, darunter auch in erheblichem Masse in der BRD. 
[...] Ich verfüge nicht über genaue Angaben darüber, inwieweit die Amerikaner in die Wirtschaft der BRD 
eingedrungen sind, aber es ist unbestritten, daß sie es sind und daß sie es noch weiter versuchen. Sie selbst 
werden sich Gedanken darüber machen müssen, was sich dahinter verbirgt. Ich weiß nicht, ob diese 
Situation der Bundesrepublik gefällt. Aber ich könnte mir vorstellen, daß Ihr Volk und Ihre Partei sich 
überlegen, wie man sich aus diesem Joch befreien könnte. Ich möchte nur sagen, daß etwa auf 
wissenschaftlich-technischem Gebieten eine solche Bevormundung für Sie überhaupt nicht nötig ist. Ich 
bin sicher, die Bundesrepublik kann selbstständig und mit mehr Erfolg viele politische, wirtschaftliche und 
andere Fragen entscheiden. In den USA weiß man es besser als ich. Deshalb betreibt man auch eine 
bestimmte Politik, schwört Treue seinem Verbündeten und stellt die Kommunisten als Bösewichte dar, und 
das Volk glaubt, dies sind nun unsere Beschützer, die sind Demokraten und das andere sind die 
Hundesöhne, die Kommunisten. Ich bin überzeugt davon, daß das gerade umgekehrt ist; wird die 
Geschichte zeigen. Ich erinnere mich noch gut an Bilder der Verbrüderung von Russen und Deutschen im 
Ersten Weltkrieg. 
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United States. Having a stronger West European integration to fall back on, a more 
assertive Germany seemed quite feasible from a foreign policy perspective. Domestically, 
however, a majority of the new Ostpolitik was still razor thin. 
Apart from gaining political support for a closer cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, the legal status of trade relations still had to be resolved. By early 1972, there 
were still many problems with a formalized agreement. While trade did increase vis-a-vis 
previous years, the trade structure was unbalanced: 98% of all exports were industrial 
machinery and large factories, and of the total imports, 32% were natural resources and 
45% half-finished goods. The Germans wished to diversify the exchange. Ideally, the 
Soviet Union would import more consumer goods and export more finished products. 
The Soviets, on their part, demanded a complete liberalization of imports from the Soviet 
Union by the end of 1974 and long-term low-interest loans. Of course, the issue of Berlin 
remained a key problem in negotiations.442 
 Later that year Finance Minister Schmidt brought the issue of trade diversification 
back up. Schmidts visit with Ambassador Falin emphasized that the trade imbalance had 
grown significantly2 billion marks for Soviet imports verses one billion marks for 
Soviet exports. But the Soviet ambassador continued the Soviet game of divide-and-
conquer. Falin noted that Japan would soon surpass the FRG in its trade with the Soviet 
Union. The year 1973 had show marked activity on the part of the Americans and the 
Japanese and he reiterated the concerns Brezhnev had voiced to Bahr, namely that the 
German industry worked too slowly, which gave other countries an edge.443 
                                                
442 Memo, Economics Minister Schiller, Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, February 15, 
1972, BA 102/100002, 1-4. 
443 Memo, Undersecretary Mommsen, Das heutige Gespräch von Bundesminister Schmidt mit Botschafter 
Falin, October 24, 1972, BA 1002/100002, 2. 
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 In mid-1972 the German industry was still euphoric about the seemingly endless 
possibilities connected with Soviet economic expansion. Certainly influenced by political 
successes, the German public viewed the Soviet Union as the one superpower most likely 
to be superior in the long run.444 With the second natural gas pipeline deal agreement in 
place, the prospect that Soviet trade with the FRG was gradually moving toward a 
Western-style exchange based on hard currency reserves and increasingly intertwined 
economic structures appeared plausible.  
 Even the Soviets expressed strong interest in the success of these political and 
economic ties. Gravely concerned about the ratification process of the Eastern treaties, on 
the day before the vote Brezhnev invited the president of the Bundesrat, Heinz Kühn, for 
a conversation that went considerably longer than originally scheduled. Brezhnev asked 
Kühn to convey to Brandt that both he and many people in the Soviet Union had personal 
sympathy for Brandt. Repeatedly, Brezhnev and Gromyko sometimes in the same 
words mentioned that the treaty was well balanced and that one could not expect the 
impossible from the Soviet Union.445 No German government will find a person to talk 
to about changing the treaty, should the Bundestag refuse it.446 
Brezhnev even went so far as to threaten compliance: A rejection of the treaties 
would be negative for the Federal Republic, negative for Europe, and negative for 
international politics as a whole. After that, he reverted to a reflective mode and asked 
Kühn towards the end of the visit What else can we do?447  Brezhnev was so eager to 
                                                
444 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung: 1968-1973 (Allensbach: Verlag für 
Demoskopie, 1974), 545. See also Appendix B, Figure 2. 
445 Memo, Heinz Kühn, Bericht über meine Moskau-Reise vom 3.-12. April 1972, n.d., BA 1-2/100023, 
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see the Eastern treaties approved that he leaned on the GDR to be supportive of the 
Brandt government in the crucial weeks before the vote in Parliament. The GDR even 
went so far as to implement a Brandt- Schutzwoche, taking great care to prevent any 
inter-German controversy that could harm Brandt politically. 448 
The Soviet backchannel contact to Brandt, Vyacheslav Kevorkov, also had a 
conversation with Egon Bahr, in which Bahr remarked flippantly that the Brandt 
government did not have the money to bribe members of the Bundestag, and thus such 
means [of gaining a majority in the Bundestag for the ratification of the Eastern treaties] 
have little interest to us.449 In response to conversation Kosygin approved a plot to 
deliver over a million marks to Bahr in West Berlin for the express purpose of bribing 
members of the Bundestag.450 Bahr ultimately declined this offer but this demonstrates 
how much the Soviet Union was willing to meddle in internal German politics to achieve 
the ratification of the Eastern treaties. 
One strategy that Bahr would have liked to see come to fruition in helping him 
battle the opponents of the Eastern treaties went too far for the Soviets: upon learning that 
former Chancellor and CDU icon Konrad Adenauer had floated the idea of a peaceful 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, Bahr urged his Soviet contact, 
Kevorkov, to have the protocol of this interchange publicized.451 Gromyko, upon 
reviewing the document, refused its release as it was categorized as a confidential 
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conversation and he feared the loss of international credibility should such a document 
come to light.452 
Brandts Ostpolitik had reached its high point thanks to this level of such Soviet support 
and an eager German industry and a German public that had gradually discarded its view 
of the Soviet Union as an enemy,. The razor-thin majority in the German parliament that 
ultimately approved his leadership and his Ostpolitik on April 27, 1972 assured the 
ratification of the Eastern treaties on May 17, 1972. With all the political hurdles out of 
the way, the political and economic interaction with the Soviet Union could achieve an 
even greater level. With the Soviets, the Western allies, and even the majority of the West 
German public in (sometimes tacit) support, the recognition of the status quothe first 
step in the plan to overcome ithad been achieved. While this first step toward 
recognition had been difficult enough, the second step, a period of political change in the 
East, would prove even more taxing. Yet, without question, Brandts policies had 
reanimated the question of German reunification. Having overcome international 
skepticism and domestic opposition, Brandt had brought West Germany to accept to post-
war status quo in Europe. Through economic diplomacy he had managed to open a line of 
communication to the Soviet Union and emphasize the strength of the FRG: economics. 
Increased cooperation with the East had normalized relations with the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern bloc, and had begun to normalize the image of the Communist states in the 
political culture of West Germany. For some, these accomplishments outweighed the 
political price he had to pay, as evidenced the Nobel Peace Price Brandt received in 1971. 
For others, the recognition of post-war borders, trade deals that heavily favored the 
Soviet Union, and a threat to Western cohesion was too high a price to pay for the 
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normalization of relations with the East. However, the underlying conflict revolved 
around how to defeat Communism. The liberal argument, as advocated by the Brandt 
government, held that technology transfer and economic help for an enemy state could 
have a positive outcome, as the penetrating effects of trade and the necessary personal 
interactions would ultimately undermine the enemy regime and cause a positive change 
in the form of freedom and democracy. This was certainly Brandts line of reasoning; by 
1972 Kissinger seemed to have seen some value in it as well. Nixon, however, along with 
the conservative element in American society, were leery of such a liberal approach. The 
conservative argument characterized economic interchanges with enemy states as 
dangerous, and only to be pursued with caution; trade deals had to be weighed carefully 
so as not to fundamentally aid the enemys economic infrastructure, social stability, or 
military readiness. Certainly, members of the CDU/CSU held similar opinions and voiced 
them publicly. However, the shift in perception of the Soviet Union from an enemy state 
to a normal onea shift brought about mostly through politics and economic 
diplomacyrendered the conservative argument increasingly less valid in West 
Germany. This would be Ostpolitiks lasting legacy and at the same time a divisive issue 
for the transatlantic alliance, as the United States had not undergone such a process and 
would soon shift to the more conservative stance.  
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CHAPTER IV 
  
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 
 
Détente  a French word we employ to conceal the fact that we have only the vaguest 
idea what we are trying to say.453   
 
 George W. Ball, 1971 
 
 
With the successful completion of the Four Power Agreement and the ratification of the 
Eastern treaties, Brandts Ostpolitik appeared more successful than ever. German 
business involvement in the Soviet Union was at unprecedented level, the West Berlin 
issue had apparently been resolved, and a military threat from the East seemed unlikely at 
best. The United States public support for Brandts initiatives had seemingly turned the 
Western alliance structures on its head. Akin to French Revolutionary Alexandre Ledru-
Rollins adage There go my people. I must follow them, for I am their leader, Nixon 
appeared to tread in the footsteps of Brandt and Pompidou rather than directing Western 
détente.  
Traditional interpretation holds that U.S. détente and German Ostpolitik were 
complementary, if not similar. As Gottfried Niedhardt argues, the structural 
interdependence of American détente and German Ostpolitik gave credence to 
Kissingers statement that your success will be our success.454 Yet, despite Kissingers 
                                                
453 Address by former Secretary George W. Ball at the World Affairs Council of Northern California 
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words, the Nixon administration was never content to follow its allies on the road to 
Moscow nor did it approve of the qualitative level of interactions between its West 
European allies and the Soviet Union. With the Vietnam conflict largely out of the way, 
the Soviet-American Summit of May 1972 allowed the leaders of the Western and 
Eastern bloc to implement a superpower détente that turned détente to their advantage. 
 
Efforts at Superpower Détente 
The Soviet-American Summit of 1972 
In the Soviet-American agreement Basic Principles of Relations, signed by the two 
heads of state in May 1972, economic ties were considered an important element in the 
strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus [we] will actively promote such ties.455 
These ties, naturally, were based on natural energy resources, as this was one of the few 
commodities the Soviets could export. The two proposed projects that resulted from this 
agreement, the North Star and the Yakutsk natural gas projects, called for heavy 
investments. Estimated at 4 billion and 2.5 billion dollars respectively, they involved the 
liquefaction of large quantities of natural gas that would then be shipped to the United 
States.  
 By 1972, the export of Soviet natural gas to the U.S. appeared less problematic 
than it had previously; the fact that it had become a politically acceptable source of 
energy was partially due to reservations over OPEC and the political instability in the 
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Middle East and partly due to heavy lobbying by energy and energy equipment 
companies in Congress,.456 
 The summit meeting drastically changed U.S. trade policy. Kissinger moved from 
a quid-pro-quo policy that restricting trade to a goodwill policy á la Brandt. Rather than 
requiring immediate political concession in exchange for trade deals, he now advocated 
long-term penetration brought by economic interaction. 
Over time trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite 
gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy and foster a degree of 
interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.457 
 
When Brezhnev visited the U.S. in 1973, Nixon even lobbied personally for such 
economic interactions. The President indicated that the United States encourages 
American firms to work out concrete proposals on these projects and will give serious 
and sympathetic consideration to proposals that are in the interests of both sides.458 
While this shift in policy may be surprising on the surface, it may simply reflect a change 
in the inner workings of the White House. Nixons preoccupation with his reelection 
campaign and later Watergate has often led to the assumption that by late 1972 Kissinger 
was taking over the management of U.S. foreign policy.  
 For Soviet natural gas to arrive on the U.S. mainland at a competitive price, 
however, the Soviet Union would have to receive MFN status. Furthermore, the perpetual 
crux when dealing with the Sovietsfinancinghad to be arranged. The Nixon 
administration therefore pushed for a change to MFN status in Congress, as well as 
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expanding the financing of the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank from 20 to 30 billion dollars 
to cover the considerable sums involved in both of these deals. 
 
U.S. and German trade policy  same difference? 
Until mid-1972, cooperation between the U.S. and the FRG on trade issues with the 
Soviet Union had not been forthcoming. The Germans followed Brezhnevs hint that they 
pursue a more independent policy and dealt with trade as a national affair. Only after the 
Soviet Union changed its stance following the Soviet-American summit meeting and 
Prime Minister Novikov explicitly declared that he did not object if Germany cooperated 
with other countries did Undersecretary Mommsen explain to Deputy Assistant Secretary 
in the Department of Commerce Lazarus that the Federal Republic does not consider the 
U.S.A. as an unwelcome rival.459 Quite to the contrary, as far as the Germans were 
concerned, the FRG and the U.S. were in the same position, one in which true economic 
relations with the Soviet Union were about to be established.460   
 Information sharing between the U.S. and West Germany did not happen 
automatically, as Secretary Peterson had to probe Finance Minister Schmidt for a lively 
information exchange regarding financing questions with the Soviet Union or the 
formation of joint ventures. Petersons underling, Lazarus, also pushed for a more 
concrete formula for consultation between Bonn and the U.S. embassy. His German 
counterpart, Mommsen, was very open to the idea, and even suggested joint ventures in 
dealing with the Soviet Union. The important thing, he underlined, was not to view each 
other as rivals but to cooperate. The Germans particularly hoped for cooperation when it 
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came to financing and insurance.461 Minister Schmidt followed his visit up with a letter, 
again stating the benefits of collaborating on financing and insurance, generously offering 
any cooperation the American side desired.462 
The usefulness of such cooperation is questionable. Despite German claims that 
the U.S. and the FRG were both on the threshold of intensive economic relations with the 
Soviet Union, the situation was quite different. The FRG had only economic incentives 
left to offer, given that its industry had a sizable part of its capital invested in the Soviet 
economy and was eager to avoid any disruptive effects.463 West German exports were 
mostly heavy machinerysuch as the large diameter steel press by Mannesmann Corp
which required domestically considerable investment. Yet despite selling a product that 
was in high demand by the Soviets, as a second rate power West Germany had little 
leverage in countering Soviet practices, be they political or economic, should these run 
counter to its interests.  
The United States, on the other hand, was an equal to the Soviet Union and, 
should the need arise, could exert political or military pressure on the Soviet Union 
through simple, nuanced shifts in ongoing negotiations such as Mutually Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR). Furthermore, existing U.S. investments in the Soviet economy were 
minimal, since the bulk of its exports were surplus agricultural products. While having a 
guaranteed buyer for agricultural exports certainly seems favorable given fickle world 
market prices, the political and social ramifications of ending grain deliveries would 
likely have been significantly less than if industrial plants had to close down in Germany.  
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On another level, the strategic value of these export goods was qualitatively 
different. West German officials and experts were quick to point out that a famine creates 
significant instability within a society and, therefore, U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union 
bolstered the Communist regime during harvest crises.464 However, supplying the Soviet 
Union with sophisticated technological know-how and machinery did more than alleviate 
an immediate shortage in the Soviet planned economy. It allowed for technology transfer 
of unheard of proportions that enabled the Soviet Union to modernize its infrastructure 
and begin the next One or Five-Year Plan at a much higher level.465 
 The significant difference between what contribution the U.S. and the FRG could 
provide in trade with the Soviet Union is striking. Fort the FRG, exporting agricultural 
products was not feasible as they had not been able to feed their own population for close 
to a century; as a result, they had to export industrial goods that were more sophisticated 
than those the Soviets could produce themselves. As a consequence, while economic 
factors fostered Brandts liberal attitude towards trade with the East, this was not as much 
of a factor for Nixon. Since détente was a French word we employ to conceal the fact 
that we have only the vaguest idea what we are trying to say, each side chose to interpret 
détente to fit their needs.466 This also held true for the Soviet Union, which redefined its 
version of détente: Soviet policy became politically more aggressive, becoming 
consistent with the literal translation of détente, namely the unloading of a gun.   
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Soviet Pressures on West Berlin 
Shortly after the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May 1972 the Soviet Union started to pursue 
a more aggressive policy toward the FRG. By this time the Soviet Union had received the 
two elements it had sought from détente with the West: first, economic assistance to 
foster its economic growth and exploit its natural resources and second, a stable border in 
Europe that allowed it to focus more of its resources in the East, toward China. On the 
first point it was clear that they were well entrenched with the industry of Western 
Europe, if not yet with that of the United States. Large investments by West European 
banks and companies in long-term contracts closely tied the fate of both to the continued 
success of Soviet détente policies. The second goal, stability and the recognition of the 
status quo in Europe, had been achieved with the ratification of the Eastern treaties. 
Another important aspect, which cannot be overemphasized, was the visit of President 
Nixon to the Soviet Union. Not only did Nixons visit lend a certain level of credibility to 
détente butmuch more importantlyit recognized the Soviet Union as an equal, and 
tacitly accepted the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. With these two milestones out 
of the way, the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies showed more teeth in their relations 
with the FRG.  
 The first problem arose, of all places, in the arena of sports. On June 10, 1972, 
during a track meet between the delegates from the Soviet Union and FRG, the Soviets 
argued that the German team had to be labeled Bundesrepublik Deutschland/West Berlin, 
even though official German policy was to not allow the use of the term West Berlin if 
the team was mixed.467 A more serious demonstration of the Berlin problem occurred at a 
                                                
467 Excerpts from questions asked by CDU/CSU delegate Dr. Evers during a Q&A session of the German 
Parliament, June 8, 1973, 2268, Drucksache 7/653 Frage A 117, cited in: BA 136/18091. 
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trade fair for machine tools in Brünn, Czechoslovakia in September 1972. The organizers 
of the fair listed West Berlin as an independent country in the catalog and during the 
official ceremony, despite previously accepting the link between West Berlin and West 
Germany. When German ambassador Finckenstein objected to the printing of the catalog, 
he received the evasive reply that logistics would not allow any changes in the printing. 
When he protested the raising of the Berlin flag during the initial ceremony, however, the 
issue became more specific. The Czech representative indicated that the treatment of 
West Berlin firms at fairs and exhibitions in the CSSR is linked to the question of 
normalization between the two countries. Finckenstein interpreted this new Czech 
approach as a permanent problem since the CSSR would not budge on the issue, and 
linked this policy to a directive from the Soviet embassy.468  
 The source of these problems was the very ambivalent language of the Four 
Power Agreement. Essentially, it allowed West Germany and West Berlin to be linked on 
a case-by-case basis, depending on whether the two countries in question decided it 
should be or not. The Western allies, of course, interpreted a stronger link between the 
two. The vagueness inherent in the Four Power Agreement makes it clear that the 
German side was more concerned with making an agreement possible than forcefully 
explaining to the Soviet Union that the link between West Germany and West Berlin was 
without question. A CDU-sponsored press leak, meant to undermine the Moscow treaties 
by providing insight into the vague nature of this alleged resolution of the status of West 
Berlin. In response to the leak Bahr compared the situation to Lichtenstein: he explained 
in the interview that no one questioned Swiss representation of Lichtenstein despite the 
                                                
468 Telegram, German Embassy Prague, Finckenstein, to German Foreign Office, Beteiligung West-
Berlins an Brünner Maschinenbaumesse, September 7, 1972, BA 102/241886. 
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fact that Lichtenstein is a completely sovereign nation.469 Likewise, he argued, 
According to international law, Berlin does not belong to the Federal Republic of 
Germany [...]Lichtenstein is not part of Switzerland, either.470 Despite this undoubtedly 
valid point, the ambiguity in the negotiations and the subsequent conflict over its 
interpretation is logical if the Soviets took Bahrs analogy between Berlin and 
Lichtenstein to mean that Berlins representation by the FRG would be a matter of 
negotiation at a later point in time and not automatic. Of course, it is not unusual in 
diplomatic circles to have two parties sign an agreement that both sides expect to 
interpret somewhat differently. 
 The problem of West Berlins status, as manifested in the Czechoslovakian trade 
fair, repeated itself in the Soviet Union in early May 1973. On this occasion the exhibits 
from West Berlin wereaccording to the Sovietssupposed to be opened by Berliner 
officials, and the flags of both Berlin and the Soviet Union would be raised. The Soviets 
insisted that FRG delegates would not participate in this ceremony. The Soviets argued 
that the military occupation forces were the sovereigns of West Berlin and that the FRG 
could represent them. The FRG, of course, did not share this interpretation, resulting in 
numerous discussions and the forceful removal of Undersecretary Rowedder from the 
scene of the opening ceremony by Soviet security forces. Apparently Rowedder, as an 
official West German representative, had attempted to push the West Berlin 
representative and the Soviet delegate aside to get to the center of the ceremony. Soviet 
                                                
469 News clip, Interview mit Staatssekretär Egon Bahr für die Sendung Echo des Tages im WDR/NDR 
am 18. April 1972, BA 136/16566. 
470 Memo, Chancellors Office, Minister Ehmke, Aus den Protokollen zum Moskauer Vertrag, [n.d.], BA 
136/16566. This is a copy of the six pages that opposition leader Barzel handed to Brandt with the request 
to verify if this was the actual protocol. 
 180
security personnel claimed that they had feared for the Soviet delegates life, and thus 
had him removed from the scene.471 
 An indication of the official Soviet line on the West Berlin issue came on the eve 
of the Brezhnev visit with the first Soviet book on Berlin after the Four Power 
Agreement. The German embassy in Moscow assessed it as follows: It is remarkable 
with which intensity the author tries to prove that the special ties of the Berlin Accord 
between the FRG and West Berlin do not hinder the independence of West Berlin. 472 
The author continued to outline the Soviet interpretation of the Four Power Agreement: 
From the viewpoint of sovereignty, West Berlin is a unique political organism that does not 
belong to any state. [...] West Berliners are as residents of such an organism neither citizens of the 
Federal Republic nor the GDR and hold special identification papers. 
 The Soviet position with regard to West Berlin has not changed and cannot change. The 
Berlin Accords do not contain decisions and do not introduce a procedure known to international 
law that would change the status of West Berlin.473 
 
Accordingly to the Germans, the Soviet Union was focusing on the issue of sovereignty 
as outlined in the Four Power Agreement, and ignoring the clause that said it was a moral 
duty to strengthen ties between West Berlin and West Germany. 
 
Systemic Shifts in the Soviet Union 
The increased diplomatic pressure to undermine the ties between the FRG and West 
Berlin must be seen as a systemic shift in the Soviet Union. A good indication of the 
strengthening of the hard-line position in the Politburo happened in March 1973 with the 
admission of Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko and Andrei Antonovich Grechko to the 
Politburo as full voting members. Grechko, as the commander of the Soviet troops that 
                                                
471 Telegram, Governing Major of Berlin to Senator for Federal Affairs, Sowjetische Handels- und 
Industrieausstellung 1973, May 7, 1973,  BA 136/18091. See also attachment I. 
472 Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow, Lüders, to German Foreign Office, Sowjetische Publikation 
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had crushed the East German workers' rebellion of 1953 and the architect of the 1968 
invasion of Czechoslovakia was no friend of an intensive cooperation between East and 
West. Nor was Gromykodubbed Mr. No for blocking many Western proposals 
during negotiationsa strong advocate of the kind of Ostpolitik Brandt envisioned. In 
this sense, there certainly was a shift to a more conservative Soviet foreign policy. For 
Bahr this Politburo shift was by no means a secrethe congratulated Gromyko on his 
election to the Politburo a month later.474 
 Bahr, however, did not interpret this as a categorical shift against détente but as a 
reprioritizing of potential partners within the Western alliance. In his view, the Soviet 
relationship with United States simply had gained greater priority with some in the Soviet 
Union.   
There exists, so to say, a pro-American faction in Moscow that argues that the relationship 
between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union has absolute priority. The issue is by and large the 
question of Most-Favored-Nation status. The Russians need it; the decision should be made before 
the adjournment of the Senate for the summer. After that, the visit of the General Secretary 
[Brezhnev] to the U.S. is planned for June. 475  
 
Judging from the continued efforts of the East to undermine the ties between West Berlin 
and the FRG during the remainder of the 1970s it seems safe to argue that a permanent 
conservative shift in Soviet foreign policy accounts for some of the cooling relations 
between the FRG and the Soviet Union. If we presume, however, that the Soviet Union 
used Brandts Ostpolitik to force the United States to implement their own sweeping 
policy of détente, Nixons visit to Moscow was the culmination of their strategy to get a 
                                                
474 Letter, Minister Egon Bahr to German Embassy in Moscow, Mr. Golowin, April 28, 1973, Mappe 2, 
Ordner 432, Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
475 Memo, Egon Bahr, Nachricht von V. Lednew, March 22, 1973, Mappe 2, Ordner 432, Depositorium 
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superpower détente in place. Once this had be achieved, they could discard Ostpolitik as a 
superfluous strategy, thus rendering the role of the FRG less important; this makes Bahrs 
assessment of a shift in Soviet priorities quite accurate. This interpretation gives credence 
to the idea that the Soviet Union used Germany to get to the U.S. 
 A report about the central committees view on this matter, provided by Bahrs 
secret backchannel contact, Ledlev, further strengthens this argument. It should have 
cautioned Bahr about the primacy of superpower détente over Soviet relations with 
Germany. The fact that in this report Brezhnev quoted Lenin in the context of economic 
relations clearly indicated that they were using trade as a temporary measure to advance 
Socialism, not to build a path to permanent cooperation. 
The Nixon visit was a turning point. For the first time he accepted the principles of coexistence 
and the borders of the Socialist world. The political fight against America will be continued 
because in many areas they are the enemy. Economic ties will continue to be developed. The 
already concluded treaty of about 10 billion dollars was just the beginning. [] 
 The General Secretary [Brezhnev] spoke for almost an hour about the economic ties to 
the Western world. He cited Lenin, whose teachings had been forgotten in the meantime: Despite 
the differences of the systems, economic ties need to be strengthened. One can structure them in 
such a way that Capitalism works for the cause of Socialism. Not everyone in the Soviet Union 
understands this great potential. 476 
 
Competing Visions of Détente 
For the German-American alliance, however, the new favoritism of the Soviets toward 
the U.S. meant a reshuffling of international positions; however, Brandt and Bahr were 
slow to recognize this. Brandt did try to place greater emphasis on the EEC, shifting from 
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a unilateral approach to the Soviets to a multilateral approach among the West European 
nations. In a conversation with Belgian prime minister Edmond Leburton, Brandt 
concluded that the bilateral phase of our [West German] Ostpolitik, which has 
dominated the last three to four years, is concluded. It created the preconditions for the 
multilateral phase, in which we currently are and will be for the next years.477 Yet in the 
framework of a multilateral Ostpolitik, the U.S. was moving too slowly for Bahrs taste. 
He indicated to Leburton that the Nixon administration had only made progress in their 
negotiations with the Soviets because they were under domestic pressure to do so. He 
further voiced his frustration that neither the Soviets nor the Americans had done their 
homework when it came to specifying their negotiating positions, thereby delaying the 
process of a European Security Conference even further.478 
 Nixon and Brandts attitudes on the issue of a European Security Conference 
illustrate the striking qualitative differences in their respective versions of détente. Nixon 
did not view a European Security Conference as a necessary, or even desirable, political 
goal. For Brandt, of course, a European Security Conference was an absolutely essential 
element to his Ostpolitik. Only a European Security Conference could create the peace 
and stability necessary to allow fears of German revanchism to abate and thus make 
reunification possible. In essence, Brandt and Nixon disagreed on the level of cooperation 
the West should afford the East. 
 This difference between détente and Ostpolitik led to a sense of competition 
between the two allies. The invitation of General Secretary Brezhnev to Germany reflects 
this. Upon hearing from Bahr that Brezhnev was planning to visit Germany, the 
                                                
477 MemCon, Conversation Chancellor Brandt with Belgian Prime Minister Leburton in Brussels on 
February 7, 1973, AAPD, Doc #38, 189-196, 196.  
478 Ibid, 196-197. 
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Americans reacted somewhat surprised and floated the idea through Dobrynin whether it 
would not be more appropriate if Brezhnev first visited America.479 
 To the Germans, Brezhnevs visit did not reflect the sense of increased 
importance with which the German population and administration viewed the role of the 
FRG on the international scene. In particular, the economic struggles that the U.S. 
economy experienced had led to the increased perception that allying oneself with the 
U.S. had become much more of a burden than previously the case. On February 12, 1973, 
for example, the German Bundesbank had purchased 5.8 billion dollars to stabilize the 
U.S. currency against a heavy run ont it. For the first time, the U.S. showed a negative 
balance of trade, which sent shock waves through the U.S. economy, which resulted in 
speculation on the dollar.  
 American pressure to discard the EC preferential tariffs also continued to rise. In 
February 1973, Ambassador Peterson warned Economics Minister Hans Friderichs of a 
potential spillover from the economic to the political arena. 
The negative symbolism of the EC preferential policy was significant despite the limited economic 
impact on the U.S. [] The EC needs to seriously ask itself if the continued pursuit of its 
preferential policy was worth the potential dangers for its political relations with the U.S.480 
 
But the Germans had concerns of their own. Asked about whether American intended to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union behind the back of their European allies, Peterson 
discarded these concerns as ridiculous.481 Despite the on-going frustrations over the level 
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of cooperation between the two states, Peterson received Friderichs assurance (as he had 
gotten from Schmidt a year earlier) that the FRG was interested in a stronger information 
exchange between the FRG and the U.S. on trade talks with the East. As was the case a 
year earlier, they agreed that contacts needed to be established soon.482  
 Despite the rhetoric, stronger consultationmuch less cooperationdid not occur. 
In a particularly revealing discussion with Secretary of the Treasury George P. Schultz on 
March 15, 1973, Brandt articulated his stance towards the United States at this particular 
time. He argued that for the FRG it is essential to stay in close accord with France. 
Otherwise there would be a significant worsening of the situation in Western Europe. He 
hoped that our American friends not only look at the community as such, but also 
consider the elements that lead to the process of its formation. 483 Not only were France 
and Western Europe thus more important to Brandt than the U.S., but he openly 
acknowledged that the U.S. should pay a price for the formation of the European 
Community.  
 Brandt also rejected Schultzs plan for a sweeping reform of the monetary sector 
to help the U.S. out, arguing that one would not be able to solve all problems in one 
step. Upon Schultzs announcement that Nixon would seek congressional authorization 
to levy import taxes for certain industries, Brandt warned against heavy use of such 
authority and even threatened retaliatory measures as public pressure could otherwise 
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force the governments of the trade partners of the U.S. to implement countermeasures in 
the area of trade as well as investments.484 
 He then sugar-coated this stance in his concluding remarks, indicating that his 
government was opposed to preferential tariffs in principle and that these tariffs had not 
really hurt American interests to the extent Schultz had suggested. However, considering 
the interests of Germanys European partners, such as France, was the price for the 
European unification.485 
 As a consequence, the German-American summit meeting of May 1-2, 1973 
proved to be somewhat tense. Despite Nixons lingering resentment over Brandts 
ambivalent support and implication that [Nixons] decisions and actions have lacked 
humanitarian concern, the Nixon administration felt compelled to raise numerous issues 
that they felt should be the subject of transatlantic cooperation.486 Nixon specified his 
views on European integration as follows: I have strongly supported European 
integration and intend to continue to do so, but as I believe we both agree, European 
integration should also be seen as a step towards increased Atlantic cooperation. 487  
Demonstrating the desolate condition of transatlantic cooperation and consultation he felt 
obligated to express that [he] hope[d] that before any proposals are made final we will 
have an opportunity to express our views. 488 
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 More important than economic issues were concerns about a rift in the alliance. 
Nixon asked Brandt bluntly whether it was not difficult for the FRG to be confronted by 
France or England about choosing to put either Europe or America first. Brandt 
responded that he had always made it clear to the French that in questions of security or 
the world currency reform he could not proceed against the U.S. 489 While this appeared 
to be a satisfactory answer, the qualifications  security and currency reform  left plenty 
of room between Nixons view of an alliance from that of Brandt. As Brandt explained to 
Brezhnev only a few days later, he rejected what had become Kissingers trademark: 
linking different aspects of negotiation. 
When he, the chancellor, had been with Nixon, he had explained that he does not agree with 
linking different areas [of negotiations] and had publicly stated such. [] Kissinger has tried to 
bring military, trade, currency, and diplomatic questions all together in one form and this did not 
correspond with reality. Military questions are discussed in the framework of NATO.  [] Trade 
issues are discussed in the framework of GATT where cooperation but also conflicts of interests 
are debated. Currency questions are discussed in yet other forums. One must bear in mind that the 
European states are closer to each other than to the U.S.A. Diplomatic questions, yet again, are a 
different area. To avoid any misunderstandings, he [Brandt] wanted to repeat that he desires a 
good relationship with the U.S. but also with Western Europe. How things would develop is not 
clear, but Western Europe will gain more its own personality as the French call it, even in 
relations with the U.S.A., on whom they have depended to such large extent after the Second 
World War.490 
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für Westeuropa wünsche. Wie sich die Dinge weiter entwickeln würden, sei noch nicht klar, aber 
Westeuropa werde wohl man an eigener Persönlichkeitwie das die Franzosen nenntengewinnen, auch 
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Nixon, of course, could in no way have been satisfied with this desire to separate issues, 
as it basically negated any European concessions in return for the military protection 
provided by the U.S. and theoretically allowed for unilateral advances in, for example, 
trade issues, without (supposedly) affecting the alliance as a whole. Nixons holistic 
concept of an alliance was expressed clearly in the following conversation with Brandt:  
He [Nixon] accepts that there is an economic competition between a united Europe and America. 
This does not trouble him. For him, it is also not important if Europe purchases more oranges or 
tobacco. What is important, however, is that the impression is not created that the Nine [West 
European Countries] are organizing against America in affairs of a certain political significance as 
the American defense readiness must suffer from this. [] 
 Cooperation with the Soviet Union does not happen for love, but for bitter necessity. 
Western cohesion must not be impeded by provincial quarrels. [] The problem, thus, is how the 
West can avoid a disintegration that would strengthen the enemy forces. 491 
 
In summary, Brandts orientation toward French interests over American ones seems 
abundantly clear. With the Soviets still appearing to back Germanys pioneering role in 
world diplomacy, Brandt did not feel the need to bend over backwards to please the 
United States. In the name of Europe, the U.S. was expected to accept developments that 
ran counter to its interests.492  
 Before the Brezhnev summit, Brandt and Bahr were still confident that Germany 
was no longer just a pawn between the United States and the Soviet Union but an 
                                                                                                                                            
im Verhältnis zu den USA, von denen sie in der Zeit nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg in so starkem Maße 
abhängig gewesen seien.  
491 MemCon, Conversation Chancellor Brandt with President Nixon at U.S. Embassy in Paris, April 6, 
1974, Mappe 2, Ordner 440, Depositorium Egon Bahr, 4-5. Original: Nixon führte aus, sein Problem liege 
darin, die gegenwärtige Struktur der Atlantischen Sicherheitspolitik trotz isolationistischer Strömungen in 
Amerika aufrechtzuerhalten, bis sich in Ost-West-Gespräch neue Möglichkeiten anbieten könnten. [...] Für 
viele Amerikaner sei es widernatürlich, wenn Amerika Europa unterstütze, obwohl die Europäer in 
Wirtschaft und Politik eine feindselige Haltung einnähmen. [...] Er akzeptierte, daß sich zwischen einem 
vereinten Europa und Amerika ein wirtschaftlicher Wettbewerb entwickele. Dies bereite ihm keine Sorgen. 
Für ihn sei auch nicht wichtig, ob Europa mehr Orangen oder Tabak kaufe, wichtig sei jedoch, daß nicht 
der Eindruck entstünde, die Neun organisierten sich gegen Amerika in Angelegenheiten von gewisser 
politischer Bedeutung, weil darunter die amerikanischer Verteidigungsbereitschaft leiden müsse.[...] 
 Die Zusammenarbeit mit der Sowjetunion erfolge doch nicht aus Liebe, sondern aus bitterer 
Notwendigkeit. Der westliche Zusammenhalt dürfe in dieser Situation nicht durch provinzielle 
Streitigkeiten beeinträchtigt werden. [...] Das Problem laute deshalb, wie der Westen eine Desintegration 
vermeiden könne, die die gegnerischen Kräfte stärken werde. 
492 Ash, 68. 
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independent player in international politics. By separating the issues, they thought they 
could create political room to maneuver, even though the world was still mired in the 
conflict of the Cold War. In Bahrs assessment of the relationship between Europe and 
the United States, self-confidence and a trust in the new German foreign policy were 
central. Furthermore, his sense that Germany would not need to contribute anything 
further to the transatlantic alliance is striking.  
Judging by Kissingers comments, Washington is thinking about redefining the relationship 
between America and Europe. His remark that they will bear the changes of the past years in mind 
must be interpreted to mean that America wants to rid itself of some of the burden. 
If it would be possibile for Europe to assume full responsibility for its security, this would be 
worth contemplating; but this possibility does not exist. The geographical situation and the 
technology have resulted in the fact that for Europe an independent role vis-à-vis both 
superpowers is not possible in the near future.  On the other hand, Europe is not Asia: its 
industrial potential is so great that disengagement, as the U.S. are conducting in Indochina, is not 
permissible. [] 
 Europes weight increases proportionally as the relative importance of the security 
question declines. Over the past years, we have actively contributed in getting the two 
superpowers to come closer together and thus made them politically more easy to manipulate, 
despite being immovable militarily. 
 America guarantees today the security of its allies, just as the Soviet Union does, without 
either needing their respective alliances. Both systems are political coordination machines, while 
the Americans increasingly want to relieve their financial burdens. The Russians accomplish this 
with trade deals negotiated through blackmail for prices under world market levels in order to 
benefit from the occupied countries economically. The Americans do the same through unequal 
currency exchange rates. 493   
 
                                                
493 Letter, Egon Bahr to Chancellor Brandt, April 15, 1973, Mappe 1, Ordner 436, Depositorium Egon 
Bahr, 1-2. Original: Aus Kissinger geht hervor, daß man in Washington an eine Art Neudefinition des 
Verhältnisses zwischen Amerika und Europa denkt. Sein Hinweis, dabei die Veränderung der letzten Jahre 
zu berücksichtigen, ist wohl dahingehend aufzufassen, daß Amerika sich entlasten will. 
 Wenn es eine Möglichkeit gäbe, daß Europa auch für seine Sicherheit volle Verantwortung 
übernimmt, wäre dies zu überlegen; aber diese Möglichkeit existiert nicht. Die geographische Lage und die 
Technik haben bewirkt, daß Europa eine selbstständige Rolle gegenüber den beiden Supermächten auf 
absehbare Zeit nicht mehr möglich ist.   Andererseits ist Europa nicht Asien: Sein industrielles Gewicht ist 
so groß, daß es ein Disengagement, wie es die USA in Indochina vornehmen, nicht gestattet. [...] 
 Europas Gewicht wächst in dem Masse, in dem die relative Bedeutung der Sicherheitsfrage 
geringer wird. Wir haben in den letzten Jahren aktiv daran mitgewirkt, die beiden Supermächte anzunähern 
und sie damit politisch relativ manipulierbar gemacht, was sie militärisch überhaupt nicht sind. 
 Amerika garantiert heute die Sicherheit seiner Verbündeten ebenso wie die Sowjetunion ohne daß 
beide dazu ihr jeweiliges Paktsystem brauchen. Die beiden Systeme sind politische 
Koordinierungsmaschinen, wobei die Amerikaner sich finanziell zunehmend entlasten wollen. Was die 
Russen über erpreßte Lieferverträge mit Preisen unter dem Weltmarkt machen, um aus den besetzten 
Ländern wirtschaftlichen Profit zu ziehen, machen die Amerikaner über das manipulierte 
Währungsgefälle. 
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Using such drastic language to equat the Soviet Union with the United States 
demonstrates how little Bahr thought the FRG had lost by loosening ties with the United 
States. Confident in the importance of Germany and the rest of Europe in the world, he 
was convinced that the United States would remain in Europe, no matter what the 
Europeans did. By creating peace and security in Europe, however, the superpowers 
could be manipulated. Therefore, for Bahr, it must have been central to maintain 
Ostpolitiks emphasis on Europe and strong political ties to both superpowers. 
 Brezhnevs visit to Brandt and later Nixon, however, would demonstrate that the 
Soviet Union preferred the U.S. as a partner and that Brandts role as a forerunner of 
détente was waning. 
 
The Opportunity and Failure of Superpower Detente 
The Brezhnev Summits 
The one issue that brought a change in Brandts perception of the Soviet Union was 
undoubtedly the status of West Berlin. Any negative developments on this issue would 
adversely affect the Brandt government as they would undermine the overall validity of 
Ostpolitik. As previously outlined, the East was undermining the Western understanding 
of the Four Power Agreement, and Brandt felt compelled to touch on the issue when 
Brezhnev visited Bonn in May 1973.  
It is clear that West Berlin cannot participate when touching on questions of [formal] status or 
military issues. But when dealing with issues of trade, economy, culture and sports, the basic 
guideline in accordance with the spirit of the agreement must be not to separate artificially. If we 
could agree on this, it would make life much easier. 494 
                                                
494 MemCon, Conversation Chancellor Brandt with General Secretary Brezhnev, May 20, 1973, Mappe 1, 
Ordner 435, Depositorium Egon Bahr, 10-11. Original: Es sei klar, daß West-Berlin nicht teilnehmen 
könne, wenn Fragen des Status, militärische Fragen etc. berührt würden. Aber wenn es um Geschäfte, 
Wirtschaft, Kultur und Sport gehe, so müsse doch die Grundregel nach dem Sinn des Abkommens sein, 
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Brezhnev, however, responded with a stalling tactic. He refused comment on the grounds 
that he did not remember the text in detail and would have to consult with Gromyko. In a 
recollection of this event to the U.S. ambassador to Germany Brandt explained that 
Brezhnev never returned to the subject. Accordingly, Brandtafter issuing a final 
statement on the summit meetingbroke protocol and, walking up to Brezhnev, 
cautioned him in the presence of Gromyko that the Soviets had to accept not only the 
general declaration that West Germany and West Berlin were separate entities but also 
the concluding remarks that the ties between the two entities need to be strengthened. 
Brandt bluntly explained that not to do so would poison German-Soviet relations. Rhe 
Soviet leaders acknowledged him but did not respond to his argument.495 The fact that the 
Soviets were no longer willing to let the FRG represent West Berlin was also evident in 
lower-level negotiations. A workgroup consisting of Gromyko, Falin, and four German 
delegates (Bahr among them), met to work out the wording of the final declaration of the 
Brezhnev visit. The debate centered once again on the issue of mentioning West Berlin 
firms as being part of West German-Soviet economic relations. Bahr commented that the 
term companies from the Federal Republic of Germany also included companies from 
Berlin (West). Gromyko only responded we do not know that. We do not know your 
contacts with companies there. We can only close our eyes. Bahr replied You do not 
                                                                                                                                            
nicht künstlich zu trennen. Wenn man sich hier einigen könne, so würde dies das Leben erheblich 
erleichtern. 
495 MemCon, Conversation Chancellor Brandt with U.S. Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand, May 22, 1973, 
Mappe 1, Ordner 440, Depositorium Egon Bahr, 4. Original: Nach der Unterzeichnung habe er, der 
Bundeskanzler, dem Generalsekretär in Gegenwart von Gromyko gesagt, die sowjetische Seite müsse 
begreifen, daß der betreffende Absatz in der Schlußerklärung ernst zu nehmen sei. Wäre es anders, dann 
würde es unsere Beziehungen vergiften. Gromyko habe darauf geantwortet, er habe dies verstanden, 
Breschnew habe lediglich mit dem Kopf genickt. 
Die Frage des amerikanischen Botschafters, ob die Sowjets zugegeben hätten, daß die Bindungen 
zwischen Berlin und dem Bund gestärkt werden müßten, verneinte der Bundeskanzler. Man dürfe aber 
nicht vergessen, daß man schließlich drei Abkommen unterzeichnet habe, in die Berlin einbezogen sei. 
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have to close your eyes. We have a trade agreement that contains a Berlin clause. 
Gromyko concluded All right, then with open eyes. 496 
 A further argument between the Soviets and the Germans was fought over the 
inclusion of West Berlin in the supplemental agreement for science and technology 
cooperation. The Soviet representative, Bondarenko, objected to the Germans 
requirement that a Berlin clause be included in this document, arguing that the FRG were 
trying to change the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, which stated that the treaties of 
the FRG may be extended to West Berlin; now, he claimed, the FRG wanted to make this 
optional regulation a required one. 
 The German reaction to the changed Soviet stance was slow. The Soviets had 
been difficult negotiating partners all along and it is not surprising that they did not 
immediately proffer a countermovee. Even German industry leaders, rebuffed by 
Brezhnev on their suggestions for vital changes in the economic structure of the 
Osthandel, remained enthused about the prospect of further economic ties with the East. 
The major issue in economic relations during the Brezhnev visit was the diversification 
of bilateral trade. This, so a report by the Economics Ministry, asserted could only be 
done through a multifaceted interweaving of the two economies via  
an increase in cooperation between companies and the relevant organizations in both countries that 
goes beyond a simple order-delivery system. Here, as many varied forms of economic cooperation 
as possible need to be developed. Not just large barter deals, such as the natural gas  pipeline 
deal. These barter deals are valuable in certain cases but not always economically feasible. A 
common development of industrial products and a joint distribution of these in third countries 
should be our goal. 497 
                                                
496 Memo, Economics Ministry, Sanne, Beteiligung Berliner Firmen an deutsch-sowjetischer 
Zusammenarbeit, May 22, 1973, BA 136/18091, 1-2. 
497 Talking Points for Brezhnev Visit, 421  Allgemeine Entwicklung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen; 
industrielle Kooperation; Wirtschaftskommission; Großprojekte, May 2, 1973, BA 102/100026, 1. 
Original: insbesondere eine verstärkte Kooperation zwischen Unternehmen bzw. zuständigen 
Organisationen beider Länder beitragen, die über reine Lieferbeziehungen hinausgeht. Dabei müssen m.E. 
möglichst vielfältige Formen der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit entwickelt werden. Nicht nur große 
Austauschgeschäfte, wie das Erdgas Röhrengeschäft, die in bestimmten Fällen gut, aber nicht immer 
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Brezhnev categorically ruled this out. No foreign investments or joint ventures with 
Soviet firms would be possible.498 Abandoning the practice of barter deals was not 
something that could be counted on in the foreseeable future, either.499 He even balked at 
cooperation between West European companies, that is, allowing German companies to 
conduct large-scale Soviet orders jointly with France, Japan, or other partners, which the 
Germans preferred as Soviet orders traditionally had had a magnitude that went above the 
customary size. Brezhnev indicated that the Soviet Union wanted to undertake 
manageable projects and that he did not wish to rule out multilateral cooperation entirely 
[] but first one had to talk bilaterally with each other.500 
 Lastly, the demand for a greater diversificationboth in terms of deals and orders 
so that the mid-sized industries could benefitfailed to some extent. Brezhnev agreed 
that these kinds of deals could be useful, but [stated that] large-scale projects are more 
important.501 He even chided the German industry and government for not thinking 
long-term in this respect. Attributing the German interest in mid-sized orders to a lack of 
courage and a lingering effect of the strained relations of the last thirty years, he did not 
perceive this to be a new period of a long-term development of 50 years or true large-
scale projects. 502 
                                                                                                                                            
wirtschaftlich durchführbar sind. Anzustreben ist gemeinsame Entwicklung industrieller Erzeugnisse; 
gemeinschaftlicher Vertrieb auch in dritten Ländern. 
498 MemCon, Conversation General Secretary Brezhnev with representatives of the German industry on 
May 20, 1973 in Bonn, BA 102/100026, 5. 
499 Ibid, 4. 
500 Ibid, 3. 
501 Ibid, 4.  
502 Ibid, 5. Original:  Breschnew wies auf seine Gespräche mit Bundeskanzler Brandt und Bundesminister 
Scheel hin. Er habe festgestellt, daß unser Verhältnis zur Sowjetunion zum Teil noch von den Beziehungen 
zwischen beiden Ländern in den letzten 30 Jahren belastet sei. Eine ganz neue Etappe müsse jetzt beginnen, 
wofür vielleicht noch der Mut fehle. Er könne noch nicht feststellen, daß man von einer langfristigen 
Entwicklung über 50 Jahre und echte Großvorhaben spreche. 
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Even after Brezhnev had openly rebuked the German industrialists during his visit 
to Germany for suggesting the concept of multi-national cooperation and foreign 
ownership in the Soviet industry, the German industry representatives still declared 
themselves willing to purchase nearly every available quantity of natural gas from the 
Soviet Union.503  
Although this was a striking example of German wishful thinking when it came to 
Ostpolitik and Osthandel, Brezhnevs comments on Berlin and economic cooperation did 
not have an immediate effect. Soviet unwillingness to modify their economic system to 
make its products more competitive and the subsequent rise in Soviet debt on the German 
money market did not have any effect on Soviet credit-worthiness.504 By 1973, the Soviet 
Union had become by far the greatest of our [German] debtors, yet the German 
business community continued to foster trade with the East and was willing to consider 
further large-scale loans.505  
Brezhnevs summit meeting with Nixon was less eventful. Since they were unable 
to come to a unified stance on the two most contentious issues, the Middle East crisis and 
Vietnam, no groundbreaking agreements were concluded during the summit. The nine 
agreements that were signed dealt mostly with general commitments to cooperate on 
matters of trade, culture, taxation, and transportation. Perhaps the most notable of these 
was the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement. However, even here Kissinger had 
managed, during preliminary talks, to whittle it down to insignificance.506 The more 
                                                
503 Ibid, 4. 
504 Talking Points for the German-Soviet conference, Mögliche Gesprächsthemen im Bereich der deutsch-
sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, July 12, 1973, BA 102/100002, 2-3. 
505 Memo, Sprechzettel für Messen und Ausstellungen 1974, October 19, 1973, BA 102/100002, 2-3. 
506 For a detailed account of these negotiations see Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 277-280. 
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significant aspect to this summit was not what was actually signed, but the attitude with 
which it was conducted. Kissingers visit to the Soviet Union in May 1973, which laid 
the ground work for the summit, was marked by Brezhnevs jovial attitude, willingness to 
compromise, and frank remarks.507 The Soviet leader continued this attitude during his 
American visit with his affable presentation to the U.S. public, good-natured humor, and 
conciliatory statements. With his Im going to leave here in a very good mood attitude 
he managed to pleasantly surprise the American public.508 Even though he did not receive 
a firm commitment from Congress on the MFN status or a strong endorsement of the 
proposed liquefied natural gas deals, Brezhnev remained enthusiastic about his U.S. visit. 
So good-neighborly did Brezhnev present himself that some commentaries suggested 
America should overlook the insignificant agreements and rejoice in the spirit of 
cooperation that sprang from this visit.509 Even behind the scenes, Brezhnevcontent 
that the Soviet Unions position was considered on par with the U.S.seemed to have 
gone beyond mere rhetoric, as his demand for a late-night meeting in Nixons study to fix 
the Middle East problem demonstrated.510 It seems clear that Brezhnev was enthusiastic 
about having achieved his goal of engaging the United States as its equal. If the 1972 
Moscow summit meeting had initiated this development, Brezhnevs comfort level and 
affability had cemented it, not in words but in spirit. It became abundantly clear to 
everyone that the two superpowers were willing and able to cooperate. 
For West Germany (and France), the public demonstration of superpower détente 
during the summit of 1973 was a mixed blessing. On one hand, an easing of superpower 
                                                
507 Hanhimäki, 277-278. 
508 Hedrick Smith, In Brezhnevs Baggage, A Supply of Ebullience, The New York Times, June 21, 1973, 
1, 17. 
509 James Reston, The Nixon-Brezhnev Promises, The New York Times, June 22, 1973, 35. 
510 Hanhimäki, 281. 
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tensions invariably alleviated confrontation in Europe; on the other there was the realistic 
fear of becoming an insignificant pawn in the European corner of the geopolitical 
superpower chess board. In this context, Kissingers ill-fated public comments on the 
American proposal for a Year of Europe must have strengthened European concerns. 
Having distinguished between the United States global interests and the European allies 
regional interest in his interview of April 23, 1973, Kissinger had essentially sidelined the 
Europeans, and the summit meeting in Washington had then demonstrated how well the 
superpowers could actually get along.511 In a clear demonstration of how disjointed the 
American and European flanks of NATO had become, Brandt vehemently refused a 
reassertion of American tutelage. Having interpreted Kissingers announcement of a Year 
of Europe as such, he declared that refurbished Atlantic relations in no case put in 
question West Germanys policy of reconciliation with the Communist states.512 Despite 
Brandts vehement affirmation of the success of Ostpolitik, Brezhnevs visits to Germany 
and the U.S. had shaken Ostpolitik at its core.  
German historian Oliver Bange illustrates Brandts Ostpolitik as a coin labeled 
German unification, with a long-term strategy of undermining the Soviet Union on one 
side, and the creation of a security conference that would allow German reunification on 
the other. If we accept the central premises of Banges illustration, then Brandts coin 
was worn down on both sides, given Brezhnevs refusal to adjust the nature of German-
Soviet interchanges and the emergence of a superpower détente that made the CSCE 
secondary, at best. 
                                                
511 See Hanhimäki, 276. 
512 Flora Lewis, Europe Reacts Warily to U.S.-Soviet Accords, The New York Times, June 25, 1973, 17. 
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Sodranos analysis of Soviet attitudes toward détente with the FRG further 
illustrates that Brandts Ostpolitik lost appeal once they could have the U.S. as a partner. 
For one, Sodrano identifies a traditional Soviet distrust of Germany that also permeated 
the Soviet leadership. They accordingly continued their military buildup, refusing to link 
military and political détente. Brezhnevs visit to Bonn also made it clear that it was not 
just military and political détente that they were unwilling to link, but economic and 
political policies, as well.513 Undermining the Soviet system through rapprochement thus 
seemed fruitless.  
As Brandt envisioned it, the establishment of an effective European security 
system would allow for an eventual German reunification. Within a European framework 
of peace and stability, Germanys reunification would no longer be perceived as a threat. 
While this was probably acceptable to Germanys European neighbors, it contradicted 
Soviet interests. A complete disarmament of Europe would seriously undermine control 
their over Eastern Europe and increase the influence Germany already exercised 
economically.  
While a withdrawal of troops and weaponry from the continent might well reduce Americas role 
in Europe substantially, it would also emasculate the Kremlins controls over Eastern Europe. A 
West German government that could no longer be portrayed as a serious threat to the security of 
the region would only accelerate the East Europeans desire to free themselves from Soviet 
domination. To risk potentially irresistible pressures to establish a unified and powerful German 
state, while at the same time risking the disintegration of Moscows security buffer in Eastern 
Europe, would be to jeopardize virtually everything Leonid Brezhnev and his generation of Soviet 
leaders had fought for in World War II and immediately afterward.514 
 
Superpower détente allowed the Soviets to continue its rule over Eastern Europe, now 
with tacit Western approval. This entailed a hard-line pro-Warsaw Pact approach that 
vilified West Germany and enabled a stronger internal cohesion. At the same time, the 
                                                
513 Sodaro argues that it was clear to the Soviet leadership by 1970 that foreign trade would only happen 
without domestic reform. 
514 Sodaro, 201. 
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Soviet Union could continue to benefit from its preexisting economic ties with Germany, 
even if a sense of disillusion about the inflexibility of Soviet trade patterns had set in. 
 
American Strength and Stalling Ostpolitik 
If one had to pinpoint a date at which the U.S. held absolute sway over Western détente 
efforts, it would be the summer of 1973. This was not necessarily due to the skillful 
maneuvering of Nixon or Kissinger but because of the Soviets actions. The summits 
between the Americans and the Soviets had made it clear that Brezhnev craved and 
enjoyed the recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal to the U.S. and also saw much 
prospect for an increase in trade. Indeed, the large U.S. economy and its global interests 
were an ideal match for Soviet demands. With the Soviets clearly favoring superpower 
détente, the Brandt government had to reorient itself and seek German reunification, as 
its predecessors did, under the auspices of U.S. leadership.  
 By May 1973, the Germans felt compelled to share their concerns about the 
Soviets Berlin policy with the United States. Yet while Brandt commented on his 
difficulties with the Eastern interpretation of the Four Power Agreement during his 
summit meeting with Nixon in May 1973, he still believed in its value. What is most 
striking, however, is that for some time now the Germans had not remained in close 
consultation with the Americans over these issues. Thus, the American side knew only 
partially of the difficulties that existed with the Four Power Agreements interpretation 
and implementation. 515 This lack of awareness was a sign that the Brandt government 
had thought, after the Berlin Accords had been signed, that they could deal with the 
                                                
515 MemCon, Chancellor Brandt, Nixon, et al. in the White House, May 7, 1973, Mappe 2, Ordner 440, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr, 1. 
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Soviet Union without the aid of the United States. Brandts May visit to the U.S. 
demonstrated the Germans need for closer consultation. Even so, a disillusionment with 
Brezhnevs policies, and a full awareness that the Soviet Union would not go along with 
Ostpolitik, had not set in.  
 In a clear attempt to have his cake and eat it too, Brezhnev wrote Brandt to warn 
him that anti-German rhetoric would be used during the upcoming Warsaw Pact meeting 
in August 1973. In particular, he emphasized his commitment to the continuity of the 
policy of peace that Brandt and he had pursued and attributed the agreement between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear war to that policy. He described 
Nixon as a statesman, who keeps his word as a solid partner and saw the improvement 
in U.S.-Soviet relations as a good support for the course our two countries are 
taking.516 
 Bahr, for one, believed Brezhnevs rhetoric. He believed Brezhnevs declaration 
of peaceful intent to be sincere and pointed to the fact that in his letter Brezhnev had 
twice used the term turning point (Wende). Not realizing that for Brezhnev the 
turning point was actually one toward a superpower détente, he concluded that the 
Eastern Summit is of course used to calm the truly upset group of chickens that make up 
the Warsaw Pact. Most of them are no smarter than our allies: they are afraid to be sold 
out.517  
 But it was the Brandt government that would be sold out. The director of the 
Osteuropa Institut in Munich, Dr. Heinrich Vogel, brought increased number of contacts 
                                                
516 Attachment to Letter, Egon Bahr to Chancellor Brandt, July 30, 1973, Mappe 2, Ordner 432, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
517 Ibid. Original: Der Ostgipfel dient natürlich dazu, die ungeheuer aufgeregte Hühnerschar des 
Warschauer Vertrages zu beruhigen. Die meisten sind dort nicht klüger als unsere Verbündeten; sie haben 
Angst, verkauft zu werden. 
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between certain Soviet foreign policy officials and the CDU/CSU to Bahrs attention. 
Using the example of Prof. Michail Sergeevic Voslenskijs visit to Germany, he 
explained that certain Soviet foreign policy experts saw the issue of German reunification 
as a dangerous one, were bothered by Bahrs emphasis on reunification, and hoped to 
find a partner in the CDU/CSU who would foster a policy that clearly delineated between 
the FRG and GDR.518 More importantly than seeking contacts with the German 
opposition, though, was the rhetorical use of a revanchist West Germany as a cohesive 
element for the Warsaw Pact.  
 In a speech in August 1973, Brezhnev singled out the FRG as critically important 
to Soviet peace policy. First, though, he also implicated the Brandt government in a 
policy to undermine the Communist order, as he stated that this phenomenon was not just 
apparent in the opposition.519 Vilifying West Germany as the raison detre for the Eastern 
military alliance apparently exceeded Brandts tolerance for what Brezhnev had warned 
him was rhetoric for domestic consumption, as Brandt felt compelled to respond to these 
accusations.  
 In a reply to Brezhnev, Brandt used an increasingly critical tone towards Soviet 
policy, but most of all he complained about the Berlin situation. 
We have spent much effort to reach the Four Power Agreement. I would like to publicly voice my 
disappointment over the fact that this is still a problem between us that can overshadow the 
entirety of our relations. I would really hope that it is possible to reach a point at which no 
questions about Berlin bother us any more. 520 
                                                
518 Letter, Direktor Osteuropa Institut, Dr. Heinrich Vogel, to Egon Bahr, July 26, 1973, Mappe 2, Ordner 
432, Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
519 Uwe Engelbrecht, Breschnew tadelt Bundesrepublik Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, August 16, 1973, Mappe 
2, Ordner 432, Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
520 Draft Letter, Chancellor Brandt to Brezhnev, [n.d.; after August 16, 1973], Mappe 2, Ordner 432, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr. Original: Wir haben sehr große Anstrengungen unternommen, um das Vier-
Mächte-Abkommen zu erreichen. Ich möchte in aller Offenheit meine Enttäuschung darüber Ausdruck 
geben, daß dieses Problem zwischen uns noch immer eine Rolle spielt, die die Gesamtheit unserer 
Beziehungen überschatten kann. Ich möchte wirklich hoffen, daß es möglich ist, einen Punkt zu erreichen, 
durch den uns keine Berlin-Frage mehr beschwert. 
 201
 
This, however, would not be the case. Starting in August 1973, the Czech authorities 
refused any contact with German administrations in Berlin who requested legal 
assistance. The reason was the absence of West Berlin in the corresponding agreement 
between West Germany and the CSSR. While the agreement previously had been 
interpreted to implicitly include West Berlin, now nothing short of an explicit mention of 
West Berlin would suffice. 
 The GDR continued this line of pressure. On September 25, 1973, immediately 
after they gained a diplomatic victory by being admitted to the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), a sub-organization of the United Nations, 
the GDR delegates protested against the FRGs September 21, 1965 statement, which 
extended the validity of the IMCO agreements to Land Berlin. The East Germans 
argued that this was a violation of the quadripartite agreement of September 3, 1971, 
that Berlin (West) is not part of the Federal Republic of Germany and should not be 
governed by it.521 In short, the GDR turned the West German success of the Four Power 
Agreement on its head by claiming that nothing short of an explicit mention of West 
Berlin would be valid in their eyes. 
 For the Brandt government, the question of West Berlin was truly its Achilles 
heel. As a former mayor of Berlin and having argued that his Ostpolitik would improve 
the life of West Berliners, Brandt could not afford to see the advances on West Berlin 
reversed. An internal document of the Brandt government suggested an immediate 
response in IMCO and evaluated the GDR protest as significant as it could weaken the 
German position overall. 
                                                
521 Telegram, German Embassy at the United Nations, Gehlhoff, to the German Foreign Office, DDR-
Erklärung zu Berlin anläßlich IMCO- Beitritts, November 1, 1973, BA 136/18091. 
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This is the first case in which the GDR denounces the Berlin declaration of the German 
government on admission to a special organization of the United Nation. It must be expected that 
this procedure will repeat itself once the GDR joins other international organizations. This could 
weaken our position in the international arena in the long term simply by the fact that the 
circulating documents depict the inclusion of Berlin as questionable. It is therefore recommended 
to try in the next conversation with Undersecretary Kohl to keep the GDR from further protests of 
this kind. 522 
 
During consultations the following day the Germans desire for a forceful response by its 
three Western allies was met with reluctance on the part of the British and the French. 
The British and the French representatives agreed that only Bonn should issue a 
statement while the three allies, through their silence, would give their tacit approval. 
Besides, with only four days before the next IMCO meeting, it would not be possible to 
agree on a statement. Only the US representative countered the opinions, and the 
Germans considered the French and British stance to be disappointingly weak. The U.S. 
position was that we must counter the GDR in the same arena that it challenged us. If 
this would be left only for the FRG to do, the three powers would convey the impression 
that it is the role of the Federal Republic of Germany to enforce the Four Power 
Agreement. He further noted that the United States would issue a declaration by itself if 
no joint declaration by the three powers could be agreed upon.523  Faced with this tough 
American and German stance, the next day the French and British delegates agreed to 
                                                
522 Memo, Economics Ministry, Germelman, to Economics Minister, Beitritt der DDR zur IMCO, 
November 8, 1973, BA 136/18091. Original: Dies ist der erste Fall, in dem die DDR die Berlin-Erklärung 
der Bundesregierung beim Beitritt zu einer Sonderorganisation der VN beanstandet. Es ist zu erwarten, daß 
sich dieser Vorgang wiederholt, wenn die DDR weiteren internationalen Organisationen beitritt. Das 
könnte im internationalen Bereich auf Dauer unsere Position in der Berlinfrage schon dadurch schwächen, 
daß die zirkulierten Dokumente  die Einbeziehung Berlins als umstritten ausweisen. Es wird deshalb 
empfohlen, im nächsten Gespräch mit StS Kohl den Versuch zu unternehmen, die DDR von weiteren 
Protesten dieser Art abzuhalten. 
523 Memo, Vermerk 210-505.35, Lücking, Bonn, November 9, 1973, betr: Beitritt der DDR zur IMCO, BA 
136/18091, 3. Original: Wir müßten der DDR auf dem Feld entgegentreten, auf welchem sie uns 
herausfordert. Falls allein der Bundesrepublik dies überlassen bleibe, würden die 3 Mächte den Eindruck 
vermitteln, als sei es Aufgabe der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, das Viermächte-Abkommen zur 
Anwendung zu bringen. [...] Er wies darauf hin, daß der Sprecher der Vereinigten Staaten in der IMCO 
selbständig eine Erklärung abgeben würde, sofern eine gemeinsame Äußerung der 3 Mächte in der IMCO 
nicht zustande käme.  
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issue a joint answer by all four powers during the next IMCO meeting, on November 12, 
1973.524 
 The wavering British and French support for the German cause on the 
international scene clearly illuminates that the United States was the only ally that offered 
unqualified support for German reunification. After such clear illustrations of loyalties, a 
renewed emphasis on the relationship with the U.S. was the obvious course of action. 
Brezhnevs unwillingness to continue to strengthen bilateral ties with Bonn to the extent 
that Ostpolitik would be a potential tool for German reunification drove Brandt back into 
the arms of the United States. With his West European allies lukewarm about 
reunification, Brandt could not even continue to emphasize the role of the EC over 
transatlantic ties. In essence, both his Ostpolitik and his Westpolitik with the EC had 
failed. What remained was not a special, ever-increasing cooperation between Western 
and Eastern Europe that would create a peaceful bubble in Europe. Ultimately, returning 
to the side of the United States tied the possibility of reunification to where it had been 
before his inauguration, namely American-style détente and the remote hope of a 
geopolitical peace rather than a European peace. 
 
German disillusionment with Osthandel 
By the summer of 1973, certain elements in the German government and industry became 
disillusioned with the state of German Ostpolitik and Osthandel. A year earlier, Otto 
Wolff von Amerongen had already identified the problems with the Eastern trade. The 
two major ones were the lack of diversification in the range of Soviet products, which 
limited trade flow and improved the trade balance in favor of FRGs exports, and the lack 
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of Soviet willingness to engage in establishing cooperation agreements between Soviet 
and German firms.525 
 In addition to the problems of increasing trade to counter the huge trade 
imbalance that forced the Germans to subsidize Soviet imports with German credit, the 
potential for Soviet exports had not been reached. Crude oil exports from the SU were 
lagging behind the quotas that the FRG assigned to the Soviet Union and were well 
behind the demand in Germany (2.8 million tons delivered versus 4.4 million tons 
expected). This was especially striking as Italy and France were able to purchase 
considerably higher quantities of crude oil from the Soviet Union (11 million and 6 
million tons, respectively). Even after the German government had raisedat the 
Soviets requestthe quota for heating oil from 1.5 million to 2.8 million tons, this did 
not result in higher crude oil exports.526 
 As a result, Soviet debt increased drastically, putting it by far at the top of all of 
Germanys debtor countries. By late summer it was estimated that in 1973 the Soviet 
Union would double its debt from 1972, putting it at a staggering 3.6 billion marks.527 
With the political impetus for Osthandel somewhat dampened, negotiations on the major 
showcase deals dragged on unsuccessfully. 
 Trying to make the most use out of their natural resources, Brezhnev had pushed 
for the continuation of large-scale orders for industrial plants to be built in the Soviet 
Union on German credit. The next showcase would be the steel plant Kursk which was to 
                                                
525 Talking Points for the German-Soviet conference, Mögliche Gesprächsthemen im Bereich der deutsch-
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526 Ibid, 6. 
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be of such a magnitude that the German industry balked at assuming responsibility for 
constructing such a project, much less financing it. Their refusal was especially due to the 
fact that the Soviets wanted to improve on the conditions they had been offered before. 
They refused to include the financing cost in the overall price of the project and would 
not pay these financing costs until the construction was completed.528 The Soviets also 
insisted on a 12year loan at an interest rate of 6%, which would mean a federal subsidy 
of 1.5 billion marks.529 
 It was at this point that the U.S. became an acceptable partner for trade with the 
East, someone to share information with and to try to avoid as a potential competitor. 
During a visit by Secretaries Schultz and Dent, Economics Minister Friederichs inquired 
about how the Americans handled loan conditions with the Soviets. This is a problem 
that the FRG imminently has to deal with. It is our [Germanys] opinion that a race of 
Western industrial countries for better loan conditions should be avoided. 530  
 But with the German government less enthusiastic about continuing to bankroll 
trade with the Soviet Union, the Soviet trade delegations threatened a possible cooling of 
relations with the FRG over the issue of loan conditions in December 1973.531 Yet, 
without political pressure, the German industry was not willing to go the extra mile. In an 
essay on trade with the Soviet Union, Amerongen was now convinced that trade with the 
East was a special case, to be treated differently from trade with the West. The 
fundamental realization here was that the Soviet Union was unwilling to modify its 
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529 Memo, Dr. Gebert,Hüttenwerksprojekt Kursk, July 26, 1973, BA 102/135253, 2. 
530 Memo, Besprechung zwischen US Finanzminister Schultz, US Handelsminister Dent und 
Wirtschaftsminister Friderichs, October 5, 1973, BA 102/111917, 2-3. 
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system of a planned economy for the sake of Western investments.532 While he offered 
the possibility that heavy Soviet indebtedness might be offset by limited Soviet purchases 
during the years 1974/75 (so as to end the Five-Year Plan with a balanced trade volume), 
even with the prospect of increased Soviet oil revenues due to the Middle East Crisis, the 
article predicted that Osthandel had only limited growth potential in the coming years.533  
 Amerongen also rejected Soviet demands for a further liberalization of import 
restrictions, as over 90% of all goods could already be freely imported. He blamed the 
Soviet Union for a lack of initiative in trying to penetrate the German market. Lack of 
knowledge of the German market and customer care, as well as limited Soviet attendance 
at trade fairs, hampered the marketability of Soviet imports. The problems for German 
exports, on the other hand, was not a question of the desirability their goods but of a 
Soviet lack of hard currency, which meant that German sales to the Soviet Union always 
had to involve the issue of credits.534 
 Lastly, cooperation between companies in both countries that extended beyond a 
simple purchase and deliver system was not fostered. Apart from the question of property 
ownership in a Communist country, cooperation on taxes, tariffs, and the status of foreign 
workers were essential to the vitalization of Osthandel, yet they remained unresolved. 
Overall, Amerongens assessment was, therefore, pessimistic.535  
 This publicly-voiced pessimism places the start of the German industrys 
disillusionment over Osthandel in the latter part of 1973 and not, as Rudolph claims, to 
1975. Certainly, a 1975 CIA warning of a significant Soviet trade deficit, which 
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Economics Minister Friderich tried to keep under wraps, as well a Deutsche Bank 
calculation of a record Soviet deficit of over four billion dollars with Western countries, 
offered more concrete reason for investors to be wary.536 Yet already in 1973 the gold 
rush excitement that the Soviet economy could save the German economy from the ups 
and downs of a market economy had worn off.  
 
The Jackson- Vanick Amendment 
Had the trend of superpower détente continued, Kissingers claim to have harnessed the 
beast of détente would have fulfilled itself some three years later.537 Yet, just as he had 
failed to realize the economic ties Brandt had established with the Soviet Union as a 
crucial and lasting element in international relations, he proved once again to be blind to 
the dangers of trade issues. With the question of economic benefits of central importance 
to the Soviet leadership and a determining factor in its foreign policy, it seems negligent 
at best for Kissinger to assure Brezhnev rather flippantly that MFN status for the Soviet 
Union was a sure thing. Overly confident in his strategy, he assured Nixon that Brezhnev 
should be deeply committed to a more positive relationship with the U.S.538 He was 
right, of course, that Brezhnev strove for an intensification of ties with the U.S.  By 
looking at foreign policy issues, however, Kissinger forgot the adage that all foreign 
policy is also domestic policy and as such, domestic pressure could seriously harm 
international ambitions. As Hanhimäki illustrates, the domestic influence of President 
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537 Kissinger, White House Years, 534. 
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Zavidovo, May 5-8, 1973, Box 75, NSC Files, NPMS, NA. 
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Nixon was a crucial component in implementing foreign policy. With Watergate 
discrediting the Presidents image and political strength an almost daily basis in the fall 
of 1973, domestic opposition to the presidents policies grew proportionally in 
strength.539 
 The Jackson-Vanick amendment was the political issue that would wipe out 
Kissingers vision of détente with the Soviet Union. As James Goldgeier illustrates, the 
irony of Senator Henry Jacksons opposition to Kissinger was that he employed the same 
linkage strategy Kissinger used. The only difference with Jacksons approach was that he 
linked the carrotsin this case American economic incentiveswith internal behavior of 
the Soviet Union, while Kissinger exclusively looked at external behavior.540  
 To Jackson, the exit tax the Soviets imposed in August 1972 on Jewish citizens 
who wished to leave the Soviet Union constituted foul play. In October 1972, Jackson 
and Representative Charles Vanick introduced bills in both the Senate and the House that 
linked the question of Jewish emigration to improvements in trade. Little came of this in 
1972 and early 1973. As Kissinger suggests, the novelty of Nixons détente with the 
Soviet Union and a strong presidential power base prevented excessive criticism of 
Nixons foreign policy. Kissinger links the strengthening criticism of increased trade with 
the Soviet Union to the Soviet crackdown on dissidents, for example on Andrei Sakharov 
in August 1973.541 As outlined before, however, the conservative shift in the Soviet 
Politburo had already taken place in March 1973, making U.S. congressional opposition 
                                                
539 Hanhimäki, 340-344. 
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to any intensification of trade more likely. In fact, when the Jackson-Vanick amendment 
was formally introduced on March 15, 1973 public support for it was already increasing. 
 Brezhnev was eager to rid himself of this problem and stopped the practice of exit 
fees in April, but Jackson went one step further, insisting that the Soviets needed to 
specify a minimum number of exit visas and extend the same right to non-Jewish 
emigrants.542 Clearly demonstrating how much the Soviets wanted MFN, in preparation 
for the summit Brezhnev told Kissinger that all those who want to can go.543 Kissinger, 
however, discarded the issue as peripheral, thereby allowing the issue to become a 
public power struggle in the U.S. that the Soviet Union could only regard as meddling in 
their internal affairs. Whether we can believe Kissingers one-sided account of Jacksons 
ever-increasing demands for Soviet Jewish emigration over the next year, which 
culminated in Gromykos warning that the Soviet government would, however, stop 
short of forcing its citizens to emigrate in order to please the American Congress matters 
little. The fundamental issue here revolves around Kissingers failure to recognize the 
dangers of a politicization of the issue in the U.S. Congress. As Goldgeier stresses, 
Kissingers emphasis on great power realpolitik led to his failure to appreciate the lack 
of control that big powers had over little ones and to his failure to recognize how his own 
society and their representatives in government could disrupt his strategy.544  
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The Arab-Israeli War 
Crisis 
The delay in MFN approval proved fateful to superpower détente. On October 6, 1973, 
the highest of high holy days for Jews, Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria initiated a surprise 
attack on Israel. Egypts forces swiftly crossed the Suez Canal and overran the Bar-Lev 
line.  Syria moved into the Golan Heights and nearly reached the 1967 border with 
Israel. With Israels general staff convinced of Israels safety from future Arab attacks, 
neither U.N. Resolution 242 nor Egyptian President Sadats peace initiative had led Israel 
to withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice lines. Sadats threats of war throughout 1972 and 
much of 1973 to the contrary, neither the U.S. nor the Israelis conceived that an Arab 
attack was a realistic possibility. Therefore, they misinterpreted the buildup of armed 
forces along the canal as military exercises rather than preparations for an attack and 
were completely surprised by the turn of events.545 
The damage to the Soviet-American relationship came when the tide of war 
turned on October 10. Having regained lost ground, Israel began to advance into Syria 
proper and the Soviet Union felt compelled to respond with an airlift of military supplies 
to Damascus and Cairo. Since the U.S. was allied with Israel, a proxy war ensued; the 
U.S. responded to the Soviets actions on October 12 and 13 with massive U.S. airlifts to 
Israel. Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army on 
October 21. 
The war started an international crisis when Egypt pleaded the Soviet Union to 
save its Third Army by threatening to send troops to assist Egypt.  Brezhnev complied, 
suggesting a joint operation with U.S. forces to maintain a previously negotiated cease-
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fire agreement based on U.N. resolution 338, which had already been broken. Brezhnev 
threatened Nixon, however, that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this 
matter, we should be faced with the necessity to consider the question of taking 
appropriate steps unilaterally.546 The U.S. countered this threat by raising the alert of its 
military forces to DEFCON III on October 24, demonstrating and later communicating to 
Brezhnev that the U.S. would not stand for unilateral Soviet action. Before the situation 
could escalate any further, the U.S. managed to pressure Israel into accepting a second 
cease-fire on October 25, 1973, sparing the embattled Egyptian Third Army.   
 
European Opposition to American Actions 
European criticism focused in part on Americas unrestrained support for Israel but 
mostly on the unilateralism with which the U.S. had implemented its policies, particularly 
its raising of the DEFCON level without consulting the European allies. Beneath this 
obvious issue of consultation was the question of the cohesion of an alliance in which 
members had different interests and perspectives. As Kissinger put it: 
The deeper problem raised by the October war was the proper conduct of allies in an emergency 
when they sincerely disagree with one another either about causes or about remedies: Should they 
use the occasion of their partners embarrassment to vindicate their own views? Or do they have 
an obligation to subordinate their differences to the realization that the humiliation of the ally who, 
for better or worse, is most strategically placed to affect the outcome weakens the structure of 
common defense and the achievement of joint purposes?547 
 
Yet if consultation was not an essential part of an alliance, then, by Kissingers argument, 
NATO would become merely a stepping stool for the U.S. to extend its power. The U.S. 
and Western Europe had developed fundamentally different interests vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union, which Kissinger recognized but did not validate. In his lament over the fact that 
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one NATO ally after another refused to let the U.S. use the bases in their country for the 
airlift to supply Israel he points at the underlying conflict. 
Dissociation from us in the Middle East war was thus coupled with an attempt to opt out of any 
possible crisis with the Soviet Union. [] they would not risk over the Middle East the web of 
their economic relations with the Communist worldwhich grew increasingly vital to them for 
economic reasons as the oil crisis triggered a worldwide recession.548 
 
In essence, Kissinger wished to involve the European allies in a fight that they perceived, 
rightly or wrongly, as not their own. In a twisted way, the Europeans reactions proved 
the validity of Kissingers thoughts on the Year of Europe: the Europeans were most 
concerned about, and gave priority to, their regional interests, which in this case involved 
good relations with the Soviet Union. Even so, unilaterally raising the DEFCON level 
rendered the Europeans as nothing more than pawns in the superpower game. 
 With major NATO partners such as Spain, Greece, Turkey, France, and Great 
Britain refusing to let the U.S. use their bases for the airlift to Israel, the FRG was in a 
somewhat unusual position. Not being fully sovereign and acutely aware of the need for 
U.S. backing on the Berlin question, it pursued a dont ask, dont tell policy. Yet when it 
became public knowledge on October 24 that Israeli ships had docked in Bremerhafen in 
order to be loaded with military supplies, the Brandt government told the U.S. to halt all 
arms shipments to Israel from German soil.549   
 In his memoirs Kissinger condemned this step, noting that as we were already 
carrying out the Federal Republics private request, the purpose of the public statement 
could only be to distance Bonn from Washington for the benefit of a presumed Arab 
constituency in the midst of an acute crisis.550 In the true Machiavellian approach that 
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had let Kissinger to ignore the lack of American domestic support for détente with the 
Soviet Union, he now overlooked the fact that the German public might hold a different 
view regarding the prospects of an escalating conflict with the Arab nations and the 
Soviet Union than the Americans. Instead, the entire Nixon foreign policy team squarely 
blamed the German reaction on a lack of support from its leaders.   
 The following day, October 26, Nixon publicly chastised his West European allies 
for their lack of support in a crisis that would have affected them even more than the 
United States. Flanked by his Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, they conducted 
the supposedly first direct criticism of the European allies since NATOs beginnings. 
Schlesinger even hinted at a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany as the 
reaction of the Foreign Ministry in Germany raises some questions about whether they 
view enhanced readiness in the same way that we view enhanced readiness.551 The 
clashing views between the Americans and the Germans are perfectly illustrated in a 
discussion between Kissinger and the German Ambassador von Staden that same day.  
18. The German Ambassador said that there was a serious problem of communication which had 
developed in the last 14 days. 
19. The Secretary said he recognized this aspect of the problem. He had given instructions that as 
negotiations for a solution in the Middle East develop, a means should be found to inform our 
European Allies more swiftly and completely. There was a problem here, however. It was difficult 
for the allies to insist on a right to private briefings when their fundamental attitude was either 
slightly or openly hostile. 
20. The German Ambassador insisted that if information were provided more promptly the policy 
adopted by the European Allies was less likely to be divergent.  
The Secretary said this was perhaps so, unless our underlying philosophies were different.552 
 
With this, Kissinger summed up the underlying dynamics and the problem that had beset 
the transatlantic alliance with the onset of European détente. The issue of military 
shipments from German soil would largely be resolved within a couple days with the 
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compromise that the U.S. could only ship its military equipment on U.S. vessels, giving 
the German government the opportunity to feign ignorance over where the shipments 
were going. Even so, European reservations over American unilateralism remained 
heated.553 As Bahr reported from London,  
I have never seen Heath so brutal or refreshingly realistic. He was bitter and critical vis-à-vis the 
Americans. Distance between London and Washington was the fundamental impression in my 
conversations. [] He [Heath] had not been consulted before the Americans had given that alert. 
Maybe Kissinger understands something of the Europe of the past century, but in Washington they 
do not understand the Europe of today.554 
 
The aftermath of the Yom Kippur War remained a divisive issue for the transatlantic 
alliance, as well. The gulf that the Europeans have chosen to open between themselves 
and the U.S., as German Finance Minister Schmidt put it in a letter to Kissinger, made 
itself felt in the Americans attempt to reestablish adequate oil deliveries from the Middle 
East.555 For the West Europeans, the solution to the crisis was of utmost importance, not 
the standing of the U.S. in the region. Hence, they were eager to involve all parties in the 
talks. Despite Kissingers efforts they encouraged active participation by the Soviets. In 
his backchannel with Ledlev, Bahr encouraged the idea of Soviet-Israeli talks. 
It is a valid question whether the Russian side wishes a line of communication with Israel. If this is 
the case the Chancellor [Brandt] would be happy to arrange it. [] Important: If the Americans 
talk with the Egyptians, why should the Russians not talk with the Israelis? 556 
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Some of the European allies equated the idea of more diplomatic weight as a peacemaker, 
with more military power, as well. Eager to replace American military influence with the 
military power of Europeans, Pompidou floated the idea of a European Defense Council. 
This, of course, would profoundly undermine the separation of issues that allowed the 
FRG to maneuver internationally, and Bahr strongly opposed the idea. 
There can only be security with America. After we blocked Kissingers nonsense to provide the 
alliance with functions that would go significantly beyond security, we now have to stop the 
French danger: A European Security Council would divide the alliance. There can be only one 
strategy and the French have to return to it. 
 Allowing France to pull eight countries to its position would be the beginning of the end 
of NATO. The American echo to a European Security Council can not only be devastating but will 
disassociate America from Europe. In any case it will be an Insecurity Council because if it does 
not have anything to say it will confuse and be a new sign of European helplessness. Why does 
Europe not focus on its strength: the economy and politics, instead of belaboring its weakness, its 
defense? 557 
 
While Bahr might have perceived the international situation in a pro-American 
perspective, overall the political climate after the Yom Kippur war benefited the Soviet 
Union. However much Brandt and Bahr wanted to separate military, diplomatic, and 
economic issues, the fact remained that they were invariably linked, if for no other reason 
than that the other nations linked them. For Brezhnev, for example, the Yom Kippur War 
had given him a new impetus to enlarge the gulf between the U.S. and Western Europe 
                                                                                                                                            
gewünscht wird. Falls dies der Fall ist, würde der Bundeskanzler das gern versuchen. Wir hätten auch 
nichts dagegen, wenn die sowjetische Seite den Hintergrund der von Wilson eingeladenen Sitzung und der 
Teilnahme des BK Sadat wissen läßt, sofern man dies in Moskau für angebracht hält. Zu gegebener Zeit, 
und wenn das von allen für nützlich gehalten wird, würde der BK natürlich gern mit Sadat 
zusammentreffen. Wesentlich: Wenn die Amerikaner mit den Ägyptern reden, warum sollten die Russen 
nicht mit den Israelis reden? 
557 Letter, Egon Bahr to Chancellor Brandt, Bonn, December 14, 1973, Mappe 1, Ordner 436, Depositorium 
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man die französische Gefahr abwenden: Ein europäischer Sicherheitsrat wäre der Spaltpilz des Bündnisses. 
Es kann nur eine Strategie geben und die Franzosen müssen zu ihr zurück. Wenn wir gestatten, daß 
Frankreich acht Länder zu seiner Position hinzieht, ist dies der Anfang vom Ende der Nato. Das Echo aus 
Amerika auf einen europäischen Sicherheitsrat kann nicht nur verheerend sein, sondern wird Amerika von 
Europa desintegrieren. Es wird in jedem Falle ein Unsicherheitsrat; denn wenn er nichts zu sagen haben 
sollte, wird er verwirren und ein neues Zeichen europäischer Ohnmacht. Warum konzentriert sich Europa 
nicht auf seine Stärke: Wirtschaft und Politik, statt an seiner Schwäche, der Verteidigung 
herumzulaborieren? 
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and it mattered little to him whether that was achieved via diplomatic, military, or 
economic means. 
 
Soviet Hopes for More Transatlantic Dissent  
The Middle East crisis did not simply allow the Soviet Union to count on West European 
countries as neutrals in the Soviet-American proxy war; instead it triggered another round 
of divide and conquer. Bahrs backchannel contact in the Soviet Union, Ledlev, was quite 
excited about West Germanys public stance on the Israeli transport ship.  As Bahr 
explained to Brandt, 
during our meeting on November 7 L. emphasized that we had made a huge mistake not to inform 
his side [Soviets] about our [German] treatment of the Israeli ship at least a couple hours in 
advance. He was really excited: This German government stance vis-à-vis the U.S.A. was not just 
bold but had provided support for General Secretary [Brezhnev] in this difficult situation. We 
could have gotten anything we wanted on Berlin for this.558 
 
Bahr noted that Brezhnev had chimed in on this point, giving an impromptu dictation of 
his thoughts to Brandt as a way to foster the close and trusting contact. According to 
Bahr, Brezhnev said that he blamed the U.S. for the crisis, as they had been driven 
solely by their own selfish interests. In a very frank and provocative manner he 
continued that 
It seems that they [the Americans] only need their partners when they find it necessary for the 
completion of their goals. This was the way it happened in Korea and Vietnam, where they 
dragged their allies into the conflict. In other cases, they not only ignored the interests of others 
but have no problem to gain advantages at the cost of others if their interests dont coincide with 
the American ones. [] Of course everyone in Washington knew that the support for Israel and 
the emerging confrontation with the Arab world would trigger crude oil sanctions. But since, 
                                                
558 Letter, Minister Bahr to Chancellor Brandt, November 9, 1973, Mappe 190, Bundeskanzler, WBA, 1. 
Original: Bei der Zusammenkunft am 7.11. betonte L.: Wir hätten einen riesigen Fehler gemacht, seine 
Seite auf einem indirekten Kanal nicht wenigstens ein paar Stunden vorher über unsere Behandlung des 
israelischen Schiffes unterrichtet zu haben. Er war ganz aufgeregt: Diese Haltung der Bundesregierung 
gegenüber den USA sei nicht nur mutig, sondern in der schwierigen Lage des Generalsekretärs für diesen 
eine Unterstützung gewesen. Wir hätten dafür in Berlin kriegen können, was wir wollten. 
 217
unlike Europe, they are much less dependent on oil, they did not pay any mind to this 
possibility.559  
 
Pouring oil into the fire, Brezhnev belabored the issue of the DEFCON alert.  
Their [American] selfishness became particularly apparent when they decided to raise the 
readiness level of the American forces in Europe. For us it is not understandable that they did this 
in the FRG without informing you. We are sure that you, chancellor, know that this did not happen 
because we had done anything that threatened security. In such a case there would have 
necessarily been consultations by the Americans with their allies, but also with us. We cannot 
fathom the reasons why they orchestrated this production. We could even leave the reasons with 
the conscience of the orchestrator of this game if it were not so provocative. You must realize that 
such a step could force the other side to implement the necessary safety measures.  
 According to reports from your country and also from France and England the actions of 
the U.S. have been criticized. The reactions in these countries demonstrate the kind of 
responsibility that has developed over the last years. But we are still not safe from relapses. 560 
 
Brandt responded to this provocative propaganda piece with an earnestness that it did not 
deserve. After assuring that he understood Brezhnevs fears, he did not try to rectify the 
provocatively one-sided account but only offered a lame reference to internal politics as a 
reason for the hard to explain American reactions. Further expressing his view that the 
                                                
559 Letter, Minister Bahr to Chancellor Brandt, November 5, 1973, Mappe 190, Bundeskanzler, WBA, 1. 
Original: Die Erfahrungen mit den USA in diesen Tagen haben bewiesen, daß sie sich zu ausschließlich 
von ihren egoistischen Interessen leiten ließen. Sie haben es Israel gestattet, den Beschluß des 
Sicherheitsrates zu ignorieren, zusätzliches Territorium zu erobern und zusätzliche Schwierigkeiten zu 
schaffen. Die USA haben auch alles getan, damit möglichst nur sie an der Regelung aller mit dem Konflikt 
zusammenhängenden Fragen aktiv teilnehmen. Es scheint, sie brauchen ihre Partner nur dann, wenn sie es 
zur Erreichung ihrer Ziele für nötig finden. So war es schon in Korea und Vietnam, als sie ihre 
Verbündeten hineingezogen haben. In anderen Fällen ignorieren sie nicht nur die Interessen anderer, wenn 
sie nicht den ihren gleichen, sondern haben auch nichts dagegen, Vorteile auf Kosten anderer zu erzielen. 
Man muß sich nur an das Streben erinnern, an einigen Punkten an die Stelle ihrer Verbündeten zu treten, 
die vorher vertrieben wurden. Natürlich war man sich in Washington darüber klar, daß sie Unterstützung 
Israels und die entstehende Konfrontation zu den Arabern entsprechende Erdöl-Sanktionen hervorrufen 
würde. Weil man aber im Unterschied zu Europa sehr viel weniger abhängig ist, haben sie dieser 
Möglichkeit keine Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Manche der amerikanischen offiziellen Persönlichkeiten 
erklären nach vorliegenden Informationen: Es sei gut, daß Sanktionen der Araber vor allem europäische 
Länder, nicht zuletzt die BRD, treffe, die eine ausgewogene Stellung eingenommen haben. 
560 Ibid, 2-3. Original:  Besonders deutlich wurde der politische Egoismus als sie entschieden, für die 
amerikanischen Streitkräfte auch in Europa erhöhte Bereitschaft zu erklären. Für uns ist nicht verständlich, 
daß sie das auch in der BRD taten, ohne Sie zu informieren. Wir sind sicher, daß Sie, Herr Bundeskanzler, 
wissen, daß dies nicht geschah, weil wir irgend etwas getan hätten, was die Sicherheit bedroht. In einem 
solchen Falle hätte es unbedingt Konsultationen der Amerikaner mit ihren Verbündeten, aber auch mit uns 
gegeben. Uns sind die Gründe schwer verständlich, warum sie so etwas veranstaltet haben. Eigentlich 
könnte man diese Gründe dem Gewissen der Veranstalter dieses Spiels überlassen, wenn es nicht zu 
herausfordernd wäre. Sie müssen sich klar sein, daß ein solcher Schritt die andere Seite zwingen könnte, 
die nötigen Vorsichtsmaßnahmen zu ergreifen. 
 Laut Meldungen aus Ihrem Lande, aber auch aus Frankreich und England, hat man dort mißbilligt, 
wie sich die USA benommen haben. Das zeugt von der Verantwortung, mit der dort auf die Lage reagiert 
wird, wie sie sich in den letzten Jahren entwickelt hat. Aber wir sind eben noch nicht sicher vor 
Rückfällen. 
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people involved (a clear reference to the U.S.) had not always been angels, he drew a 
clear line between the U.S. and West European foreign policy and even cautioned that an 
Arab oil embargo could change the independent stance of Western Europe vis-à-vis the 
United States. Thus selling out alliance cohesion for Arab oil, he even suggested an 
increase of oil shipments from the Soviet Union. 
The position of my government was and is not easy. We are militarily not involved there [the 
Middle East] and will not be. Politically, the West European states try to develop a common 
stance, which, of course, cannot in all points coincide with the American one. The Arab countries, 
to put it mildly, do not act very smart. A policy of blackmail does not create solidarity but could 
even lead to a point where the Arabs trigger a change in the independent stance for which the West 
European countries strive; which would certainly not be in favor of the Arabs. 
 Of course it would all be somewhat easier if we were not as dependent on oil. The 
question would be of interest whether and to what extend the Soviet Union would be willing and 
able to conduct short- or medium-term oil deliveries. In the long term, we will make great efforts 
to become independent from future blackmail. 561 
 
On March 4, following the lines of what Brandt indicated to Brezhnev, the EC members 
decided to pursue negotiations with the Arab countries over the oil crisis independently 
from the U.S. and without consultation, leading to a further separation of policies.562 
 Political issues were not the only means used to undermine the transatlantic 
alliance. During Economics Minister Friederichs visit with Kosygin, the Soviet expert 
on international trade touched on a vulnerable spot in U.S.-German relations. For the new 
                                                
561 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to Prime Minister Brezhnev, November 7, 1973, Mappe 1, Ordner 432, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr. Original: Ich kann Ihre Sorge verstehen, die Sie mir haben übermitteln lassen. 
Manche nach außen dringende Reaktion der USA ist kaum zu erklären, wenn man die innenpolitische 
Situation vergißt. [...] Ich bezweifle, daß die dort beteiligten Mächte immer Engel gewesen sind. Aber jetzt 
muß man zum Frieden kommen, um unkontrollierbare Entwicklungen zu verhindern. [...] 
Die Haltung meiner Regierung war und ist nicht einfach. Wir sind militärisch dort nicht engagiert und 
werden es auch nicht sein. Politisch versuchen die westeuropäischen Staaten, eine gemeinsame Haltung zu 
entwickeln, die natürlich nicht in allen Punkten mit der der USA übereinstimmen kann. Die arabischen 
Länder verhalten sich dabei zum Teilum es milde auszudrückennicht besonders klug. Eine Politik der 
Erpressung ruft nicht nur Solidarität hervor, sondern könnte sogar dazu führen, daß die Araber damit die 
unabhängige Haltung, um die sich westeuropäische Länder bemühen, verändern, sicher nicht zum Gunsten 
der Araber. 
 Natürlich wäre alles etwas leichter, wenn wir nicht so sehr vom Öl abhängen wären. Die Frage 
wäre interessant, ob und inwieweit die Sowjetunion zu kurzfristigen oder mittelfristigen Lieferungen bereit 
oder in der Lage wäre. Langfristig werden wir große Anstrengungen machen, um künftig von Erpressungen 
unabhängig zu werden. 
562 Letter, President Nixon to Chancellor Brandt, March 15, 1974, Mappe 2, Ordner 440, Depositorium 
Egon Bahr, 3. 
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Five-Year Plan the Soviets indicated that they wanted to involve the FRG even more than 
before. However, he noted that as a result of the devaluation of the dollar U.S. products 
had become cheaper, and that therefore there was now a stronger competition between 
the U.S. and Germany with respect to their economic relations with the Soviet Union.563 
Later on he expressed his conviction that combining the possibilities of European 
countries (FRG, France, Italy, and England) provides solid ground for further efforts in 
the economic sector. 564 
 Kosygin played the same card a week later with Bundesbank president Karl 
Klasen. After describing Soviet efforts not to devalue the ruble, he indicated that U.S. 
equipment was much cheaper these days. He also mentioned the large dollar reserves 
that the FRG held, stating and reiterated the financial dependence of the U.S. on West 
German currency holdings.565 
 The week his letter to Klasen, Kosygin pursued this line with German labor Union 
leader Otto A. Friedrich. As Friedrich explained to Economics Minister Friedrichs, 
especially Prime Minister Kosygin pointed out that competition in trade and services would 
become fiercer for the German economy thanks to the American efforts and their advantages 
through the dollar devaluation and lower wage increases. Even so, Kosygin expressed his 
confidence that the trade relations and technological cooperation with the German industry would 
continue to grow. [] Kosygin emphasized that even with a weakening Western economy, the 
Soviet economy would continue to expand as planned.566 
                                                
563 Telegram, German Ambassador in Moscow, Sahm, to German Foreign Office, Gespräch O. A. 
Friderichs mit Kossygin, October 5, 1973, BA 102/135258. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Telegram, German Ambassador in Moscow, Sahm, to German Foreign Office, Besuch 
Bundesbankpräsident Klasen in der SU, October 12, 1973, BA 102/135258, 2. Original: Kossygin fuhr 
fort, daß man sich bemühe, den Rubel nicht abzuwerten. Die preise in Europa stiegen überall. Die SU 
möchte erreichen, daß dem ansteigen des Nominallohns ein entsprechendes Wachstum des Reallohns 
entspreche. [...] 
 Kossygin kam dann auf die großen Dollarreserven der Bundesrepublik zu sprechen. Heute 
kreditiere die BRD die USAes sei wie ein umgekehrter marshallplan. Nach einem Exkurs, ob der Dollar 
sich halten werdewas Klasen glaubtekam Kossygin darauf zu sprechen, daß die amerikanischen 
Ausrüstungen der SU heute sehr viel billiger kämen als früher. 
566 Letter, Otto A. Friedrich to Economics Minister Friderichs, Zusammenfassende Notiz über einen 
Besuch in Moskau vom 1. bis 5. Oktober 1973, October 17, 1973, BA 102/135258, 2-3. Original: Ich 
wurde insbesondere von Ministerpräsident Kossygin darauf hingewiesen, daß sich der Wettbewerb im 
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The Soviet preoccupation with the strength of the German economy, as Friedrich put it, 
clearly indicated that the Soviets were contemplating a shift in its economic strategy. 567 
Their underlying premise is logical: if the U.S. could not deliver the products they 
needed, the question became whether or not the German economy was strong enough to 
take up the slack. Sowing discord among the Western allies certainly was a nice by-
product to reviving trade, especially in previously-protected areas such as nuclear or 
high-tech computers. 
 
Reviving Trade with the East 
For the Soviet leadership domestic in-fighting was nothing new. Ending a political career 
over the breaking of local laws was probably another matter. In this sense, Dobrynins 
claim that neither Watergate nor the impeachment process had an appreciable effect on 
the conduct of Soviet leaders seems reasonable.568 The events surrounding the Yom 
Kippur War, however, brought the confrontation over geopolitical power back to the 
forefront. 
 If we accept Blackers argument that for the Soviet Union détente meant lowering 
the possibility of a military escalation with the United States as American power declined 
                                                                                                                                            
Handel und in den Dienstleistungen durch die offenkundigen Bemühungen der Amerikaner und deren 
Erleichterung durch die Dollar- Abwertung und durch geringere Lohnsteigerungen für die Wirtschaft der 
Bundesrepublik verschärfen werde. Trotzdem bekundete mir Kossygin sein vertrauen, daß sich die 
Handelsbeziehungen und die technologische Zusammenarbeit mit der Wirtschaft der Bundesrepublik stetig 
erweitern würden; denn man habe inzwischen sehr gute Erfahrungen mit deutschen Firmen gemacht. 
Kossygin hob hervor, daß auch bei einer sich abschwächenden Konjunktur in den westlichen Ländern die 
Sowjet-Wirtschaft weiter planmäßig expandieren werde. 
567 Ibid, 4. 
568 Dobrynin, 313. 
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throughout the world, then the Yom Kippur War must be seen as a disappointment.569 
Not only did Israel retain the upper hand militarily, but Kissinger managed to conclude a 
ceasefire agreement, essentially excluding the Soviet Union and leaving the U.S. as the 
central power broker in the region. 
 Potentially more damaging for the Soviets than being shut out of the Middle East 
peace process, however, was the re-shelving of the trade act in Congress that would have 
granted the Soviet Union MFN status. With East-West tensions at a new high, the Nixon 
administration saw no prospect of getting such legislation passed. Senator Jackson had 
won the battle over Soviet MFN status and the Soviets realized that no close economic 
cooperation with the U.S. would be forthcoming. The particularly damaging aspect of 
this situation was that the two proposed liquefied natural gas deals would not come to 
fruition. The process of liquefying the gas before transporting it across the Pacific left 
little financial maneuvering room. Adding a significant tariff surcharge rendered Soviet 
prices way above market level. In essence, the possibility of a close détente on a political 
or economic level would be severely limited. 
 With the U.S. no longer a viable partner for détente, the most likely source for 
future investment and high-tech know-how were the Europeans. In order to reinvigorate 
the stalled negotiations on Kursk, the Soviet Union was now willing to at least partically 
accommodate Western concerns. Until October 1973, Soviet strategy had been to deal 
with Western countries on a bilateral basis, which enabled them to play companies and 
governments from one country against those of another. After October, Kosygin seemed 
willing to entertain the notion of conglomerates of companies from different nations 
                                                
569 Coit D. Blacker, The Kremlin and Détente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations, in 
Alexander L. George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 119-137. 
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(FRG, France, Italy, and GB) in large-scale, investment-heavy projects. These projects, 
of course, should focus on metalworking.570 In an interview in Brussels a month later, it 
became clear that this was just a temporary concession to revitalize trade. Soviet 
ambassador Falin stated that the Soviet Union would remain entrenched in the principle 
of bilateral agreements, even if the EC countries transferred their authority to Brussels in 
1974.571 
 While using multi-national conglomerates overcame the difficulty of the size of 
Soviet projects, financing remained the central problem. In December 1973, after the visit 
of a Soviet trade delegation led by Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, Komarov, the 
entire Kursk project was settledwith the exception of the financing. Economics 
Minister Friederichs reminded Brandt of the great symbolic meaning of the project and 
that they could not overestimate the gravity of this project for the Soviets and asked 
him to let him know if, for political reasons, you do not wish to risk failure of this 
project over the question of the interest rate.572 Brandt agreed with Friederichs 
assessment of the significance of the project also in regards to our overall relations with 
the Soviet Union and asked Friedrich to nail down the Soviet demands during the next 
meeting.573 By the end of the Soviet trade delegations visit on December, 17, 1973, the 
Salzgitter/Krupp/Korf consortium had come closer to finalizing the financing. The 
Soviets insisted on 6.05% while the market rate was much higher.574  
                                                
570 Memo, Sprechzettel für Messen und Ausstellungen 1974, October 19, 1973, BA 102/100002, 1-3. 
571 Letter, Chief Editor, Industriemagazin, Peter K. Pernutz, to Berthold Beitz, November 29, 1973, Mappe 
Ernst Wolf Mommsen, Ordner 108, Depositorium Egon Bahr.  
572 Letter, Economics Minister Friderichs to Chancellor Brandt, December 6, 1973, BA 102/135253, 1-2. 
573 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to Economics Minister Friderichs, [n.d., before December 10, 1973], BA 
102/135253. 
574 Letter, Chairs of Salzgitter, Krupp, Korf Konsortium, Hans Birnbaum, Willy Korf, and Ernst Mommsen 
to Economics Minister Friderichs,  December 17, 1973, BA 102/135253, 3-4. 
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 Implementing a carrot-and-stick approach, in January 1974 a high-ranking Soviet 
trade delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister W. N. Novikov embellished the benefits 
of continued trade with the Soviet Union. Trade Minister Friderichs received note upon 
note that the Soviet Union is willing to devote much effort into utilizing these [plentiful 
Soviet] natural resources but requires help in financing these undertakings from countries 
that want these resources. The Soviet Union needed not only technical but also financial 
assistance in utilizing its resources.575  
If the FRG wants to have electrical power or natural gas from us it must help us construct and 
finance the power plants, pipelines, and equipment. Also, the FRG could become a good partner in 
the area of machine tooling. If would, for example be possible that its companies produce half-
finished goods in our country since production here would be cheaper.576 
 
Brandt was quick to acquiesce to the Soviets demands during his meeting with Novikov. 
He stated that the financing of the Kursk project was somewhat unusual but felt that if 
the Soviet side would be flexible, the German one would not be a problem, either, and 
that one could come up with a positive result in time for the deadline.577 However, 
Brandts willingness to bankroll another Soviet project at discounted interest rates was 
blocked in the cabinet by Finance Minister Schmidt and Economics Minister Friderichs, 
for whom these concessions went too far.578  
 After his unsuccessful negotiations in Germany, Novikov returned home and 
decided to use the stick. In a conversation with German ambassador Balser, he reiterated 
                                                
575 Letter, Minister Heinz-Herbert Karry to Economics Minister Friderichs, Tagung der deutsch-
sowjetischen Kommission für wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit, January 18, 1974, 2. 
576 Memo, Resumé der Ansprache des stellv. Vorsitzenden des Ministerrats der UdSSR Nowikow am 
15.1.1974 anläßlich einer Weinprobe im Kloster Eberbach, January 15, 1974, BA 102/99998, 3. Original: 
Wenn die Bundesrepublik Deutschland z.B. elektrischen Strom oder Erdgas von uns haben will, muß sie 
uns helfen, die Kraftwerke, Pipelines, Ausrüstungen etc. zu errichten und zu finanzieren. Auch auf dem 
Sektor des Maschinenbaus könnte die Bundesrepublik ein guter Partner werden. Es wäre z.B. möglich, daß 
ihre Firmen in unserem Lande halbfertige Produkte fabrizieren, da die Herstellung hier billiger wäre. 
577 MemCon, Chancellor Brandt with Deputy Chair of the Ministerial Council of the Soviet Union, 
Novikov, on January 18, 1974, BA 102/99998, 9. 
578 Rudolph, 318. 
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the Soviets financing demands. Novikov spoke of a frustrated mood and the chairman of 
the Soviet EXIM bank, Ivanov, threatened that the FRG did not realize the implications 
of unfavorable German export credits for German-Soviet economic relations and a 
continuation of Ostpolitik. If the German side will persist in their ideas about credit 
conditions, he fears that the project [Kursk] will fail just as the proposed Daimler-Benz 
involvement in the Kama [River] project had failed.579 
 Despite the Soviets rhetoric, the German consortium remained reserved about the 
prospect of a deal. By the beginning of February 1974, the Kursk project had been 
postponed indefinitely because the German consortium did not see a way to 
accommodate the financing the Soviets demanded. 580 Soviet ambassador Falin 
approached Economics Minister Friderichs to express his dismay about the German 
consortiums rejection of the Soviets offer to continue negotiations. He pushed hard for 
the continuation of talks.581 Yet only the direct intervention by Bahr and a supporting 
letter from Brandt helped save one of the largest projects of the German industry.582 It is 
interesting to note here that the dynamics had changed somewhat. For the first time since 
1969 the Soviets could not get satisfactory financing but still agreed to the deal. After 
Bahr personally intervened with Brezhnev, the Soviet side agreed to pay the first stage of 
the project in cash (2.5 billion marks out of 6 billion for the entire project) and thus 
                                                
579 Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow to German Foreign Office, dritte Tagung 
Wirtschaftskommission, January 21, 1974, BA 102/99998; Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow to 
German Foreign Office, Gespräche von Bundesminister Bahr in Moskau, February 3, 1974, BA 
102/99998. 
580 Letter, Chair, Salzgitter Corp, Hans Birnbaum, to Finance Ministry Undersecretary Hans Hermsdorf, 
Projekt Kursk, February 5, 1974, Mappe 1, Ordner 432, Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
581 Letter, Economics Minister Friderichs to Chancellor Brandt, February 27, 1974, Mappe 1, Ordner 433, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
582 Letter, Chair, Krupp GmbH, Ernst Wolf Mommsen, to Chancellor Brandt, April 2, 1974, BA 
102/135253. 
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brought the process forward again.583 The remaining stages of the project would not go 
smoothly, either. A mixture between COCOM restrictions, Soviet administrative 
difficulties, and the inclusion of East European contractors left the West German 
consortium with a severely truncated role, one that focused mostly on the high-tech 
parts.584 
 The increase in oil prices significantly benefited the Soviet Union in its 
negotiations with the FRG. It stands to reason that the Soviet Union would have been 
hard pressed to finance a huge project like Kursk without the extra hard-currency inflow. 
Even so, the Soviets soon demanded that the second stage of the Kursk project would 
have to be financed with German credits. The reason for this may be the lack of oil the 
Soviet Union was actually able to export to West European countries. Already unable to 
meet the import quota for crude oil to West Germany in 1972, the Soviet Unions export 
capacity was reduced even further because it had to supply its East European allies with 
oil that they could no longer afford on the world market. While Soviet natural resources 
were plentiful, exploiting themgiven the difficult terrain in which they were located
was another matter. 
 Soviet interest in cooperating with the German industry also revolved around 
nuclear issues. Here, Soviet plans were two-fold. They wished the Germans to build a 
sizable nuclear power plant, and also wished to sell their uranium ore to fuel West 
German reactors. As early as the German-Soviet summit of 1973 Brezhnev repeatedly 
                                                
583 Letter, Chancellor Brandt to General Secretary Brezhnev, March 14, 1974, Mappe 1, Ordner, 433, 
Depositorium Egon Bahr. 
584 Memo, Economics Ministry, Gayman, Ausfuhr eines Hüttenwerks in die UdSSR (Kursk), October 25, 
1974, BA 102/135253, 1-2; Telegram, German Ambassador to Moscow, Sahm, to German Foreign Office, 
Hüttenwerk Kursk, December 13, 1974, BA 102/ 135253. 
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and forcefully pushed for both of these projects. 585 Uranium deliveries were a politically 
sensitive issue, as the U.S. had so far been the sole provider of uranium for German 
nuclear power plants. During the Brezhnev visit, however, the Brandt government 
expressed no objection to a one-time delivery of uranium. The Soviet Union, however, 
wished to break into the American monopoly on uranium supplies through low-cost, 
long-term offers. Because the U.S. government would react indignant over close ties of 
the German industry with the Soviet Union in this sensitive area, the German 
negotiation approach was generally open but without any firm commitments.586 It 
would take a few years longer before uranium would become another Soviet fuel 
supplying West German energy needs. 
 The construction of a nuclear power plant was actually an alluring potential 
project to the Germans. In 1972, the Economics Ministry had expressed concern over the 
long-term supply of electricity to West Berlin.587 When Novikow met with Brandt in 
January 1974, he suggested supplying Berlin with electricity as part of the payment for 
the construction costs of the plant.588 The Soviet delegates had very clear ideas about the 
plant.  
The Soviets expect a complete offer by the end of February and have clear intentions to make a 
deal with the KWU [Kraftwerk Union AG, Mühlheim Ruhr] if the simultaneously conducted 
financing negotiations will turn out satisfactorily for the Soviets. Here, the entire deals would be 
conducted on the basis of compensation (electricity). Herr Kuljow frequently mentioned the 
political goodwill of the federal government.589 
                                                
585 MemCon, General Secretary Brezhnev with Representatives of the German industry on May 20, 1973 in 
Bonn, BA 102/100026, 2-5. 
586 Talking Points for the Brezhnev Visit, 413  Bezug von angereichertem Uran aus der Sowjetunion, 
May 2, 1973, BA 102/100026, 1. 
587 Memo, RD Kreuzberg to MinDir Kleindienst, Sprechzettel für den Breschnew-Besuch, May 3, 1973, 
BA 102/100026. 
588 MemCon, Conversation Chancellor Brandt with Deputy Chair of the Ministerial Council of the Soviet 
Union, Novikov, on January 18, 1974, BA 102/99998, 4. 
589 Memo, Ministerialrat Bernhard Kahl, Bericht über die am 16. und 17. Januar 1974 durchgeführten 
Dienstreisen Nr. 131/74 und Nr. 137/74 nach Erlangen und Mülheim/Ruhr, February 5, 1974, BA 
102/99998, 2-3. 
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Even more striking than assuring a stable supply of electricity to West Berlin, the Soviets 
were very outspoken in their desire to have this deal come to fruition. Deputy Chair of 
the State Committee Kuljow used an unusual diplomatic tactic, visiting the German 
embassy in Moscow, to arrange for a meeting with Undersecretary Bahr. He reminded 
Bahr that the German companies should submit their offers for constructing a nuclear 
power plant at the agreed time (February 28) and promised that the Soviet Union would 
respond in a speedy manner. Kuljow did not fail to mention that Finland or Italy operated 
much more speedily than West Germany and that the Soviet Union would have to look 
somewhere else if the Germans would not quickly complete the deal and agree to a loan 
of 6.7% (Bahr had offered 10%).590 
 With all the economic aspects in place, the political implications eventually 
ruined the deal. The Germans felt that it was necessary to gain COCOM approval for the 
exports of nuclear power technology, and the American attitude on this subject proved 
difficult to reconcile with Soviet policy. The U.S. government had indicated that it would 
only agree to the COCOM exception by Soviet acceptance of International Atomic 
Energy Organization visits and safety checks. The U.S. government felt unable to justify 
the proposed COCOM exception to the American public without IAEO safety checks. 591 
The Germans pointed to the fact that the Soviets had continually refused to be bound by 
IAEO safeguards and had already rejected any deal that committed them to such 
                                                
590 Telegram, German Embassy in Moscow to German Foreign Office, Gespräche von Bundesminister 
Bahr in Moskau, March 2, 1974, BA 102/99998 
591 COCOM Record of Discussion, COCOM Doc (74) 2018, October 15, 1974, BA 102/135253, 2; 
Telegram, Dr. Rupprecht to Diplogerma, Dr. Schroembgens, Ausfuhr eines 1300 MW Kernkraftwerks in 
die UdSSR, October 21, 1974,  BA 102/135253. 
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regulations. 592 As a consequence, the deal failed because neither superpower was willing 
to budge. The conflict over the reactor deal is an excellent illustration of the intermediate 
position in which the FRG found itself again after the Yom Kippur War. 
 With U.S. companies unable to finance and implement the pioneering work on the 
new gas fields that were developed, German companies took up the slack. The project of 
foremost interest was the completion of the Iranian Gas deal of October 1974. After 
Brandt decided on a pipeline route through the Soviet Union as opposed to Greece and 
Turkey, negotiations had faltered on the proposed role the Soviets should play in this 
deal. The Germans wished to buy the gas directly from the Iranians, treating the Soviet 
Union as nothing more than a transit country. The Soviets, however, preferred to act as an 
intermediary, thereby assuming a more influential role. In January 1974, however, Brandt 
used the word triangle, implying an equal part for the Soviet Union in front of Soviet 
officials, much to the concern of the German ambassador. So far, the term triangle had 
been strictly avoided, as it seemed counterproductive to the Germans negotiating 
stance.593 Yet, seemingly, the tides had turned in favor of the Soviet Union and the deal 
was concluded in October 1974. The deal never resulted in any transportation of natural 
gas as after the 1979 Iranian Revolution the Iranian government broke the contract.594 
Nevertheless, this illustrates a strengthening of the Soviet position in economic matters. 
Neither the uranium imports, the triangular Iranian gas deal, nor the third gas pipeline 
deal in 1975 (in which the Germans took over the development of the gas fields 
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earmarked for American companies) triggered any warnings about too much Soviet 
influence on West Germany. 595 The Soviet Union had become a normal state with which 
to do business, even if political concessions had not materialized. In this, West Germany 
had assumed its own foreign policy, creating a substantially different international 
position from the that of the United States.  
 
Continued Political Pressure on Berlin  
In early 1974, the Soviet-orchestrated barrage of attacks on the legal bond between Berlin 
and Bonn continued. On January 21 1974, the CSSR protested against the inclusion of 
West Berlin in the Convention on the High Seas (Hohe See und Fakulativprotokoll), 
followed on February 1, 1974 by a protest against the inclusion of Berlin in the Protocol 
to Amend the Convention for the suppression of traffic in women and children (of 1921), 
of the traffic in women of full age (1933), and of the white slave traffic (1904).596 The 
GDR also chimed in with a protest over the inclusion of Berlin in the IAEO in February 
1974 and a protest of the inclusion of Berlin before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on March 27, 1974.597 
 The establishment of the Environmental Protection Office (Bundesumweltamtes) 
in Berlin created another escalation of the Berlin issue in which the Soviets stood 
squarely behind the GDR and would not embrace the fostering of West German-West 
Berlin relations as stipulated by the Four Power Agreement. The unilateral establishment 
of this German federal office had resulted in harsh reactions from the Eastern bloc. In a 
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conversation with Deputy Foreign Secretary Rush Bahr expressed grave concerns about 
the Soviet stance on the issue and the potential crisis that might ensue. In particular, he 
was worried about the GDRs announcement that they would potentially refuse transit to 
Berlin to employees of the Environmental Protection Office and their dependents. 
Furthermore, the GDR threatened potential actions if trading with East German mark was 
not prohibited by the West German government, giving the GDR government a pretext to 
implement controls on transit traffic. Bahr saw all of this as instigated by a Soviet policy 
to counter the creation of the Environmental Protection Office in West Berlin.598 
 Clearly, any independent German foreign policy that the Brandt government had 
hoped might ensue from the signing of the Four Power Agreement had been thoroughly 
undermined by this development. Bahr was ready to throw himself on the mercy of the 
Americans. 
It must be made unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union how gravely the situation was viewed in 
the West, whereby the U.S. opinion would be of special significance. Furthermore the Soviet 
Union must be reminded what impact the concluding of the Four Power Agreement has had on 
President Nixons trip to Moscow in 1972 and for the MBFR and CSCE. [] He [Bahr] therefore 
believes that a binding interpretation of the Four Power Agreements has become necessary. For 
this, consultations in accordance to the mechanisms mentioned in the agreement seem 
unavoidable. The FRG will accept any interpretation that it receives from the three Western 
allies.599  
 
Once again the Americans came through for the Germans. After indicating U.S. support 
for the German interpretation, Rush explained that the true reason for this Soviet 
behavior was not so much Berlin but the intention to exert pressure on the FRG in order 
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to push them to faster and bigger concessions in the area of trade and cooperation.600 
However, he also admonished the FRG for not having sufficiently consulted with the 
U.S. before establishing the Environmental Protection Office and expressed his 
governments interest if with future Berlin initiatives the German government could 
consult the Western powers before it went to the press and thus became part of the public 
discussion.601 In yet another demonstration on how much of an Achilles heel Berlin was 
to the Brandt government, Chancellor Brandt personally wrote to President Nixon to ask 
for his support on the matter. While it almost took a month for Nixon to respond to his 
letter, Nixon nevertheless stood squarely behind Brandt and protested against any Soviet 
obstruction. 602 
 Soon afterwards Brezhnev warned against an interpretation of the Four Power 
Agreement that established close links between the FRG and West Berlin. To avoid 
misunderstandings, he advised that one must view the Four Power Agreement as a 
balancing of interests of all sides und not try to pry more from the agreement than it 
contains.603 For the Soviets the issue would become even more charged. On February 
28, 1974, the Soviet ambassador Falin protested against the Environmental Protection 
Office in Berlin and even demanded the removal of the Federal District Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) from Berlin. Furthermore, he protested against the fact that 
Berlin residents could vote for the German President, even though this had already been 
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the case for several years.604 Clearly, the Soviets were not going to leave West Berlin to 
the FRG without a fight, despite having a Four Power Agreement.  
 In a meeting with Brezhnev Bahr expressed his grave frustrations with the Soviet 
stance. He explained that in Chancellor Brandts opinion: 
nothing had harmed his government as much as the stagnation of Ostpolitik. [] The goal of my visit 
is not only trade but, equally important, to explore if the questions surrounding Berlin can be solved 
between us. For this, I will stay as long as it is sensible. These questions are like small stones in a shoe. 
If you do not get rid of them, they start to hurt and you cannot walk any more, despite still having a 
long ways ahead of us. It is not sensible but a sign of failure if the same topics will be discussed at a 
chancellors visit that have already been discussed last year in Bonn. 605  
 
Yet Soviet attempts to strike the FRG in their Achilles heel would continue throughout 
the 1970s. In April, they exerted pressure on Austria to change its use of Land Berlin in 
its treaties with the FRG. Austrian ambassador Willfried Gredler indicated his 
disappointment about the firm German line in response to Austrian probing on whether 
a change would be feasible. Clearly, the Austrian government wanted to avoid ending up 
in the crossfire in a battle that was not theirs. In response to the German insistence on 
keeping the formulation Land Berlin in the treaties, Gredler suggested a note of support 
from the Western Allies in this regard.606 Upon receiving such a note, the Austrians held 
the German line for a year longer. 
 The Soviets renewed the pressure on Austria in meetings on June 1213, 1975 
with Soviet ambassador Bondarenko, who complained about the inclusion of Berlin in a 
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treaty that had nothing to do with Berlin at all (such as the agreement to use the Salzburg 
airport by both the FRG and Austria). However, much stronger was his criticism of the 
formulation Land Berlin. Despite the assurances that the Western powers condoned this 
formulation, Austrian ambassador Michael Steiner viewed the matter with grave 
concern.607 The matter escalated further when the Soviets accused the Austrians of 
breaking their constitution (Staatsvertrag) in which Austria committed itself to accept any 
agreement by the allied powers that served to reestablish peace for Germany. The Soviets 
felt that Land Berlin violated the Four Power Agreement, as no such term was used in 
the agreement. The German side placed a strong emphasis on the term established 
procedures in the agreement, which guaranteed the continued use of language that had 
previously been established.608 A year later, in December 1976, they finally found a 
semantic compromise that pleased both sides. The Austrian government intended to reuse 
the phrase Land Berlin as the FRG had insisted but wanted to include a, yet 
unspecified, form that would indicate that this refers to the Berlin.609 
 The year of the conclusion of the CSCE, 1975, saw more protests by Eastern 
Europe over the Berlin issue. The Soviet Union (6 June 1975), Hungary (2 July 1975), 
and the CSSR (11 July 1975) protested in Washington and London against the inclusion 
of West Berlin in the Non-Proliferation treaty.610 Rumania chimed in with the other 
Eastern bloc states when it refused to agree to the inclusion of Berlin in a basic treaty 
between the FRG and Rumania on scientific-technological cooperation. From one day to 
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the next, after the details had already been worked out to everyones satisfaction, the 
Rumanian side presented new suggestions that would have eliminated the inclusion of 
Berlin in the agreement. The German ambassadors assessment was 
The same problems that we are experiencing for years in negotiations with other East European 
states and for example prevent the conclusion of a framework agreement for scientific-
technological cooperation with the Soviet Union, have now occurred with Romania for the first 
time. Romania has so far been the only East European country with which we have such a 
framework agreement that contains a satisfactory Berlin clause. The execution of this agreement 
seems to create difficulties here, as well.611 
 
In the CSCE the FRG was also unable to establish a legal bond to Berlin. The FRG 
pushed for an inclusion of Berlin but had to content itself with the general application of 
the conferences results in all of Europe. 
 The signing of the CSCE did not bring closure to the problem of Berlin. In 1976, 
the German government sparred with the Soviets in the international press over the issue 
of Berlin. Op Ed pieces, supporting the Western position, called on the Soviet 
government to no longer hinder East-West cooperation and to abide by the Four Power 
Agreement, especially on the international representation of West Berlin.612 The Foreign 
Office entirely agreed with this article and its interpretation and wanted to gain as much 
exposure of this viewpoint as possible. It thus sought to reprint it in several languages, 
first in the Bulletin der Bundesregierung, and, upon the refusal of the German Press 
Office due to the confrontational tone of the article, in the government-financed German 
Tribune.613 An interesting element of this article is the clashing viewpoints on foreign 
policy towards the Soviet Union between the SPD and FDP.  
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The article reflects a line of argument that has become more and more visible over the last months. 
I recall Foreign Minister Genschers remark that as long as he is Foreign Minister, the Federal 
Republic will not conclude a treaty without a Berlin clause. I further point to the accompanying 
study which the Foreign Ministry has submitted to the Group of Four without involving other parts 
of the government or the Berlin Senate. This study demands a firmer stance vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union from the three powers and, thus, undermines exactly like the article in the magazine 
Europa-Archiv all efforts to deescalate the Berlin controversy with the Soviet Union through 
limited compromise. I would not rule out that the article, the study, and certain public remarks 
were done with regards to the coming coalition negotiations. 614 
 
The Eastern Interpretation of the Berlin issue continued to materialize in 1977, this 
time in German relations with Yugoslavia. In a report by the German embassy in 
Belgrade, Ambassador Jesco von Puttkamer points to a gradual shift away from an 
acceptance of West Berlin as part of the FRG. Apart from smaller issues, such as 
Yugoslav officials avoiding visits to West Berlin or listing of the Berlin Ensemble as 
being from West Berlin rather than the FRG, the contentious area was the Berlin clause in 
official treaties. On October 12, 1968 Yugoslavia had already agreed to a Berlin clause 
(gilt auch für das Land Berlin) in the Agreement on Social Security, just as it did a year 
later in the Agreement on Culture on July 28, 1969. In the negotiations for a fourth two-
year Cultural Program in 1977, however, the Yugoslavs balked at including a reference to 
Berlin and only upon personal initiative by the Yugoslav minister of culture were the 
objections of the Yugoslav foreign ministry overridden. Any supplements to the Cultural 
Agreement itself failed because the Yugoslavs were no longer willing to include the 
Berlin clause in the agreement. 
 The most striking point is the agreement on double-taxation, which had already 
been initialed in 1973. In June 1977, the Yugoslavs presented a list of desired changes, 
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among them the removal of the Berlin clause. These negotiations also failed, as the 
Germans insisted on it while the Yugoslavs categorically refused.615 
 
Legacy of Ambivalence 
In summary, the period between the Soviet-American summits in 1972 and 1973, while a 
period of domestic weakness for President Nixon, became a period of increased U.S. 
influence in inter-allied politics. With the Soviet Union trying to implement a superpower 
détente that its psychological standing as the supreme military power of the Eastern bloc 
called for, West European partners in détente efforts became less important. The Soviet 
Union had used Western European powers to force the hand of the United States while, at 
the same time, binding the economies of the FRG (and other European powers) to the 
success of its own economy. Brandt, however, saw his Ostpolitik reach the limits of its 
success when Brezhnev balked at integrating the German and Soviet economies beyond 
an order-delivery exchange. The inherent conflict of Ostpolitik courting the Soviet Union 
on one hand and ultimately trying to reduce superpower conflict and influence on the 
other caused Ostpolitik to stall. Even worse, by the summer of 1973 it became evident 
that the Soviet Union would not permit an increase in ties between West Berlin and West 
Germany, the Achilles Heel of Ostpolitik, go unchallenged. By portraying West Germany 
as a revanchist power, they brought greater cohesion within the Warsaw Pact. 
 The effects of this period on the German-American relationship were significant, 
if somewhat delayed. Brandt, having compartmentalized different areas of international 
relations, felt confident that the security aspect was guaranteed by the Americans 
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regardless of his actions. In an attempt to further his ultimate plan of pan-European 
integration, he sought to limit American influence within the EC and pursued a largely 
independent policy, always protected by cloaking his policy in Europes name. Support 
for the U.S. on the monetary crisis, Vietnam, and other geopolitical goals was reluctant at 
best and the summit meeting of May 1973 reflected American fears of an ultimate 
separation between Western Europe and the United States. Only with Brezhnevs clear 
rejection of any solution on West Berlin did the Brandt government come around. With 
the Soviet road to German reunification at an apparent dead-end, the FRG had to hope for 
a superpower détente at the side of the U.S. as the road to German reunification. This led 
to more intensive transatlantic consultations and the opportunity for the Nixon 
administration to cement its leadership in détente through trade. With Kissingers refusal 
to acknowledge domestic opposition, however, the Jackson-Vanick amendment was able 
to block Most Favored Nation status for the Soviet Union and with it the opportunity to 
competitively market Soviet natural gas on the American market.  
 Soviet involvement in the Yom Kippur War ended all hope for the ratification of 
MFN and made economic dealings with the Soviet Union difficult at best. The political 
ramification was a Soviet disillusionment with superpower détente and a return to a 
divide-and-conquer game with the West European countries. Trade with Germany had 
stalled during 1973 as the political incentives had not outweighed the significant 
disadvantages that trade with the Soviet Union entailed for West German companies. 
Realizing that they had to offer more incentives to revitalize trade, the Soviets 
temporarily allowed for the creation of multi-national conglomerates to meet large-sized 
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orders, abandoned their unrealistic financing demands, and paid hard currency for the 
first stage of the Kursk steel mill project. 
 With the West Germans frustrated over American use of their harbor to supply 
Israels defense force and the raising of the DEFCON level without prior consultation, 
the Soviets were also able to use political issues to foster a rift in the transatlantic 
alliance. Ultimately, though, it was the different concepts on the nature of the 
transatlantic alliance and divergent foreign policy interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that 
opened a rift in the alliance. While Osthandel revitalized in Germany and stagnated in the 
U.S., neither Nixon nor Brandt managed to implement a concise and clearly delineated 
détente policy. Nixon, battered by the Watergate affair, did not manage to reassert his 
moral leadership over the transatlantic alliance or find a plausible (and politically viable) 
balance between his Cold War ideology and the need for cooperation with the enemy. 
Brandt could not muster domestic enthusiasm or Soviet support to fully implement his 
Ostpolitik, as he was constantly bombarded with new Soviet accusations on West Berlin. 
Just like Nixon, Brandt was not able to find a plausible balance between the portrayal of 
the Soviet Union as the new friend that would help reunite Germany and the central 
power behind oppressive regimes weakening West German ties to Berlin. Secretary 
Balls description of détente as a French word that we employ to conceal the fact that we 
have only the vaguest idea what we are trying to say reflects the fact that neither 
statesmen was able to leave a legacy that would have brought the two pillars of the 
Atlantic alliance back in unison. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
On May 6, 1974, Willy Brandt resigned as German chancellor because of numerous 
adulterous affairs, which the East German spy, Günther Guillaume, had tried to blackmail 
him with. The White Houses relief over his replacement, Helmut Schmidt, was short-
lived. Almost three months to the day, on August 9, 1974, Nixon also resigned over the 
looming impeachment process. Born in the same year, assuming the leadership of their 
respective countries the same year, and now resigning the same year, they left an alliance 
that would never fully recover from the divisions that had emerged during their tenure. 
The starting point for this rift was the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961. Brandt 
underwent a drastic evolution in his ideology throughout the 1960s. While at first he was 
decidedly pro-Western, the more his Ostpolitik took shape, the more he moved away 
from the U.S. and sought a unilateral reconciliation with the East. Brandt and Bahr 
believed that different aspects of international relationspolitical, economic, military, 
currency, etc.had to be separated in order to provide enough maneuvering room within 
the Cold War context. Thus, Brandts assertive and more independent policy is more 
apparent in some areas than in others. 
The United remained the guarantor of military security for the FRG and, indeed, 
was necessary to allow Brandt to negotiate with the Soviet Union without having to give 
in to Soviet threats. However, the willingness of former administrations to accommodate 
American wishes in financial or political respects in exchange for this military protection 
ended with the Brandt administration. American unwillingness to defend West 
Germanys interests in East Germany, and the subsequent disillusionment with the 
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rejection of inter-alliance nuclear sharing programs, made Brandt understand the U.S. 
military presence to be a self-interested projection of military might by a superpower 
over a territory it considered vital to its geopolitical interests. Being convinced that the 
U.S. would not surrender Germany for this reason allowed Brandt to pursue an 
independent policy course without fearing a loss of security. 
 This independence is most prominently reflected in his diplomatic initiatives. 
While in 1959 Brandt was still willing to yield to American diplomatic initiatives when it 
came to defending German interests, he gradually came to believe that Germans should 
develop their own initiatives. Beginning with humanitarian efforts in East Germany, and 
extended to economic and cultural areas a few years later, his efforts eventually reached 
political levels. At first only with consent of the allies, and later alone, Brandt gradually 
moved out from underneath the blanket of American diplomatic tutelage, advocating a 
shift away from a transatlantic to a European framework, all in the interest of German 
unification. 
This breakup of old Cold War structures had to first occur on the ideological 
level. Without the prospect of a German reunification through Western strength, the 
Soviet Union became the gatekeeper to a unified Germany and Europe, a neighbor with 
whom good relationships were essential. By virtue of necessity the Soviet Union changed 
from an aggressive empire with which one should not negotiate to a state with legitimate 
security interests. The East European states also became more significant as these were 
the other states through which the interim goal of a pacification and cooperation in 
Europe would be realized. The strategy for such a European vision also shifted from 
military strength and confrontation to carefully balanced arms reductions through which 
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the risk of nuclear war could be avoided. Close pan-European cultural, economic, and 
political cooperation would make a German unification either on a state level or within a 
European framework a reality.  
Possibly one reason why Kissinger got along so well with Brandt and Bahr was 
that this separation between the different areas of international relations appealed to 
Kissinger. As a practitioner of high diplomacy, he was blind to economic diplomacy and 
insensitive to domestic shifts in public perceptions. Brandts compartmentalization of 
issues allowed Kissinger to operate in a world of high politics until the German-Soviet 
economic ties and the subsequent increasingly positive German public opinion of the 
Soviet Union as well as the breakdown of U.S.-Soviet economic ties and the 
accompanying negative American public opinion of the Soviet Union, brought down his 
intricate web of international relations. 
Like Kissinger, economics did not play a significant role in Brandts thinking 
during the beginning stages of his new Ostpolitik in the early 1960s. The economic 
difficulties over the 1962 pipeline embargo had, if anything, worsened German-Soviet 
relations. It was only after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Brandt wanted to 
reestablish a dialogue with the Soviet leadership, that trade would be come the avenue to 
high-level talks. 
For Nixon, trade with the Soviet Union had ideological undertones. While he 
campaigned for an era of negotiation, he still operated under a Cold War ideology that 
did not allow for intense cooperation with the Soviet Union without concessions on their 
part. Initially, Nixons assurances of a continued commitment to Western Europe, while 
giving them greater political flexibility, led to enthusiasm about the new American 
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leadership. When, first as Germanys foreign minister and later as its chancellor, Brandt 
put theory in practice, and became the leading figure in an economical, social and 
political détente with the Soviet Union, his selective détente generated tremendous 
conflict with the United States. Brandts policy of compartmentalization, which separated 
military, political, and economic matters, was incompatible with Nixons vision in two 
respects. First, separating military from diplomatic matters eliminated the moral and 
diplomatic tutelage within NATO that their military security role had afforded the U.S. in 
the past. Operating very much under the Cold War paradigm (reminiscent of his vice 
presidency under Eisenhower), Nixon expected his allies to fall in line with American 
leadership once their interests had been listened to by the Americans. When Brandt 
pursued détente with the Soviet Union in a much more intensive way than the U.S., 
Nixon became disillusioned with his European allies. Secondly, separating the military 
and political from the economic allowed Brandt to pursue an intensification of Osthandel 
to a degree the Nixon administration felt was harmful to its geopolitical position. 
Providing Western technology to the Soviet Union allowed for the exploitation of energy 
resources and improvements in the Soviet economy. Here, two world views clashed; 
Brandts liberal belief that engaging Communist countries would eventually undermine 
their political system, and Nixons conservative ideology that trading with Communist 
countries would strengthen their power base.  
 While Nixon resented Brandt for his leftist ideology and, therefore, became 
wary of his policies, Kissinger initially appreciated the apparent flexibility that Brandts 
détente policies afforded the United States. Yet, Brandts economic policies vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union actually undermined the negotiation position of the United States. Only 
 243
after a surprising display of popular German nationalism during the inter-German summit 
meeting in Erfurt did Kissinger also recognize the dangers of Brandts policies: Brandts 
honeymoon period was over. 
 By the spring of 1970 Ostpolitik had already been set in motion. The gas pipeline 
deal of 1970 in particular triggered excitement about trade with the Soviet Union. 
German industrialists considered many projects simply for the prestige of trading with the 
Soviet Union. This excitement turned into a real gold rush in 1971 and 1972 as reports of 
the vast economic potential and virtually unlimited natural resources were reported back 
to the FRG. From the first gas pipeline deal to the Kursk steel mill project in 1974, 
Brandt facilitated these deals politically, granting federal loan guarantees, encouraging 
German business leaders, alleviating German security concerns, intervening with Soviet 
officials and negotiating for a German-Soviet trade agreement. Osthandel had become the 
platform on which Ostpolitik could be carried out. More importantly, though, Osthandel 
had become the medium through which the German public slowly altered their threat 
perception of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would quickly turn into a wonderland 
of economic opportunity in which the 1968 threats of a Soviet invasion into West 
Germany were soon forgotten. Of course, this was not the case for all politicians, and the 
CDU/CSU in particular continued to obstruct progress on Ostpolitik. The economic 
dependency of the West German industry on continued cooperation with the Soviet 
Unionboth for payments and for jobscreated an advocate in the German political 
process that fundamentally separated the German from the U.S. position. West German 
political parties of all sides now had an intrinsic motive to retain good relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
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 The American situation was quite different. With the U.S. engaged in a proxy war 
with the Soviet Union in Vietnam, economic cooperation proved to be somewhat more 
challenging. Ford Motor Company, for example, had to retract a bid to participate in the 
truck manufacturing plant at Kama River once concerns were voiced that these trucks 
could be used on the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail. Furthermore, while Brandt was willing to level 
the path for economic cooperation while receiving little in return, the Nixon 
administration demanded quid-pro-quos on Vietnam. Soviet-Chinese rivalries, however, 
made any assertive stance on Vietnam virtually impossible. With Kissinger pushing the 
rope of Soviet support for a negotiated Vietnam ceasefire, only limited economic 
cooperation could take place. While the American public tired of the Vietnam War, the 
image of the Soviet Union had not improved to the same degree as it had in West 
Germany.  
Soviet interest in strengthening relations, an eager German industry, and a 
German public that gradually discarded the enemy paradigm of the Soviet Union meant 
that in 1972 Brandt was experiencing the pinnacle of his Ostpolitik. Despite a razor-thin 
majority in the German parliament, he ultimately gained approval for his leadership and 
Ostpolitik on April 27, 1972, and then assurance for the ratification of the Eastern treaties 
on May 17, 1972. With these political hurdles out of the way, political and economic 
interaction with the Soviet Union could assume an even greater level. With the Soviets, 
the Western allies, and even the majority of the West German public in (sometimes tacit) 
support of Ostpolitik, the recognition of the status quo (as the first step in the plan to 
overcome it) had been achieved.  
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As evidenced by Brandts Nobel Peace Price in 1971, for some these 
accomplishments outweighed the political price he had to pay. For others, the recognition 
of post-war borders, trade deals that heavily favored the Soviet Union, and a threat to 
Western cohesion was too high a price for the normalization of relations with the East. 
However, the underlying conflict lies with the assumption on how to defeat Communism. 
The liberal argument, advocated by the Brandt government, held that technology 
transfers and economic help for an enemy state had a positive outcome as the penetrating 
effects of trade would ultimately undermine the enemy regime and cause a positive 
change. This was certainly Brandts line of reasoning, and Kissinger also seemed to have 
seen some value in it by 1972. Nixon, however, and parts of American society were leery 
of such a liberal approach. Heeding the conservative argument that perceived economic 
interchanges with enemy states as dangerous and only to be pursued with caution, he 
believed that trade deals had to be weighed carefully as to not fundamentally aid the 
enemys economic infrastructure, social stability, or military readiness. Certainly, 
members of the CDU/CSU held similar opinions and voiced them publicly. However, the 
shift in perception of the Soviet Union from an enemy state to a normal one, caused 
mostly through politics and economic diplomacy, rendered the conservative argument 
less and less valid in West Germany. 
The rise of Germanys international standing also reflected on the German-
American relationship. Once the Four Power Agreement on Berlin had been concluded, 
Brandts policies reflected a primacy of European (mainly French) interests over 
American ones. The argument that there was a need to strengthening European 
integration was used to exclude the U.S. from political consultations, information on 
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trade with the Soviet Union, and from an EC preferential tariff zone. The Nixon 
administration was gravely concerned about the situation, claiming that sacrifices to 
obtain European integration would only be sensible if they improved overall transatlantic 
relations.  
It was, however, the Soviets who resolved this conflict. Having clearly recognized 
the long-term implications of Brandts Ostpolitikthe reduction of superpower tensions 
in EuropeBrezhnev was unwilling to extend cooperation beyond a simple order-
delivery trade with the FRG. Fearing that if relations with the FRG became even 
friendlier they would undermine Socialism and lead to the loss of Soviet legitimacy in 
Eastern Europe, Brezhnev ensured that Ostpolitik remained within certain boundaries. 
 In a countercyclical manner, Brandts Ostpolitik and Osthandel succeeded until 
mid-1972 while American détente failed, largely because the Nixon-Kissinger team made 
significant American economic concessions contingent on Soviet support on the issue of 
Vietnam. The Soviet Union was unwilling or unable to provide such support and, thus, it 
had to import Western technology and high-tech industrial goods from West European 
countries instead. After Nixons visit to Moscow in 1972, however, American détente 
succeeded while Ostpolitik stalled, as the Soviet Union had already gotten the most 
significant political and economic concessions West Germany had to offer. The concept 
of superpower détente, with its implicit recognition of Soviet parity with the U.S., 
Western acceptance of the status-quo in Europe, and the possibility of economic 
cooperation with a Western power more capable of meeting the large-scale orders of the 
vast Soviet economy, seemed more in line with Soviet interests than the implicitly 
revanchist goals of Brandts Ostpolitik.  
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 By 1973, the Soviet Union also began to exploit the Achilles Heel of Brandts 
government: the ties between West Berlin and West Germany. Utilizing the vagueness of 
the Four Power Agreement that regulated these ties, the Soviet Union and its East 
European satellite states vilified West Germany as a revanchist power and sought to 
undermine any link with West Berlin. Brandt stood to loose his credibility as his vision of 
a European peace order would remain illusionary if he could not achieve a permanent 
solution to the West Berlin question. 
 After Brezhnev directly rejected any concessions on Berlin at the German-Soviet 
summit in Bonn, Brandt was forced to turn to the U.S. for its leadership in pursuing a 
détente that would ultimate allow for German reunification. By the fall of 1972, Bonn 
had submitted its diplomatic initiatives to the leadership of the U.S. 
 Kissingers inability or unwillingness to recognize the significance of trade for the 
Soviet Union, however, spoiled this opportunity for Nixon to regain said moral leadership 
over détente efforts by the Western Allies. In light of Watergate, the increased 
politicization of the Jackson-Vanick Amendment in an increasingly more assertive 
Congress effectively prevented the Soviet Union from gaining Most-Favored-Nation 
status and, with it, the possibility of exporting its most valuable commodity, natural gas, 
at competitive prices in the U.S. 
 Kissingers failure to cement political opportunity with economic realities to the 
same extent that it had happened in West Germany left the U.S. with few moderating 
voices during the ensuing Yom-Kippur war. The result of these West German ties to the 
Soviet Union and the lack of the same in the U.S. precipitated West Germanys 
normalization of relations with the East which left the U.S. at odds with its ally over the 
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treatment of the Soviet Union long after West German criticism over American 
involvement in the Yom-Kippur war had been forgotten. This West German paradigm 
shift, brought on in large part by Brandts new Osthandel, led to further transatlantic 
differences. 
The most striking illustration of this difference in the new Cold War paradigm 
between the FRG and the US is the 1982 Euro-pipeline debate. Here, ideological 
positions were so contradictory that a compromise, amidst a heated political debate, took 
more than one year to achieve. President Reagan reiterated the conservative view of 
dealing with the Soviet Union, blocking any American cooperation in the construction of 
a new pipeline because this would strengthen the industrial potential of the Soviet Union 
by allowing more inflow of Soviet hard currency. Indeed, the Soviet Union was highly 
dependent on energy exports to earn convertible currency. In 1970, the country earned 
444 million dollars from its energy exports, which represented 18.3% of its hard currency 
revenues. After a decade of détente, in 1980, these revenues amounted to 14.7 billion 
dollars, or 62.3% of hard currency revenues. The Soviet Union had relatively few 
additional products of interest to the world market. Consequently, Soviets gas export 
deals did significantly aid the Soviet economy to utilize its most important natural 
resource.616 The escalated disagreement that ensued over the construction of this pipeline 
demonstrated just how deep the rift between the U.S. and Western Europe had become. 
In a recent Wall Street Journal article the same issue, namely economic ties 
dividing political reactions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, was evident. 
As U.S. and European leaders consider how to handle an increasingly 
authoritarian Russian President Vladimir Putin, energy may be one big reason 
                                                
616 Bruce Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
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they are taking different approaches. A series of actions by Mr. Putinsuch as 
eliminating gubernatorial elections in Russia, endorsing November's Ukrainian 
presidential elections ruled fraudulent by that country's Supreme Court and 
effectively re-nationalizing OAO Yukos, which had been Russia's most 
Westernized oil companyhave led the Bush administration to start rethinking its 
policy toward the Kremlin. U.S. officials have delivered some sharp public 
criticisms, returned in kind by Mr. Putin. 
In Europe, by contrast, there has been no similar shift among larger 
countries such as Germany, Britain, France or Italy. In November, for example, 
after the faulty Ukraine elections, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was 
asked on television whether he thought Mr. Putin was a "crystal-clear democrat." 
He answered, "Yes, I am convinced that he is." 
One underlying reason for this difference in approach, analysts say, is the 
drastically different economic relationships between Russia and the U.S., and 
between Russia and the European Union. That difference also is likely to 
complicate efforts to achieve a unified Western approach to the Kremlin.617 
 
In summary, this analysis has proven the centrality of Osthandel for the success of 
Ostpolitik. Trade was the key that allowed Western leaders to establish a line of 
communication with the Soviet Union. The analysis of economic diplomacy, however, 
has also brought the competitive nature of the transatlantic alliance to the forefront.  
While the historiography holds Ostpolitik and U.S. détente to be similar, 
complementary, or structurally interconnected, this study demonstrates that, if anything, 
Ostpolitik and American détente were countercyclical. To the extent that the Soviet 
leadership received the necessary credits and high-tech equipment from West Germany, it 
had little interest in pursuing détente with the United States. After a superpower détente 
had been established, however, Ostpolitik clearly took the back seat. Apart from this, it is 
evident that U.S. détente and German Ostpolitik were some very distinct policies, both in 
quality and in purpose.  
                                                
617 Marc Champion and Gregory L. White, Europe, U.S. Diverge on Russia Policy: Nature of Energy Ties 
Shapes Responses to Putin's Moves on Yukos, Ukraine Election Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2005, 5. 
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The competitive element between the FRG and the U.S. also leaves little room for 
the kind of silent cooperation between Brandt and Nixon that Jeremi Suri suggests. Even 
thought they were the same age, one almost has to speak of a generational conflict to 
explain their disparate views. While Nixon and certainly Kissinger would have 
entertained the idea of a conservative leadership alliance to suppress domestic unrest 
within the U.S., Brandts sympathies lay with the protesters and one gets the feeling 
reading his personal correspondence that he would have liked to have become as actively 
involved in the Vietnam protests as his son Peter was. 
As to the nature of the transatlantic alliance, the emergence of a European 
Community and the increased assertiveness of its allies attest to the fact that NATO was a 
true alliance of willing members and not a military empire like the Warsaw Pact. As non-
military matters, such as trade and currency policies, became more important, the power 
dynamics within the alliance shifted. The relative easiness with which Brandt was able to 
initiate his Ostpolitik, and the grin-and-bear-it approach the Nixon administration 
employed in response, demonstrate how well the alliance actually functioned. Aside from 
the matter of military strength, which probably suffered from this multitude of opinions 
and approaches, the political transparency and democratic aspects of this alliance is 
clearly evident. The lack of European support for Americas geopolitical role of the 
defender of democracy against Communism is one of the more disappointing element of 
European foreign relations. However, even here this study illustrated that American 
foreign policy during the era of détente did not adequately address the needs of the FRG. 
In this sense, the unilateralism of Ostpolitik was a breakdown on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
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Brandts ascension to the chancellorship resulted in an increased independence 
from the United States. Unwilling to pursue a foreign policy course that was not in 
Germanys interests, he implemented the first truly independent West German foreign 
policy initiative. While its ultimate success is debatable, the rifts within the NATO 
community continue to this day. 
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 APPENDIX A 
TRADE STATISTICS 
 
Figure 1: FRG and U.S. Trade with the Soviet Union in Million US $ 618 
      ($1=3.475DM) 
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618 Warenverkehr USA-UdSSR and Warenverkehr BRD-UdSSR by VC 5, Bonn 13 March 1973, BA 
102/111917- 
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APPENDIX B 
OPINION POLLS 
 
 
Figure 2: Survey of West German population with the question Which country will be  
 more powerful in 50 years? 619 
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Figure 3: Survey of West German population with the question Who has the stronger  
   interest in and benefit from German-American cooperation?620 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Janury-57 May-73 SPD-73 CDU-73 FDP-73
US
FRG
 
 
 
 
                                                
619 Noelle, In fünfzig Jahren, 545. 
620 Noelle, Das Bündnis, 558. 
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Figure 4: Survey of West German population on perceived Russian Threat level.621 
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Figure 5: Survey of West German and British population with the question Will the next  
   year bring an increase or decrease in power for the following countries? 622  
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621 Noelle, Sowjetunion, 575. 
622 S.H. Drescher (ed.), Jahresend-Befragung in 7 Ländern (End of Year Poll 1968) in EMNID-
Informatonen, 21,1 (January 1969), A1-A3; S.H. Drescher (ed.), Jahresend-Dokumentation von Gallup-
International in EMNID-Informatonen, 21,11/12 (November/December 1969), 5-6; S.H. Drescher (ed.), 
Internationale Gallup-Jahresendbefragung 1970 in EMNID-Informatonen, 22,11/12 November/December 
1971), 5-6; S.H. Drescher (ed.), Internationale Gallup-Jahresendbefragung 1971 in EMNID-
Informatonen, 23,11/12 (November/December 1971), 5-6. 
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Figure 6: Survey of West German population with the question With which countries  
   should we work with most closely? 623 
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Figure 7: Survey of U.S. Americans as to the most important Problems facing the US  
today (1969-1975) 624 
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